



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The Times
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR
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VOL. II.

THE CHINESE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR

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DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOLUME II

DIPLOMATIC—PART 2



LONDON
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE
1917

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George G. H. Quincy
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR



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LONDON
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE
1898

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PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE
LONDON

INTRODUCTION

"THE TIMES" DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR is a collection of documents concerning the War in all its aspects, so arranged as to record the events of the great struggle in which the Nations are now involved, and the circumstances which led up to them.

It consists of documents issued officially or recognised by the various belligerents, such as diplomatic correspondence, proclamations, ultimatums, military orders, reports, despatches, messages from monarchs to their peoples, etc., together with public statements by responsible Ministers and Correspondence in the Press of an authoritative character; the whole collated, classified, indexed, and where necessary cross-referenced and annotated.

The documents are left to speak for themselves, except where brief unbiased notes are needed to elucidate them. These are placed within square brackets, to distinguish them from the notes in the originals.

The Times, with its network of Correspondents in all parts of the world, is in a particularly favourable position to obtain information, and, having at its service an experienced staff, is able to reach sources not generally accessible to others.

As the large mass of documents involved in the collection has been systematically classified and arranged from the commencement of the War, it has been found possible to issue to the public simultaneously a representative series of volumes.

INTRODUCTION

A survey of the constantly accumulating material would appear to indicate that *The Times* DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR will be grouped into at least five main divisions :—

I. DIPLOMATIC.

II. NAVAL.

III. MILITARY.

IV. OVERSEAS, comprising documents dealing with events in the Dominions and Possessions Overseas and in enemy territories not included in the first three divisions.


V. INTERNATIONAL LAW, including documents relating to the Laws of War, the Proceedings of Prize Courts, etc.

Each division will appear in its own distinct set of volumes.

PREFATORY NOTE

THIS volume is very closely connected with its predecessor, of which, indeed, it would have formed part had not the mass of material made a division into two more convenient. Both relate to the same period and subject—the Outbreak of the War—and the Preface to the first elucidates the contents of both. In the first volume also will be found an explanatory list of the principal persons mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence; but for the convenience of the reader the list of abbreviations is here reproduced.

The index of the present volume incorporates all the references contained in that of its predecessor and is thus a combined analytical index to both.



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

B = The British Blue-book.
G = The Belgian Grey-book (official translation).
O = The Russian Orange-book (official translation).
R = The Austro-Hungarian Red-book (official translation).
S = The Serbian Blue-book (official translation).
W = The German White-book ("only authorised translation," published by Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin).
Y = The French Yellow-book (official translation).
C.D.D. = "Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War. London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office by Harrison & Sons, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 1915."
D.O.W. = "Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War. Published by the Imperial German Foreign Office." (An English translation of the second German White-book, "Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch. Herausgegeben vom Auswärtigen Amte." Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin.)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

app.	= appendix.
encl.	= enclosure, enclosed.
Eng. tr.	= Official English Translation.
exh.	= exhibit.
F.O.	= British Foreign Office.
intro.	= introduction.

NOTE.—In the marginal cross-references the seven "blue-books" are distinguished by their index letters (*see* list above), and the individual despatches by their numbers. A number standing alone, without an index letter, refers to a despatch in the same book in which the cross-reference itself appears.

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DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE WAR

PUBLISHED BY THE

BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of
His Majesty. October 1914.*

[*Official Translation Published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous
No. 12 (1914). Cd. 7627.]*

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DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
THE WAR.

(JULY 24—AUGUST 29.)

No. 1.

*Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna,
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.*

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 1.

[Text of Austro-Hungarian note, for which see B. 4.]

No. 2.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna,
and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, July 24, 1914.

[See No.
16.]

THE Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 2.

[See Nos. 3 and 17.] THE international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

[See p. 487.] Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839⁽¹⁾; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government.⁽²⁾ The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

[G. 3]

any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

No. 3.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and
Luxemburg.*

Brussels, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of [See No. 17.] which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839. ⁽¹⁾

The communications in question would only be made upon telegraphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me.

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 487.]

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 3.

(See Enclosure in No. 2.)

No. 4.

*Monsieur Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade,
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 4.

[Text of the Serbian reply, for which see B. 39.]

No. 5.

Communication made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MONSIEUR PASHITCH gave the reply of the Serbian Government⁽¹⁾ to the Austro-Hungarian note before six o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade.⁽²⁾ Serbian mobilisation⁽³⁾ had already been ordered [31.] before three o'clock.

⁽¹⁾ [B. 39.]
⁽²⁾ [B. 23.]
⁽³⁾ [cf. B. 32,
Y. 75 (2).]

No. 6.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

ACCORDING to a telegram from the British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, the Serbian Government have given way on all the points of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of international law. The

British Chargé d'Affaires considers that this reply⁽¹⁾ should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Serbia have not begun. The British Government suggest⁽²⁾ mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied.⁽³⁾ The decision rests with the Emperor.

43.]

No. 7.

*Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia. ⁽⁴⁾ [Text B. 50.]

No. 8.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna,
St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

THE Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.⁽⁵⁾

⁽⁵⁾ [cf. Y. 87.]

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

No. 9.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

THE French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said :—⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 15; B. 125; Y. 119.]

"I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities."

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

No. 10.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.

(Telegram.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

THE Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered,⁽²⁾ and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

No. 11.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

THE British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped

for some days to be able to present to me : Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately⁽¹⁾ if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it :—

“ In view of existing treaties I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it.”⁽²⁾

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication,⁽³⁾ which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent re-organisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army.⁽⁴⁾ I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision⁽⁵⁾ before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 115.]
⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 128.]

⁽³⁾ [No. 10.]
⁽⁴⁾ [cf. B. 90.]

NO. 12.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

IN the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken,⁽¹⁾ and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made

reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 12.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, May 2, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the Meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th :—

“A member of the Social Democrat Party said: ‘The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.’

“Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: ‘Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.’⁽¹⁾

“This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

“In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: ‘Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.’

“A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear.”

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 20, 35.]

No. 13.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[*cf. Nos. 14, 38.]* (Telegram.) *London, August 1, 1914.*

[⁽¹⁾ [B. 114.] GREAT BRITAIN has asked France and Germany separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory⁽¹⁾ in the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.⁽²⁾ [B. 125.]

No. 14.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

[⁽³⁾ [B. 114.] THE British Ambassador has been instructed⁽³⁾ to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer

[⁽⁴⁾ [B. 122; the question.⁽⁴⁾]

[*cf. No. 38.]*

No. 15.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

[⁽⁵⁾ [*cf. No. 9 and note.*] I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication⁽⁵⁾ to me:—

“I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.”

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.⁽⁶⁾

[⁽⁶⁾ [*cf. No. 2 and note.*] Y. 87.]

No. 16.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of the 24th July.

(See No. 2.)

No. 17.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

(See No. 3.)

No. 18.

Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with [Duplicate of B. 147 and Y. 131.] the following facts: According to information which has just reached the Grand Ducal Government, early on the morning of Sunday, August 2, German troops entered Luxemburg territory⁽¹⁾ by the Wasserbillig and Remich bridges, proceeding more particularly towards the south and towards the town of Luxemburg, capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have passed along the railway from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where they are expected at any moment. These incidents constitute acts plainly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867.⁽²⁾ The Luxemburg Government have not failed to protest vigorously to the German Representative at Luxemburg against this act of aggression. An identic protest will be telegraphed to the German Secretary of State at Berlin.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 35; also B. 129; Y. 132, 133.]

⁽²⁾ [See p. 489.]

No. 19.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna,
and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through Monsieur de Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August.⁽¹⁾ When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

No. 20.

⁽²⁾ [Presented at 7 p.m. See No. 23.] Note presented⁽²⁾ by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien.—

Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien.—

DER Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlässige Nachrichten vor über den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch französischer Streitkräfte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen Zweifel über die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniß nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, ohne Hülfe einen französischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands

gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung für Deutschland, dem feindlichen Angriff zuvorzukommen. Mit dem grössten Bedauern würde es daher die deutsche Regierung erfüllen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken würde, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten.

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklärt die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende :

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegenüber eine wohlwollende Neutralität einzunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhängigkeit des Königreichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Königreichs wieder zu räumen, sobald der Friede geschlossen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Königlich Belgischen Behörden alle Bedürfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden könnte.

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstörungen von Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunnels oder sonstigen Kunstdichten Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Königreich als Feind zu betrachten. In diesem Falle würde Deutschland dem Königreich gegenüber keine Verpflichtungen übernehmen können, sondern müsste die spätere Regelung des Verhältnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen überlassen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventualität nicht eintreten, und das die Königliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnahmen zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhindern, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwähnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle würden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren.

(TRANSLATION.)

(Très Confidentielle.)

LE Gouvernement allemand a reçu des nouvelles sûres d'après lesquelles les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun doute sur l'intention de la France de marcher sur l'Allemagne par le territoire belge.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ne peut s'empêcher de craindre que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté, ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche française d'un si grand développement. Dans ce fait on trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirigée contre l'Allemagne. C'est un devoir impérieux de conservation pour l'Allemagne de prévenir cette attaque de l'ennemi. Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait très vivement que la Belgique regardât comme un acte d'hostilité contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemis de l'Allemagne l'obligent de violer de son côté le territoire belge.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu le Gouvernement allemand déclare ce qui suit :

1. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilité contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique consent dans la guerre qui va commencer à prendre une attitude de neutralité amicale vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son côté s'engage, au moment de la paix, à garantir le Royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur étendue.

2. L'Allemagne s'engage sous la condition énoncée à évacuer le territoire belge aussitôt la paix conclue.

3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, l'Allemagne est prête, d'accord avec les autorités du Gouvernement belge, à acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est nécessaire à ses troupes et à indemniser pour les dommages causés en Belgique.

4. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une façon hostile contre les troupes allemandes et particulièrement fait des difficultés à leur marche en avant par une opposition des fortifications de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes, chemins de fer,

tunnels ou autres ouvrages d'art, l'Allemagne sera obligée de considérer la Belgique en ennemie.

Dans ce cas l'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-à-vis du Royaume, mais elle laissera le règlement ultérieur des rapports des deux États l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes.

Le Gouvernement allemand a l'espoir justifié que cette éventualité ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement belge saura prendre les mesures appropriées pour l'empêcher de se produire. Dans ce cas les relations d'amitié qui unissent les deux Etats voisins deviendront plus étroites et durables.

(TRANSLATION.)

Imperial German Legation in Belgium,

(Very Confidential.)

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

RELIABLE information has been received by the German [cf. B. 153; Y. 141.] Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France⁽¹⁾ to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility⁽²⁾ against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding the German Government make the following declaration :

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

⁽¹⁾ [Denied, Y. 149; cf. Nos. 15, 22; also No. 21.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. 60, 62 (encl.); B. 129.]

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

[Reply,
No. 22.]

No. 21.

Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 a.m., on August 3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

AT 1.30 a.m. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von

Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 20, 22.]

No. 22.

Note communicated by Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

[Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).]

PAR sa note du 2 août 1914, le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaître que d'après des nouvelles sûres les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté ne serait pas en état de repousser sans secours une marche en avant des troupes françaises.

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans l'obligation de prévenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire belge. Dans ces conditions, l'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement du Roi de prendre vis-à-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix à garantir l'intégrité du Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur étendue. La note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficultés à la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, l'Allemagne sera obligée de la considérer comme ennemie et de laisser le règlement ultérieur des deux États l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes.

Cette note a provoqué chez le Gouvernement du Roi un profond et douloureux étonnement.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue à la France sont en contradiction avec les déclarations formelles qui nous ont été faites le 1^{er} août, au nom du Gouvernement de la République.

D'ailleurs, si contrairement à notre attente une violation de la neutralité belge venait à être commise par la France la Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son armée opposerait à l'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse résistance.

Les traités de 1839 confirmés par les traités de 1870 consacrent l'indépendance et la neutralité de la Belgique sous la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

La Belgique a toujours été fidèle à ses obligations internationales ; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialité ; elle n'a négligé aucun effort pour maintenir ou faire respecter sa neutralité.

L'atteinte à son indépendance dont la menace le Gouvernement allemand constituerait une flagrante violation du droit des gens. Aucun intérêt stratégique ne justifie la violation du droit.

Le Gouvernement belge en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiées sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en même temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-à-vis de l'Europe.

Conscient du rôle que la Belgique joue depuis plus de 80 ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse à croire que l'indépendance de la Belgique ne puisse être conservée qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralité.

Si cet espoir était déçu le Gouvernement belge est fermement décidé à repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte à son droit.

(TRANSLATION.)

[*cf.* Y. 141;
B. 153.]

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.)

⁽¹⁾ [No. 20.] THE German Government stated in their note⁽¹⁾ of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

BELGIAN GREY-BOOK

[G. 23]

The intentions attributed to France by Germany⁽¹⁾ are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.⁽²⁾

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectations, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.⁽³⁾

The treaties of 1839,⁽⁴⁾ confirmed by the treaties of 1870,⁽⁵⁾ vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.⁽⁶⁾

⁽¹⁾ [Nos. 20, 21.]

⁽²⁾ [No. 15. See also p. 349.]

⁽³⁾ [*cf.* Nos. 23, 40.]

⁽⁴⁾ [See p. 487.]

⁽⁵⁾ [See p. 488.]

No. 23.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London,
Paris, Vienna, The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

AT 7 p.m. last night Germany presented a note⁽⁷⁾ proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to

⁽⁷⁾ [No. 20.]

⁽¹⁾ [See No. treat Belgium as an enemy.⁽¹⁾ A time limit of twelve hours⁽²⁾ 26 ; B. was allowed within which to reply.

⁽³⁾ [cf. No. 153, 159.] Our answer⁽³⁾ has been that this infringement of our 24 ; see neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. note on To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the Y. 141.] honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is

⁽⁴⁾ [No. 22.] firmly resolved to repel any attack (*une agression*) by all⁽⁴⁾

⁽⁵⁾ [cf. Nos. means in her power.⁽⁵⁾ 22, 40 ; Y.

152. Also

p. 421.]

No. 24.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

SIR,

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).

AS you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an

⁽⁶⁾ [No. 20.] ultimatum⁽⁶⁾ which expires this morning, 3rd August, at

⁽⁶⁾ [cf. No. 7 a.m.⁽⁶⁾ As no act of war has occurred up to the present 23.] the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no

⁽⁷⁾ [cf. No. need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.⁽⁷⁾ 40.]

The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject :

" Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal ; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guaranteee of

⁽⁸⁾ [cf. No. the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to 40.] be done.⁽⁸⁾

No. 25.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George.

(Télégramme.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

ME souvenant des nombreuses marques d'amitié de votre Majesté et de ses prédécesseurs, de l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870, et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle vient encore de nous donner, je fais un supreme appel à l'intervention diplomatique du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour la sauvegarde de la neutralité de la Belgique.

(Signé) ALBERT.

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegram.)

MINDFUL of the numerous marks of friendship of your [cf. B. 153; Majesty and of your Majesty's predecessors, as well as the *also p. 411.*] friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870 and of the proofs of sympathy which she has once again shown us, I make the supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.

No. 26.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Télégramme.)

London, August 3, 1914.

J'AI montré votre télégramme au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, que l'a communiqué au Conseil des Ministres. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères m'a dit que si notre neutralité était violée, c'était la guerre avec l'Allemagne.

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegram.)

I SHOWED your telegram⁽¹⁾ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany. ^{(1) See No. 23.}

No. 27.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(The original is in French.)

[Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).]

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'AI été chargé et j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que par suite du refus opposé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnées que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement Impérial, celui-ci se verra, à son plus vif regret, forcé d'exécuter—au besoin par la force des armes—les mesures de sécurité exposées comme indispensables vis-à-vis des menaces françaises.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Signé) VON BELOW.

(TRANSLATION.)

[Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).]

[*cf. B. 154; Y. 154.*] IN accordance with my instructions, I have the honour [*No. 20.*] to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal⁽¹⁾ of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.

No. 28.

Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(TRANSLATION.)

[Brussels, August 4, 1914.]

[*B. 155.*] I AM instructed⁽²⁾ to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality,

His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

No. 29.

Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 4, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt.⁽¹⁾

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however, given me this assurance.

⁽¹⁾ [See No. 50.]

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.
I will at once telegraph to you.

NOTE ENCLOSED IN NO. 29.

THE Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp.

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

No. 30.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.
159; Y. THE General Staff announces that Belgian territory has
151.] been violated at Gemmenich.⁽¹⁾

No. 31.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the Staff of the legation.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [Reply,
No. 32.]

No. 32.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 4th August,⁽²⁾ and to inform you⁽²⁾ [No. 31.] that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague.

No. 33.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

PLEASE ask the Spanish Government⁽³⁾ if they will be⁽³⁾ [See Nos. good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, 34, 46; cf. and whether in that event they will issue the necessary Y. 149.] instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

No. 34.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THE German Minister is leaving to-night; you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government⁽⁴⁾ to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be⁽⁴⁾ [No. 33.] good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany.

No. 35.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality :—⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.

160. "We are in a state of legitimate defence and necessity
Full trans- knows no law.

lation of "Our troops have occupied Luxemburg⁽²⁾ and have
speech, perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the
p. 353. dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared
Interview at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of
and com- Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But
ments, p. 382.] we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France
⁽²⁾ [See No. could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our
18.] flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been
fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over
the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and

⁽³⁾ [cf. No. Belgium.⁽³⁾ For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will
12(encl.); make reparation so soon as our military object is attained.

see also "Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is
Y. 2., struggling for his supreme welfare can only be concerned
(encl.)] with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side
with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

No. 36.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement⁽⁴⁾ with regard to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey,⁽¹⁾ the Prime Minister read :—

⁽¹⁾ [See pp.
400 sqq.]

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented to the Belgian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (*see* No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich,⁽²⁾ a copy of which I have given to ⁽²⁾ [No. 30.] Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning⁽³⁾ with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers :—

"Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory."

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality."

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland."

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information."

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated⁽⁴⁾ their proposal of last week,⁽⁵⁾ namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.⁽⁶⁾

⁽⁴⁾ [B. 159.]
⁽⁵⁾ [B. 114.]

⁽⁶⁾ [B. 159.]

No 37.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *London, August 4, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [See

Nos. 39.
43.]

I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.

No. 38.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal communication⁽²⁾ according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power.

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this communication, which was in accordance with our expectation,

⁽²⁾ [See No.
xx.]

and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality ; nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication on August 1st⁽¹⁾ to the effect that he was authorised to [No. 15.] inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence and our frontiers.

On the morning of August 2nd I had a fresh conversation with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st⁽²⁾ to his Government, and that he had been careful [See No. 11.] to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added : " We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin⁽³⁾ on this subject." [cf. Nos. 13, 14.]

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, " that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Germany intends to respect."⁽⁴⁾

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision.⁽⁵⁾

[No. 12, (encl.)]

[See No. 23.]

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to

⁽¹⁾ [cf.] No. appeal to the guaranteeing powers.⁽¹⁾

^{24.} Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon

⁽²⁾ [cf.] No. this point, and said :—⁽²⁾

24.] “Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that—unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.”

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guaranteee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to

⁽³⁾ [See No. be done.⁽³⁾

40.] Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neu-

⁽⁴⁾ [No. 43.] trality.⁽⁴⁾

No. 39.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

London, August 4, 1914.

GREAT BRITAIN this morning called upon Germany

⁽⁵⁾ [B. 159.] to respect Belgian neutrality.⁽⁵⁾ The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens

the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops ; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich ; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France ; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the *See No. 37.* British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

No. 40.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist⁽¹⁾ ^{(1) [cf. No. 22.]} by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals⁽²⁾ to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.⁽³⁾

There should be* concerted and joint action (*Il y aurait une action concertée et commune*) to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

* [In Y. 152, and on p. 421, translated "There would be."]

No. 41.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

London, August 5, 1914.

⁽¹⁾[B. 159.] GERMANY, having rejected the British proposals,⁽¹⁾ Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from eleven o'clock.

No. 42.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

AFTER the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich,
⁽²⁾[No. 40.] Belgium appealed⁽²⁾ to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their representatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

No. 43.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

IN my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing power, was cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain⁽¹⁾ [B. 159.] giving Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

No. 44.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

BY the treaty of April 18th,* 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon

* [The correct date of the treaty is April 19th, 1839. For text see p. 487.]

⁽¹⁾[See p. 509.] their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907⁽¹⁾ respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

No. 45.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *Berlin, August 5, 1914.*

⁽²⁾[*cf.* B. 160 (vol. I., p. 212); *contrast* Y. 155.] I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland⁽²⁾ with the staff of the legation.

No. 46.

Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.*

See No. 33. [Also No. 51.] THE Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian interests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

No. 47.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 5, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day.

Enclosure in No. 47.

[Text of notification, for which see Y. 157.]

No. 48.

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government⁽¹⁾ that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839⁽²⁾.

[See No. 40.]

[See p. 487.]

No. 49.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

London, August 5, 1914.

GREAT BRITAIN agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory.⁽³⁾ The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp.

[See No. 40.]

No. 50.

Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 5, 1914. See No. 29.

THE war buoying is about to be established.

No. 51.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

PLEASE express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government.

No. 52.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to
⁽¹⁾ [No. 40.] respond to our appeal,⁽¹⁾ and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

No. 53.

*Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.*

Brussels, August 6, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the *Staatscourant* containing the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

ENCLOSURE TO NO. 53.

LAWS, DECREES, NOMINATIONS, &c.

*Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and
the Colonies.*

THE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the

Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken :—

ARTICLE 1.

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations.

ARTICLE 2.

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted.

ARTICLE 3.

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes⁽¹⁾ the provisions of articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war.

ARTICLE 4.

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

⁽¹⁾ [Should be "which contravene"—
"navires de guerre . . . qui contreviendront."]

ARTICLE 5.

The provisions of Article 4 do not apply to :—

i. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter the ports or roadsteads of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave

the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian mission.

ARTICLE 6.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities.

ARTICLE 7.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration.

ARTICLE 8.

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in Article 5, in the same part of the world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship. Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which flies the flag of another belligerent.

ARTICLE 9.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent to which Articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned in the territory of the State.

ARTICLE 10.

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or food-stuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it as prize.

ARTICLE 11.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents.

ARTICLE 12.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships or ships assimilated thereto.

ARTICLE 13.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

ARTICLE 14.

It is forbidden in State territory to supply arms or ammunition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their equipment.

ARTICLE 15.

It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorisation by the competent local authorities, to repair warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel.

ARTICLE 16.

It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the dismantling or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary to make them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

ARTICLE 17.

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of three nautical miles, reckoning sixty to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance of three nautical miles is measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than ten nautical miles, reckoning sixty to the degree of latitude.

ARTICLE 18.

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of the Penal Code; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of

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[G. 55]

the Penal Code of Surinam ; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaçoa.)

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal service), or by rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to all the consequences of those acts, and would not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government.

No. 54.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

PLEASE communicate the following note to the Nether- See No. 50.
lands Government :—

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.⁽¹⁾

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar,⁽²⁾ and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel.

No. 55.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) *The Hague, August 6, 1914.*

NAVIGATION on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long as it is light.⁽³⁾ The Wielingen buoys will be ⁽⁸⁾ [cf. No.

replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have Bath?

No. 56.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

PLEASE express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agreement with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 54, 55.]

No. 57.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.

(Replies : Telegram.)

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

BELGIUM trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa.⁽²⁾ The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

No. 58.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.

Brussels, August 7, 1914.

⁽³⁾ [No. 57, and note.] WITH reference to my telegram of this morning,⁽³⁾ I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Government the following information :—

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common

frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisation in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Government share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at London [Paris].⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [Replies,
Nos. 74,
75.]

No. 59.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 8, 1914.

I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday.⁽²⁾ I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering.

⁽²⁾ [No. 57.]

Monsieur Poincaré has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply.⁽³⁾ He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

⁽³⁾ [See Nos.
61, 74, 75.]

No. 60.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 9, 1914.

[See No.

62.] THE Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so :—

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No.

20.] not coming as an enemy⁽¹⁾ into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

No. 61.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Paris, August 9, 1914.

See No. 59.

THE French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain⁽²⁾ to make the suggestion at Berlin.

No. 62.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 10, 1914.

IN response to a call on the telephone yesterday evening, at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

[See No.
63.]

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these matters, Herr von Müller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.⁽¹⁾

You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation.

⁽¹⁾ [No. 60.]

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

DIE Festung Lüttich ist nach tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm genommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu blütigen Zusammenstössen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als

[Reply,
Nos. 71,
73.]

Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang der Verhältnisse hat es angesichts der militärischen Massnahmen Frankreichs den schweren Entschluss fassen müssen, in Belgien einzurücken und Lüttich als Stützpunkt für seine weiteren militärischen Operationen besetzen zu müssen. Nachdem die Belgische Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Überlengenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glänzendste gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestät den König und die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu jedem Abkommen mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Rücksicht auf seine (*voir pièce No. 70*) Auseinandersetzung mit Frankreich vereinigen lässt. Deutschland versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutschland ist noch immer bereit das Belgische Königreich unverzüglich zu räumen, sobald die Kriegslage es ihm gestattet. "Der hiesige Amerikanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsversuch seines Brüsseler Kollegen einverstanden."

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 62.

(TRANSLATION.)

LA forteresse de Liège a été prise d'assaut après une défense courageuse. Le Gouvernement allemand regrette le plus profondément que par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement belge contre l'Allemagne on en soit arrivé à des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique. C'est seulement par la force des événements qu'elle a dû, à cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave détermination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liège comme point d'appui pour ses opérations militaires ultérieures. Après que l'armée belge a, dans une résistance héroïque contre une grande supériorité, maintenu l'honneur de ses armes de la façon la plus brillante, le Gouvernement allemand prie Sa Majesté le Roi et le Gouvernement belge d'éviter à la Belgique les horreurs ultérieures de la guerre. Le Gouvernement allemand est prêt à tout accord avec la Belgique, qui peut se concilier de n'importe quelle manière avec ses arrangements avec la France. L'Allemagne

assure encore une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas été dirigée par l'intention de s'approprier le territoire belge et que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'Allemagne est encore toujours prête à évacuer la Belgique aussitôt que l'état de la guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des États-Unis ici est d'accord avec cette tentative de médiation de son collègue de Bruxelles.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regrets that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Government's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium.⁽¹⁾ It is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 20.]

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

No. 63.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

THE Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly. See No. 62 enclosures.

No. 64.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

DOUBT exists as to the meaning of the word "Auseinandersetzung," which you translate by "arrangement."⁽¹⁾
⁽¹⁾[See No. 70.] Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and Germany.

No. 65.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the British, Russian, and French Ministers at
Brussels.*

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See No. 62, enclosure 2.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following
⁽²⁾[See No. 62.] reply⁽²⁾ to this communication :

71.] "The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of
⁽³⁾[No. 20.] August 2.⁽³⁾ Faithful to her international obligations, Bel-
⁽⁴⁾[No. 22.] gium can only reiterate her reply⁽⁴⁾ to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the
⁽⁵⁾[Nos. 48, 52.] guarantors of her neutrality have responded⁽⁵⁾ loyally and without delay to her appeal."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers
⁽⁶⁾[See Nos. 68, 69, 72.] guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognizance of these documents.⁽⁶⁾

No. 66.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St.
Petersburg.*

Brussels, August 10, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg.⁽¹⁾

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation :

" YOUR EXCELLENCY,

" Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

" In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg.

" His Excellency the German Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Ploetz at Coblenz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via Trèves-Coblenz.

(Signed) " VON BUCH."

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms :

" SIR,

" Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

" I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure.

⁽¹⁾ [c].
French
Minister's
departure,
Y. 156.]

" You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

" Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you.

" The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

" I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions.

(Signed) " EYSCHEN."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intention towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires to leave Belgium.

No. 67.

Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

THE United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Government had, at the request of the German Government, consented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

No. 68.

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German communication⁽¹⁾ See No. 65 and the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by Germany.

⁽¹⁾ [No. 62, (encl.).]

No. 69.

Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 11, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.⁽²⁾

The reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

⁽²⁾ [No. 62, (encl.)]

No. 70.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

The Hague, August 12, 1914.

THE German text contained a mistake: instead of See No. 64. "seine Auseinandersetzung," it should read "ihre," and thus be translated "their conflict with France."

No. 71.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Télégramme.)

[Brussels, August 12, 1914.]

PRIÈRE de remettre le télégramme suivant au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères :

" La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait été formulée dans l'ultimatum du 2 août. Fidèle à ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que réitérer sa réponse à cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 août sa neutralité a été violée, qu'une guerre douloureuse a été portée sur son territoire, et que les garants de sa neutralité ont loyalement et immédiatement répondu à son appel."

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 12, 1914.

PLEASE communicate⁽¹⁾ the following telegram⁽²⁾ to the
⁽¹⁾ [See No. 73.] Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs :

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 65.] " The proposal⁽³⁾ made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum⁽⁴⁾

⁽³⁾ [No. 62, of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations,
^(encl.)] Belgium can only reiterate her reply⁽⁵⁾ to that ultimatum,

⁽⁴⁾ [No. 20.] the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been
⁽⁵⁾ [No. 22.] violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory,

⁽⁶⁾ [Nos. 48, 52.] and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded⁽⁶⁾ loyally and without delay to her appeal."

No. 72.

Monsieur Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914.

See No. 65. PLEASE thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at the firm and dignified attitude upon which they are heartily to be congratulated.

No. 73.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 13, 1914.

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, *See No. 71* and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith.

No. 74.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 16, 1914.

IN the course of a conversation which I had this morning *See Nos. 57* with Monsieur de Margerie,⁽¹⁾ I turned the conversation to ^{and 58.} colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed ⁽¹⁾[Political Director.] me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant.

Monsieur de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain,⁽²⁾ but the latter had not ⁽²⁾[No. 61.] answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer.

Monsieur de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident.

Monsieur de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain.

No. 75.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 17, 1914.

See Nos. 57 and 58. IN reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

No. 76.

Monsieur Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to Monsieur Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies.

(Telegram.)

Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.

THE Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

No. 77.

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Télégramme.)

[*The Hague, August 28, 1914.*]

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de notifier à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

"Vu que la Belgique, après avoir refusé d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l'Allemagne, prête sa coopération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux ont déclaré la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d'être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorités Royales, dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissibles même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un État ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des États-Unis d'Amérique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele."

(TRANSLATION.)

The Hague, August 28, 1914.

(Telegram.)

ON the instructions of my Government,⁽¹⁾ I have the honour [See R.
to inform your Excellency as follows :— 67.]

"Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain,

both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas, as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity⁽¹⁾ and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele.”⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾[See No. 78.]

⁽²⁾[Reply, No. 78.]

No. 78.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague.*

(Télégramme.)

[Antwerp, August 29, 1914.]

PRIÈRE accuser réception à Légation Autriche par intermédiaire Ministre Affaires Étrangères déclaration de guerre Autriche-Hongrie à Belgique et ajouter ce qui suit :

“ La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d’amitié avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les devoirs que la neutralité lui impose. Si elle n’a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de l’Allemagne, c’est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements qu’elle a pris à la face de l’Europe, engagements qui ont été les conditions de la création du Royaume de Belgique. Elle n’a pas cru qu’un peuple, quelque faible qu’il soit, puisse méconnaître ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s’inclinant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement les délais de l’ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel à la France et à l’Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralité au même titre que l’Allemagne et l’Autriche-Hongrie, pour coopérer au nom et en vertu des traités à la défense du territoire belge.

En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n’a même pas accompli un acte d’hostilité aux termes de l’article 10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres.

L'Allemagne a reconnu elle-même que son agression constitue une violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoqué son intérêt stratégique.

La Belgique oppose un démenti formel à l'affirmation que les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité.

Le Gouvernement Royal a donné, dès le début des hostilités, les ordres les plus stricts quant à la sauvegarde des personnes et des propriétés austro-hongroises.

(TRANSLATION.)

(Telegram.)

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

PLEASE inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war⁽¹⁾ against Belgium, and add ⁽¹⁾[No. 77.] the following :—

"Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals,⁽²⁾ it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum⁽³⁾ had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops,⁽⁴⁾ before appealing to France and Great Britain,⁽⁵⁾ guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Convention⁽⁶⁾ respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers. ⁽⁶⁾[See p. 509.]

"Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a violation of international law,⁽⁷⁾ and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests.

"Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity."⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [No. 77.] "The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property."

No. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers abroad.

Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

UNDER date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue-book recently published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 79.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London.

Brussels, August 17, 1914.

THE Blue-book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 65) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs⁽²⁾ :—

^{122.} [See B. 122.] "It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th

July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the *Moniteur Belge* the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transhipped in our port, were in reality only in *transit*. Herr von Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr [von] Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 79.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the *export* of grain, but of grain in *transit*, the goods in question having been merely transhipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the *Moniteur* of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible convenience, I have, &c.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 79.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-named decree might be avoided.

ENCLOSURE 4 IN NO. 79.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when

duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry, which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August.

THE SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK.

(Official Translation from "Collected Diplomatic Documents."

[Cd. 7860].)

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THE SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK.

No. 1.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, June 16/29, 1914.

THE Vienna Press⁽¹⁾ asserts that the magisterial enquiry⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 3.] has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade;⁽²⁾ further, that the whole conspiracy in its⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. 2, 8, 30.] wider issues was organised at Belgrade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

No. 2.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.

THE tendency at Vienna⁽³⁾ to represent, in the eyes of Europe,⁽³⁾ [cf. No. 4.] the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our Press⁽⁴⁾ in its articles on the Serajevo outrage.⁽⁴⁾ [cf. No. 30.]

No. 3.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No.

THE Berlin Press,⁽¹⁾ in publishing articles based on information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion.

No. 4.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.

THE hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming ⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. from Vienna and Budapest.⁽²⁾] Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contradictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies.

No. 5.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.

AS Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our conversation I adopted the following line of argument :—

" The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the

Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia.⁽¹⁾ The Royal Serbian Government notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, &c.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to continue to work for this object,⁽²⁾ convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 30.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. 6. 8. 30.]

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to communicate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him.

On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Ambassadors the substance of this conversation.

No. 6.

*M. M. Georgevitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to
M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs.*

Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914.

I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event—whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles—would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown considerable improvement.⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [cf. Nos. 5. 8. 30.]

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro-Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with Serbia.

No. 7.

*M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.) London, June 18/July 1, 1914.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 1.] BASING their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources,⁽¹⁾ nearly all the English newspapers⁽²⁾ attribute the Serajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries.⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 27.]

No. 8.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.

THE Austrian and Hungarian Press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her

⁽⁸⁾ [cf. Nos. 5, 6, 30.] relations with the neighbouring Monarchy,⁽⁸⁾ it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her.

frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian Press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever.

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European Press.

No. 9.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, June 18/July 1, 1914.

THERE were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been burned, I will lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna Press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade Press to be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral.

No. 10.

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, June 19/July 2, 1914.

THE French Government advise us to maintain an ⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure⁽¹⁾ in 13, 14, official circles as well as in public opinion. 30.]

No. II.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.*

Vienna, June 20/July 3, 1914.

YESTERDAY being the day on which the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning.

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accordingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an insult. At 2 a.m. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the heading "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely described.

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State Council to demand the removal of our flag.

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director-in-chief of the Catholic *Reichspost*, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the Austrian and German Press against Serbia and the Serbians.

No. 12.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 20/July 3, 1914.

IN the course of a conversation which I had with the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade Press and the tone of its articles. He argued that the Belgrade Press was under no control and created *die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie*. I told him that the Press in Serbia was absolutely free,⁽¹⁾ and that as a result private people as well as the Government very often suffered; there were, however, no means of proceeding against the Press except by going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian Press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past two years the Austrian and Hungarian Press had been attacking Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings? The anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with which the Vienna Press had written about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The Press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent? Even if the criminal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner.

Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation of its object."

⁽¹⁾[cf. Nos. 20, 30.]

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as *die Bosniaken, bosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien*, while now it was being said that the assassin was *ein Serbe*, but not that he was a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . .

"I repeat," said Baron Macchio, "that we do not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agitators. . . ."

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna Press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to a severe test.

No. 13.

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, June 21/July 4, 1914.

I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude

⁽¹⁾[cf. Nos. 10, 14, 30.] of calm and dignity⁽¹⁾ in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate.

No. 14.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, June 21/July 4, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages committed upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for public opinion in Serbia to remain calm.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. * Nos.
10, 13,
30.]

No. 15.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 23/July 6, 1914.*

THE excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our Press,⁽²⁾ which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

⁽²⁾ [cf. No.
19.]

No. 16.

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.*

Vienna, June 23/July 6, 1914.

THE principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of the Vienna Press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as follows :—⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [cf. Nos.
20, 21, 22,
30.]

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 15/28 last, when the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the perpetrators were Serbians ; moreover, this was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that

* ["His Majesty the Emperor has, this 18th (31st) of August, been pleased to ordain that the city of St. Petersburg shall henceforth be called the city of Petrograd."—*Journal de Pétrögrad*, Aug. 20 (Sept. 2), 1914.]

they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the place of origin of the outrage, viz.: (1) the visit to Belgrade of both of the perpetrators; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the *Az Eszt* were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show: (1) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the *comitadji* Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch.

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz.: to hold the "Narodna Odbrana" responsible for this

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 30.] outrage.⁽¹⁾ Further, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated:—

"The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers."

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau sent the following request to the newspapers:—

"We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin."

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the following official statement:—

"We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public Press should be accepted with reserve."

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last "report" of the Budapest newspaper *A Nap*, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage.

No. 17.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 24/July 7, 1914.

IN influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively,⁽¹⁾ and to the Minister of Finance, Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the enquiry.

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses:⁽²⁾ either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's co-operation in the work will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are

[See p.
483.]

[*cf.* No.
25.]

many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is therefore advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect.

No. 18.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, June 26/July 9, 1914.

THE Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and journalists.

No. 19.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 1/14, 1914.

THE Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian Press and the attacks made by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a [cf. No. 15.] Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings.⁽¹⁾

No. 20.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.

(1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe.⁽²⁾ Nos. 16, 21, This Bureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the 22, 30, tone adopted by the Belgrade Press. It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public.

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of any party or corporation.

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary prohibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenzbureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the *Odyek*, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was prohibited ; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria-Hungary.

(4) With us the Press is absolutely free.⁽¹⁾ Newspapers can be confiscated only for *lèse-majesté* or for revolutionary propaganda ; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers.

In these circumstances, you should point out for their information, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of our Press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria-Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy,⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 21.] while ours merely reply.

Please also emphasise the fact that public opinion in Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to Serbia.

No. 21.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.

DURING the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers⁽³⁾ have been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demonstrations at Belgrade against the Austro-

⁽³⁾ [cf. Nos. 16, 20, 22, 23.]

Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were killed ; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken ; that at the funeral

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 30; R. 6.] of the late M. Hartwig⁽¹⁾ Serbian students made a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary.⁽²⁾ Complete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind this year, nor has there been any question of disorder.

⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. 4, 30.] Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff walk about the town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia.

The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were present to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig ; there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was maintained ; so much so that foreigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries.

Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited and to the Press.

No. 22.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 1/14, 1914.

⁽³⁾ [cf. Nos. 16, 20, 21.] ONCE more public opinion has been excited against us⁽³⁾ by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the *Zeit* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is.

I am reliably informed that official German circles here are especially ill-disposed towards us.⁽¹⁾ These circles have had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna Press, especially upon those of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

^{(1) [cf. No. 24; B. 95; Y. 18, 20.]}

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian *à l'outrance*. The *Neue Freie Presse*, which is widely read and has many friends in high financial circles, and which—if so desired—writes in accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises the matter as follows: "We have to settle matters with Serbia by war;⁽²⁾ it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now."

^{(2) [cf. No. 52; B. 20; Y. 12.]}

The Bourse⁽³⁾ is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 kronen.

No. 23.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

THE most important question for us is, what, if any, are the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar position. The word has now been passed round here not to tell anybody anything.⁽⁴⁾

^{(4) [cf. Nos. 31, 52.]}

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the object and the result of this meeting. The communiqué issued on the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Emperor,⁽⁵⁾ who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of

the Opposition concerning the Serajevo incident ; you are acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure.⁽¹⁾ Some people

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No.

52.] saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the development of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for (I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some time has now elapsed ; the matter has been spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted ; then came the death

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. of Hartwig⁽²⁾ and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection 30 ; R. 6.] with this again came the interpellations addressed to Count

⁽³⁾ [cf. No. Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament ;⁽³⁾ you have read his 30.] reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. Y. 12.] is much more restrained than the first,⁽⁴⁾ and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Emperor. (The Bourse⁽⁵⁾

⁽⁵⁾ [cf. Nos. 22, 52.] has now recovered ; both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being complied with.

One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the Court.

No. 24.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

IT is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary elements. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the attitude

throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna Press.⁽¹⁾ There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the Vienna Press.

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here⁽²⁾ is at this very moment encouraging such a policy.

^{(1) [cf. Nos. 20, 21, 22.]}

^{(2) [cf. No. 22; B. 95; Y. 18, 20.]}

No. 25.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

WHAT steps will be taken? In what form? What demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia? I do not believe that to-day even the Ballplatz itself could answer these questions clearly and precisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach is the moving spirit.

In an earlier report⁽³⁾ I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to choose between two courses: either to make the Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish the culprits; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials? Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates undertaking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, Austria-Hungary must take some action⁽⁴⁾ in the belief that she will thus raise her prestige internally as well as externally. . . .

^{(3) [cf. Nos. 30, 31; Y. 19.]}

⁽¹⁾[B. 4; R. 8, 19.] Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memorandum an accusation against Serbia.⁽¹⁾ In that accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets of the European Powers with the remark that the facts contained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfil all the obligations of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be requested to accept unconditionally.

No. 26.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 3/16, 1914.

THE Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

No. 27.

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

London, July 4/17, 1914.

THE Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over the English Press⁽²⁾ against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia.⁽³⁾ The Embassy is submitting to the news editors and note.] cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed in our Press. The situation may become more acute during the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It

is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 30; Y. 45 and note.]

No. 28.

M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 4/17, 1914.

I HAVE obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the disapproval of public opinion in Italy,⁽²⁾ and that the Italian Government desire⁽³⁾ [cf. Y. 72.] to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained.

No. 29.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914.

I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna Press.⁽³⁾

⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. 20, 24.]

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile agitation on the part of the Press in Vienna which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself.

No. 30.

M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Serbian Missions abroad.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 6/19, 1914.

IMMEDIATELY after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian Press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the opinion of that Press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian Press further

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 16.] contended that that idea was spread and propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana,"⁽¹⁾ "Kolo Srpskich Sestara," &c., which were tolerated by the Serbian Government.

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence, and at the same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled.

Nevertheless, the Press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 1.] Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian Press began to spread in connection with it various false reports,⁽³⁾ designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade Press

⁽³⁾ [cf. Nos. 4, 21.] to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hostility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian Press was intentionally luring the Belgrade Press into an awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the Press in Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. Nos. 2, 10, 13, 14.] to the suppression of false and misleading reports.⁽⁴⁾ The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread abroad with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Government were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and the Austrian Press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself,

⁽⁵⁾ [cf. Nos. 12, 20.] guarantee the complete independence of the Press and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers.⁽⁵⁾

These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna and Budapest journals selected passages from such of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the foreign Press with the obvious intention of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of representing Serbia as being guilty.⁽⁶⁾

Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Press to excite public opinion in its own country and abroad.

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage.⁽¹⁾ The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skupština, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State.

5.]

During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakrätz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied.

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued in the Austrian Press, and public opinion was excited against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied.⁽²⁾ It is evident from the discussions in this connection that Austria is contemplating some action,⁽³⁾ [No. 23.]
⁽³⁾ [cf. Nos. 25, 52; Y. 19.] but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the measures which are to be taken—more especially military

measures—will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply.

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hart-

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. wig,⁽¹⁾ at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics 23; R. 6.] in the newspapers became still more acute; nevertheless this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. funeral⁽²⁾ of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal themselves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels, and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner,

I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice-Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro-Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any preparations of this kind being made; but that I would in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian Press took advantage of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises.

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evident that the

enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea.

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,⁽¹⁾ which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens.

^{(1) [cf. Nos. 5, 6, 8.]}

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a *démarche* which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a State,⁽²⁾ and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.

^{(2) [cf. No. 27; Y. 19.]}

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbouring Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia —should such, of course, exist.

But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be unacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.⁽³⁾

^{(3) [cf. No. 52 (p. 118).]}

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise.

No. 31.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 7/20, 1914.

IT is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here anything positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about everything that is being done.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 23, 52.]

Judging by the articles in our newspapers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pending with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly probable, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed—the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan war—have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier.

No. 32.

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government.

Handed personally at 6 p.m.

[See B. 4.]

No. 33.

Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 6 p.m. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within two days, *i.e.*, by Saturday, at 6 p.m. He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time.

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [*cf.* No. 35; B. 10; O. 1, 41.]

No. 34.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

I INFORMED the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that I would hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at 6 p.m. I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal to the Governments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [*cf.* O. 9.]

No. 35.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London.

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

I INFORMED the British Chargé d'Affaires to-day that the Austro-Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent country could accept them in their

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. entirely.⁽¹⁾ I expressed the hope that the British Government
33 and might possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian
note.] Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my
anxiety as to future developments.

No. 36.

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, July 24, 1914.

AS I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Ambassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits. During the conversation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* I asked Count Pourtalès to indicate to me some way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Ambassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 9.] question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only,⁽²⁾ and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtalès that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely

⁽³⁾ [cf. O. 10; R. 26; W. intro.] between Serbia and Austria, but a European question.⁽³⁾

No. 37.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

[See O. 6.]

No. 38.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Government was communicated to the representatives of the allied

Governments at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day. They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.

No. 39.

*Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note.—
Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

[See B. 39.]

No. 40.

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

AS the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 p.m., has now expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply,⁽¹⁾ I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 41, 42; R. 24.]

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German Legation.

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a *fait accompli*.

No. 41.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian

⁽¹⁾ [cf. R. 24] Note to-day at 5.45 p.m.⁽¹⁾ You will receive the full text⁽²⁾ — “two minutes gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to six.”]

⁽²⁾ [B. 39.] have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to

⁽³⁾ [No. 40.] the Ministry, I was informed in a note⁽³⁾ from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary must be considered as definitely broken off.

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministers with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued in the name of the King, an order

⁽⁴⁾ [See note, p. 126. cf. G. 5; B. 32; Y. 75] for the mobilisation of the army,⁽⁴⁾ while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked.

No. 42.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna.

Vienna, July 12/25, 1914.

AS no satisfactory reply has been given to the note which the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Pleni-

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potentiaty handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital⁽¹⁾ and to entrust the protection of ⁽¹⁾[See No. the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty 40.] to the German Legation.

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation.

No. 43.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia.

(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914.

[See O. 40.]

No. 44.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 17/30, 1914.

[See O. 56.]

No. 45.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 15/28, 1914.

THE Royal Serbian Government not having answered [Duplicate of R. 37.] in a satisfactory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and,

with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. a state of war with Serbia.]

46 ; B.

50 (note
verbale).]

No. 46.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 15/28, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian

⁽²⁾ [No. 45.] Government.⁽³⁾

No. 47.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from Nish at 2.10 p.m.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian

⁽³⁾ [No. 45.] Government."⁽³⁾

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia,

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. O. 1.] the protector of Serbia.⁽⁴⁾

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His

⁽⁵⁾ [See No. Majesty.⁽⁵⁾

48.] I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty and respect.

No. 48.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd.

Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914.

I HAD the honour to receive your note⁽¹⁾ of July 15/28, ⁽¹⁾[No. 47.] No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of the telegram received by you from His Excellency, M. Paschitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are.

No. 49.

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/August 4, 1914.

PLEASE inform the Imperial Government that you have received instructions to leave Germany, together with the staffs of the Legation and Consulate. You should leave immediately.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 50.]

No. 50.

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Legation at Nish.

Nish, July 21/August 6, 1914.

THE Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Legation.⁽³⁾ The necessary passports are enclosed herewith.

⁽³⁾ [cf. No. 49.]

No. 51.

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24/August 6, 1914.

ON the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political *groupement* our relations had to be broken off. He blames

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 134; Y. 127; O. 78; W. *passim.*] Russia only,⁽¹⁾ as the instigator of Serbia, for the developments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment—just when it appeared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided—had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 121, 138; Y. 109.] forces, there would have been no war,⁽²⁾ for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria-Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of

⁽³⁾ [cf. B. 88, 98; Y. 103; O. 112; 67.] Belgrade,⁽³⁾ when negotiations would have begun with a view to regularising the relations between Serbia and Austria.

No. 52.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nish, August 3/16, 1914.

FROM June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under constant police supervision. Our movements and our communications with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered extremely difficult; the attitude of the population towards the Legation and its staff was inclined to be menacing.

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity that I was unable to report to you some

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of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now.

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed the existence of some hidden intentions.⁽¹⁾ First of all, the Vienna and Budapest Press, in conformity with instructions issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magisterial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The Press began also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone—eventually by war.⁽²⁾

^{(1) [cf. Nos. 23, 30, 31.]}

^{(2) [cf. No. 22; R. 6.]}

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. Exceptions were: the semi-official *Fremdenblatt*, which was, in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles; *Die Zeit*; and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*.

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the Press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse,⁽³⁾ such as it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange took place.

^{(3) [cf. Nos. 22, 23.]}

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly travelled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad.

All the reserves which had been called out for the June

manceuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the stipulated period.

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is usually the case ; at the same time those whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever increasing numbers.

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza,⁽¹⁾ a statesman who is very clear as a rule in his political statements.

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold were held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign coun-

⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos. 23, 31.]
tries ;⁽²⁾ or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject ; that is to say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magisterial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But, at the same time, it was said that this step

⁽³⁾ [cf. Y. 20, 159] Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject
(vol. I., p. 422).
with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold,

was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. Schébéko told me that Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. Schébéko, Count Szápáry had also assured M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise should the

eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary, Baron Macchio,⁽¹⁾ that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the powers of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain *faits accomplis* which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European war.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 20.]

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria-Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke European complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna on long leave of absence⁽²⁾ at various watering places.

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 161, vol. I., (p. 214).]

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in its minutest details,⁽³⁾ while I had reason to believe that he was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be no unacceptable demands. When the contents of the note⁽⁴⁾ were published all of them were surprised, not to say dumbfounded.

⁽³⁾ [cf. B. 95; Y. 15.]

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Belgrade, the French Ambassador had

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 20.] a prolonged conversation⁽¹⁾ with the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl—on the subject of the note. Yet Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in the newspapers on the following day.

On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to the Serbian Government, a feeling of depression came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception of *Die Zeit* and *Arbeiter Zeitung*, and by demonstrations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution⁽²⁾—a war with Serbia, of course.

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 161 (vol. I., p. 215).] On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was inevitable,⁽³⁾ even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal attacks upon the members of the staff.

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hungary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time limit of the note; they also declared it to be unacceptable.

In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Government officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy,"⁽⁴⁾ would be unacceptable as not being compatible with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia.⁽⁵⁾ Only a victorious war, I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were

⁽¹⁾ [B. 4, stipula-
tion No. 5.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 30 (p. 105).]

so humiliating to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schébékó, previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent⁽¹⁾ to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassadors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The day after the note was presented, Prince Kudachef went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter.⁽²⁾ In reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was unacceptable, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step as her very existence was threatened; that she could not withdraw nor alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for interference.

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European concert. From conversations which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente—who, during the whole of that difficult period showed every kindness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation—it seemed quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt

⁽¹⁾ [cf. O.
10.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. R.
18.]

convinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised,⁽¹⁾ as she would otherwise not have decided upon and note.] a note which undoubtedly meant war. It was also clear

that Austria-Hungary was confirmed in this impression especially—and perhaps solely—by Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirschky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 32.] out her punitive expedition against Serbia.⁽²⁾ He declared

that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Panslavists, in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary,

⁽³⁾ [cf. B. 18 and note.] according to Herr von Tschirschky, to give Serbia a lesson.⁽³⁾ Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the matter.

These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganisation, *i.e.*, before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. "The longer the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given to him.

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schébéko, on his return from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of the brief time limit given to the Serbian Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to the whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian

Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia,⁽¹⁾ even if war were to be the price.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y.
18, 20.]

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schébéko told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian Government and Count Szápáry.⁽²⁾ A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and the Dual Monarchy.

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 45
and note.]

THE GERMAN WHITE-BOOK

(Only authorized translation)

How Russia and her Ruler betrayed
Germany's confidence and thereby
caused the European War*

WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES

DRUCK UND VERLAG: LIEBHEIT & THIESEN, BERLIN

[**Price 40 pf.**]

* [This sub-title is not in the original German White-book itself, the title page of which, literally translated, is simply: "The German White-book. Laid before the German Reichstag on August 4th, 1914. Berlin: Published by Carl Heymann. 1914. Price 50 pf."]

Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914.

ON June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Serbian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Archduke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the co-operation of Serbian officials, and executed with arms from the Serbian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of the Serbian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Serbia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the

⁽¹⁾ [cf. R. Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Serbia.]⁽¹⁾
 intro., R. This direction of Serbia's policy has not been altered in the
 6, 8.] least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of
 Serbia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies
 toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good
 (2) [cf. B. 4.] and neighbourly relations.⁽²⁾

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last six years Serbia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan States under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkan, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the

idea that Serbia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Serbia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised (*sic*) [“*benachrichtigte*”] Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally’s estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies.⁽¹⁾ We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia but have not participated in her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Serbian Government a note,⁽²⁾ in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not

⁽¹⁾ [cf. R. 26]
O. 10; S.
36.]

only countenanced but actively supported by the Serbian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Serbian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Serbian Government started the mobilisation of its army one day after* the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.

As after the stipulated date† the Serbian Government

⁽¹⁾ [B. 39.] rendered a reply⁽¹⁾ which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy,

⁽²⁾ [B. 23; O. 21; G. 5.] ; the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Serbia⁽²⁾ without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Serbian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

* [This is inconsistent with statements in the Austro-Hungarian documents. The Austro-Hungarian note was transmitted on July 23. (See B. 4.) An official *communiqué* from the Vienna Press Bureau, on July 28, recorded in the French Yellow-book [Y. 75 (2)] states that orders for mobilisation were given by the Serbian Government "on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted"—i.e., on July 25. Similarly, the communication made on July 26 by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Serbian mobilisation was ordered before 3 o'clock on the afternoon of July 25. (See G. 5; cf. S. 41; R. 23, 29.)]

† [This is inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the diplomatic correspondence. The "stipulated date" for the delivery of the Serbian reply was Saturday, July 25, at 6 P.M. (see par. 10 of the Austro-Hungarian note, B. 4.) A despatch from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade on July 27 states that the Serbian reply was handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade "before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum" (O. 13). The Austro-Hungarian communication at Brussels (G. 5) mentioned in the footnote above records that the reply was given "before 6 o'clock" on the 25th. The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at 6.30 the same evening because the reply was not considered satisfactory. (G. 5, B. 23.)]

GERMAN WHITE-BOOK

[W.]

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [B. 50;
Y. 83.]

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria *alone*,* which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localising of the war, and toward convincing the other Powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions.⁽²⁾ We emphatically took the position that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Serbians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign Powers.⁽³⁾

⁽²⁾ [B. 9.]
⁽³⁾ [cf. O. 28.]
see exhibits 1 & 2.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Serbia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkan.

see exhibit 3.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the French⁽⁴⁾ and the English⁽⁵⁾ Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Serbian disagreement.

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. Y. 28,
36.]
⁽⁵⁾ [cf. B.
11.]

The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent⁽⁶⁾ in the Serbo-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial

⁽⁶⁾ [O. 10.
Its date is
July 25.]
see exhibit 4.

see exhibit 5.

* [In the "authorized translation" published in Berlin this word is emphasised by widely-spaced type.]

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 62.] gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.⁽¹⁾

⁽²⁾ [cf. Y. 50.] The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin in the evening.

see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.
see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government :*

“ Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.

⁽³⁾ [cf. R. intro., p. 180.] “ But mobilisation means war.⁽³⁾

“ As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Serbian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding.”

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchomlinof, gave the German military attaché his word of honour

* NOTE [to British official reprint].—This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follows :—

“ The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtalès. (See exhibit 4.) On the afternoon of July 26 the Imperial and Royal (*that is the Austrian*) Government declared again through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin. (See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed energetically to point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. (See exhibits 10, 10a, and 10b.) After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Serbia the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government.”

that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, *i.e.* Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilised,⁽¹⁾ under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, *i.e.*, St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilisation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the conflict by most emphatic steps [*"durch nachdrücklichste Einwirkung auf die Kabinette."*]

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal⁽²⁾ [B. 36.] to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Serbia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal.⁽³⁾

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it,⁽⁴⁾ as was to be expected.

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two powers.

see exhibit
15.

(¹) [cf. B.
46, 67.]

see exhibit
16.
(²) [cf. B.
75.]

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Serbian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations.⁽¹⁾ The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.⁽²⁾

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.*

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken ["überholt"] by the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised.⁽³⁾ At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

(³) [B. 70
(1); O.
51.]

see exhibit
17.

(⁴) [cf. B. 93
(2).]

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary,⁽⁴⁾ in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows :

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference† to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Serbia, i.e., an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration—a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war—should therefore be

* [This passage printed in italics is, in the Berlin "authorized translation," emphasised by more widely-spaced type.]

† NOTE [to official British reprint].—The German word translated "conference" is *konversation*: the German text also contains the words *auf freundschaftlichem Wege* ("in a friendly manner").

permitted to attend to its affair with Serbia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Serbia.

"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia."

On July 29th, the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army :

"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilisation, viz., calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, *i.e.* 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasise that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation.

"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves."

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with ⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. Sazonof. ⁽¹⁾] Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to 104.]

the Russian minister the note to Serbia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Serbia,
⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 88, i.e., after her march into Serbia.⁽¹⁾] We thought that Russia
 98.] would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st* there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been
⁽²⁾ [Y. 118.] received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation.⁽²⁾

During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser, and Tsar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Tsar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilisation during the continuance of his own mediating activities.

On July 31st, the Tsar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser:⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [See Y. app. v., and addition, Vol. I., pp. 442-3.] "I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation.

* NOTE [to official British reprint].—The following words appear here in the German text: *während diese unsere Bemühungen um Vermittelung, von der englischen Diplomatie unterstützt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fortgeführt wurden* ("whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy").

It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

“Your cordially devoted

“NICOLAS.”

This telegram of the Tsar crossed with the following sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. :—

“Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue these military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.”

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon* of the 31st of

* NOTE [to official British reprint].—The German text says here *Vormittag* (morning).

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 118.] July,⁽¹⁾ was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Tsar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilisation became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilisation if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [Y. 117.] The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilisation, menacing the security of our country,⁽³⁾ the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets.* The Russian mobilisation in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.⁽⁴⁾

The reply of the Russian Government has never† reached us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit† the Tsar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:—

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to

* NOTE [to official British reprint].—The German text adds here *kurz vor dem Erfolge* (" just as it was on the point of succeeding").

† [Emphasised in the Berlin "authorized translation" by widely-spaced type.]

see exhibit
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see exhibit
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prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied :—

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilisation of the entire German Army and Navy⁽¹⁾ on August 1st at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Tsar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ [B. 138;
Y. 130.]

see exhibit
26.

⁽²⁾ [cf. R.
57.]

Thus Russia began the war against us.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [Y. 117.]

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply⁽⁴⁾ on August 1st at 1 p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilisation of the entire French army and navy was ordered.⁽⁵⁾

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. Y.
125.]

see exhibit
27.

⁽⁵⁾ [B. 136;
Y. 127.]

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.

THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.

⁽¹⁾ [*cfr.*
French
text and
trans-
lation.
B. 4.]

THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERBIA,⁽¹⁾

Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.

ON March 31st, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government :

" Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."

The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Serbian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled language of the Press, the glorification of the originators of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues ; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifesta-

tions which would mislead the Serbian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

This sufferance of which the Royal Serbian Government made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance.

It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian frontier officials.*

The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.

In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.

In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration :

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the

* [The paragraph : "It becomes plain . . . Serbian frontier officials" is emphasised in the Berlin "authorized translation" of the German White-book by widely-spaced type.]

Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.

"The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st, 1909.

"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will henceforth proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."

This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the Army.

The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows :

1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity ;

2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form ;

3. Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

4. To remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with

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a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government;

5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. To commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Serbian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the examinations;

7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian State officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation;

8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier;

9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th.

10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8 is enclosed with this note."

ENCLOSURE.

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following results :

1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo

Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Serbian Army in Kragujevac.

4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades, and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider—(outside Belgrade).

5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organised by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popovic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom-house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.

⁽¹⁾ [Cf. the more exact British official translation of this document, R. 34; also B. 39; Y. 75 (2).]
⁽²⁾ [See Italian comment, B. 64.]

THE SERBIAN ANSWER.⁽¹⁾

Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914.

(With Austria's commentaries⁽²⁾ [in italics].)

THE Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia.

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewed protests against the great neighbourly monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in the Skupshtina, as well as in the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that time, and which were terminated by the Serbian declaration of March 31st, 1909; furthermore that since that time neither

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[W.]

the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government has made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has given during the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to Serbia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved.

The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing that since the declaration of March 31st, 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the State. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have arisen between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favour of the progress of both countries.

The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations possess a private character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control

of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian institutions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to

⁽¹⁾ [cf. the more accurate translation in R. 34 (pp. 255-257).]

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions that citizens of Serbia had participated in the preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to co-operate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it would receive information.

This assertion is incorrect. The Serbian Government was accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction.

According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Serbian citizen, for whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish the following enunciation:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propaganda which should be directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of such activities as aim towards the separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations."

The Austrian demand reads:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. . . ." The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us,⁽²⁾ which has been made by the Royal Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Serbian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognised the same as hostile to the monarchy,

⁽²⁾ [Referred to, B. 64.]

whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present one.

The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I. and R. Government certain Serbian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text.

The formula as demanded by Austria reads :

"The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries . . . have participated . . ."

Also with this formula and the further addition "according to the declaration of the I. and R. Government," the Serbian Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.

The Royal Government binds itself further :

1. During the next regular meeting of the Skupshtina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be most severely punished, as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to embody an amendment into Article 22 of the constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible according to the clear definition of Article 22 of the constitution.

Austria had demanded :

1. *"To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."*

We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take care that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.

Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means towards this end, viz. :

(a) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished, a matter, which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as

the individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired success.

(b) *An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation* of the Government to enforce* it and that has not been promised us.*

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive, as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of the Government.

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Serbia; it is therefore an entirely unacceptable reserve if the Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked besides :

"To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in another form."

In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.

* [The words "obligation" and "enforce" are emphasised in the Berlin "authorized translation" by widely-spaced type.]

3. The Royal Serbian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia any thing which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.

Also in this case the Serbian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Serbian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Furthermore, the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition desired by us ; "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction"—a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Serbian schools.

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy ; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged.

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services⁽¹⁾ of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent to those cases in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Serbia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point.

[⁽¹⁾See foot-note to R. 34, pp. 260, 261.]

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Serbian Government to permit the co-operation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Serbian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations.

The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases⁽¹⁾ the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.

The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:

i. *To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage.*

2. *Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire").*

3. ⁽²⁾ *It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation.*

If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislard Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefore a warrant has been issued against him.

⁽¹⁾ [“in einzelnen Fällen,” cf. translation in R. 34, p. 262.]

⁽²⁾ [Referred to, B. 64.]

The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo.

This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade.

8. The Serbian Government will amplify and render more severe the existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.

It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the expressions which its officials in Serbia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were made, and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected therefor.

The Royal Serbian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfil the demand.

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of the measures in question

as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution.

The Royal Serbian Government believes it to be to the common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at The Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 136.]

The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time.*

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 9.]

EXHIBIT I.⁽²⁾

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on July 23rd, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilises for their realisation. Through the published facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the separation of the south Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Serbian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and of the Army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the

* [This sentence is not in the German text of the White-book. In place of it appears, with the heading, "Extract from the Austro-Hungarian Records," a summary, dated "Vienna, July 27," of the "dossier concerning the Serbian conflict" (R. 19), which, it states, "was made public to-day" (July 27).]

Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Serbia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Serbian Government gave at that time,⁽¹⁾ it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Serbia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Serbia does not preclude the fear that the Serbian Government will decline to meet these demands⁽²⁾ and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to press its demands with the Serbian Government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it.

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 136.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. wording in exh. 2.]

I have the honour to request you to express yourself in the sense indicated above to (the present representative⁽³⁾ of M. Viviani), (Sir Edward Grey), (M. Sazonov) and therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences.

⁽³⁾ [M. Bienvenu-Martin.]

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report after the course of your interview.

EXHIBIT 2.

The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany.

Confidential.

Berlin, July 28th, 1914.

You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited :

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note to the Serbian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Serbia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Serbian government and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Serbian government gave at that time,⁽¹⁾ it has not kept. Under the very

⁽¹⁾ [See p.

136.]

eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Serbia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.

The reply of the Serbian government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Serbia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation.⁽²⁾ There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian government than to press its demands,

⁽²⁾ [cf. wording in exh. 1.]

if need be through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great power.

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the *Novoe Vremya* believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.

The Russian Press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Serbia, but it is Serbia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Serbia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility,⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 134; Y. 56 and note; also exhs. 10a, 10b, below.] if out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all other great powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Serbian territory or to touch the existence of the Serbian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Serbian intrigues threatening its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary.⁽²⁾ The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 15, 30; R. 12 and note.]

Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

EXHIBIT 3.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

COUNT BERCHTOLD has asked to-day for the Russian Chargeé d'affaires⁽¹⁾ in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Serbia.

After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasised that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Serbia.⁽²⁾ Austria-Hungary would not claim Serbian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria-

⁽³⁾ [cf. B. 93 (1).] Hungary must have a guaranty⁽³⁾ for continued amicable relations with Serbia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The Chargeé d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary *ad referendum* with the promise to submit it immediately to Sazonof.

EXHIBIT 4.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.

I HAVE just utilised the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview with Sazonof. The Secretary (Sazonof) indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the Serbo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned.⁴

EXHIBIT 5.

*The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor.
Telegram of July 26th, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sazonof this afternoon.⁽¹⁾ Both parties had ^{(1) [cf. O. 25.]} a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.

EXHIBIT 6.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 25th, 1914.

MESSAGE to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp to the Tsar).

The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilisation against Austria are being made.

EXHIBIT 7.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.

THE military attaché requests the following message to be sent to the general staff :—

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.

EXHIBIT 8.

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

KOVNO has been declared to be in a state of war.

EXHIBIT 9.

*Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor
on July 27th, 1914.*

HAVE learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued manœuvres.

EXHIBIT 10.

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
London. Urgent. July 26th, 1914.*

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Serbia;⁽¹⁾ that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions.
⁽¹⁾ [cf. O. 28; B. 90 and note.] According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation.* If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.

EXHIBIT 10A.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. July 26th, 1914.

AFTER officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain⁽²⁾ and to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia⁽³⁾ which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe⁽⁴⁾ that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

57.] * NOTE [to official British reprint].—The German text adds here *auch gegen uns* ("also against us").

EXHIBIT 10B.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.

AFTER Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia.⁽¹⁾ We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.

EXHIBIT II.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

MILITARY Attaché⁽²⁾ reports a conversation with the Secretary of War:⁽³⁾

Sazonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order to mobilise has as yet been issued.⁽⁴⁾ Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, *viz.*, Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised.⁽⁵⁾ Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing.

EXHIBIT 12.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 27th, 1914.

WE know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London.⁽⁶⁾ It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal.⁽⁷⁾ Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. exh. 10a. and note.]

⁽²⁾ [Major von Eggerling.]

⁽³⁾ [cf. R. 28.]

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. R. 33.]

⁽⁵⁾ [See B. 70 (1).]

EXHIBIT 13.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 25th, 1914.

THE distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an

⁽¹⁾ [See B. Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict ⁽¹⁾] is perfectly
25.] correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any

more than England, and as heretofore we take the position
⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 9.] that this question must be localised⁽²⁾ by virtue of all Powers
refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that
Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsi-
bility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared,
in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart
from our known duties as allies [*"vorbehaltlich unserer
bekannten Bündnispflichten"*], to intercede between Russia

⁽³⁾ [cf. B.
18, 84.] and Austria jointly with the other powers.⁽³⁾

EXHIBIT 14.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.

WE continue in our endeavour to induce Vienna to
elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian
action in Serbia⁽⁴⁾ in a manner both convincing and satis-
factory to Russia. The declaration of war which has mean-
while ensued alters nothing in this matter.

EXHIBIT 15.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.

⁽⁵⁾ [cf. B.
71.] WE have at once started the mediation proposal in
Vienna⁽⁵⁾ in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We
⁽⁶⁾ [cf. B.
45.] have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire
of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna.⁽⁶⁾

EXHIBIT 16.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.

COUNT BERCHTOLD requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal.⁽¹⁾ He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ [B. 36.]
⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 61, 62.]

EXHIBIT 17.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914.

NEWS received here regarding French preparations of war⁽³⁾ multiplies from hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*),⁽⁴⁾ and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

⁽³⁾ [cf. R. 45.]

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. exh. 24; also B. 112, Y. 117.]

EXHIBIT 18.

Telegram of the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg to H.M. the Kaiser on July 30th, 1914.

PRINCE TROUBETZKI said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Tsar Nicolas : Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor⁽⁵⁾ has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Tsar but as the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered⁽⁶⁾ and Sazonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a

⁽⁵⁾ [Exh. 20.]

⁽⁶⁾ [B. 70 (1).]

⁽¹⁾ [cf. O. 28; B. 90 and note.] local war with Serbia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia⁽¹⁾ which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Serbia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Serbia⁽²⁾ [cf. O. 51.] and not against Russia⁽²⁾ and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her brethren in Serbia," after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised.

EXHIBIT 19.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July 31st, 1914.

⁽³⁾ [See pp. 132-135 and below.] WE have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Tsar,⁽³⁾ as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia⁽⁴⁾ all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is* taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.

EXHIBIT 20.†

I.—HIS MAJESTY TO THE TSAR.

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You

* NOTE [to official British reprint].—The German text adds here *allen uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge* ("according to all the information that has reached us").

† [See Y. app. V. and note (vol. I., p. 442), for an omitted letter from the Tsar to the Emperor William.]

will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Signed) WILHELM.

EXHIBIT 21.

II.—THE TSAR TO HIS MAJESTY.

Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.

I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

EXHIBIT 22.

III.—HIS MAJESTY TO THE TSAR.

July 29th, 6.30 p.m.

I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot—as I told You in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows

from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

(Signed) WILHELM.

EXHIBIT 23.

IV.—HIS MAJESTY TO THE TSAR.

July 30th, 1 a.m.

MY Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation; I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

EXHIBIT 23a.

V.—THE TSAR TO HIS MAJESTY.

Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

NICOLAS.

EXHIBIT 24.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.

IN spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her *entire** army and navy,⁽¹⁾ hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war,⁽²⁾ which does not yet imply mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies us definitely to this effect.⁽³⁾ Please to communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication.

⁽¹⁾[B. 113;
Y. 118;
R. 52.]
⁽²⁾[cf. exhs.
17, 25;
also Y.
117.]
⁽³⁾[cf. O.
70; R. 54.]

EXHIBIT 25.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.

RUSSIA has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet,⁽⁴⁾ therefore also against us in spite of our still pending

⁽⁴⁾[B. 113;
Y. 118;
R. 52.]

* [Emphasised in Berlin "authorized translation" by widely-spaced type.]

⁽¹⁾ [cf. exh. of war⁽¹⁾ which is bound to be followed by mobilisation
24 and unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war
note.] against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war.
Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain
⁽²⁾ [See Y. neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in
117.] 18 hours.⁽²⁾ Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed
necessary.

EXHIBIT 26.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.

IF the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement :⁽³⁾

76.] "Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

"A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant⁽⁴⁾ sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

"Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom

* NOTE [to official British reprint].—The German text adds here *und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmachungsmassnahmen getroffen haben* ("and although we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation").

⁽¹⁾ [Correc-
ted into
"insistant"
in a later
issue of the
document.]

de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

EXHIBIT 27.

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor
on August 1st, 1.05 p.m.*

UPON my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y.
117, 125.]

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK.

(Official Translation from "Collected Diplomatic Documents."
Cd. 7860.)

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Serbian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian system. The following is the signification of the sounds :

š = sh in the English "ship."

č ch „ „ "church."

ć (the same, softer).

c ts in the English "mats."

j y „ „ "yell."

gj dj „ „ "adjourn."

ž j in the French "jour."

INTRODUCTION.

SINCE the dynasty of the Karađorđević ascended the blood-stained throne of Serbia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy,⁽¹⁾ whenever the general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of the Great-Serbian claims.⁽²⁾

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep disappointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge of war.

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of 1909 the Serbian Government found themselves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe,⁽³⁾ that they recognised the new political and international conditions which had been created by the annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Serbia had not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary.

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Serbia,⁽⁴⁾ as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenović, and, as was then the case, to show goodwill to, and further the interests of this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence at the Berlin Congress. The Serbian Government who, by

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 4 (vol. I., p. 81); B. 9.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 6; B. 9.]

⁽³⁾ [B. 4 (vol. I., p. 81).]

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. No. 8; B. 4 (vol. I., p. 81).]

their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way ; they permitted associations formed on Serbian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary ; they did not prevent prominent members of their military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in Serbia. However, the sacrifice of his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanimity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Serbia and obtain guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary.

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Government had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way by which our interests could be secured.

It was necessary to present to Serbia all such demands and to require from her such guarantees⁽¹⁾ as would ensure the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the Great-Serbian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria-Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Serbia, the Belgrade Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories ; and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 93
(r) and
note.]

the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers,⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 39; B. 32, 93 (1).] by an apparent agreement to the demands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual Serbian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by Serbian aspirations, if they were to avoid endangering the peace of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory.⁽²⁾ Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Serbia should be carried through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this State. The request made by Russia⁽³⁾ for an extension of the time given to Serbia for answering our demands would have given the Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the interference of single Powers in the interests of Serbia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit.⁽⁴⁾ [No. 20.] Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Serbia had ordered general mobilisation,⁽⁵⁾ [B. 39.] and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war.⁽⁶⁾ [No. 23. See note, p. 126.] The suggestion of the British Government⁽⁷⁾ that the settlement of the Serbian controversy should be entrusted to a conference of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostilities, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee

for a tolerable relationship with Serbia. The Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to Serbia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been lost, and Serbia would have been encouraged to continue her endeavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary.

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Serbia⁽¹⁾ that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who were in Serbian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States, their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were representing the common interest of the civilised world that murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political controversy, and that Serbia should not continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations.

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Serbian conflict, the world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made answerable before history for the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race.

There can be no doubt that the small Serbian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Tsar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to

come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisation of the Great-Serbian projects.

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would secure to the Russian Empire predominance in the Near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening independent of the will of other countries.

As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the endeavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union which barred the way to the universal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, and to undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Serbian intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central Powers.

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh territories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy, through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of

the world, Serbia was a catspaw which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war.

The Imperial and Royal Government—and the documents provided in this collection give ample evidence of this—again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Serbian territory,⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 90 and note.] and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government; as early as the 24th July, in the communiqué of that date,⁽²⁾ she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military

⁽²⁾ [B. 13.]

⁽³⁾ [B. 70] districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan;⁽³⁾ this was

⁽¹⁾ [.] a threat to the Monarchy; on the 31st July she ordered general

⁽⁴⁾ [No. 52.] mobilisation,⁽⁴⁾ disregarding the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Government, which had been made on the 26th, that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures which must consist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation meant war.⁽⁵⁾

⁽⁵⁾ [W., p. 128.] On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁽⁶⁾ laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty from Serbian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Serbia.

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Serbia under her protection; she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Serbian Kingdom continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary.

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Serbia, should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers.⁽⁷⁾ Guided

by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this mediation.⁽¹⁾ The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation in the Empire of the Tsar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the St. Petersburg Cabinet answered by mobilising the whole of the Russian forces.

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the desire for *revanche* of the French Republic, the St. Petersburg Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes.

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, determined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy.

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia.

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty.

No. I.

Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, June 29, 1914.

UNDER the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it is difficult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain facts.

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsfeld,⁽¹⁾ was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Serbian patriot, Miloš Obilić, who in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad.

Among all Serbians, Obilić is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the ægis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for many years been carried on in the press.

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Serajevo, Princip, Čabrinović and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think that they have surpassed their model.

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock ; the Serbian Government at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilić festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight,⁽²⁾ and remarks were heard, such as : "It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or "This is revenge for the annexation."

⁽¹⁾[A.D.
1389.]

⁽²⁾[cf. Nos.
3, 5.]

No. 2.

Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, June 30, 1914.

TO-DAY I sent an inquiry to Herr Gruić, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Serbia.

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian police.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 9.]

No. 3.

M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold.

Uskub, July 1, 1914.

ON the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of the Liberation" of the Serbian nation.

For four months a special committee had worked at making this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Serbian nationality.

The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those who took part in it received free passes on the Serbian State railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, &c., were promised.

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite end in view.

The visitors to the celebration at Pristina were brought in special trains.

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Serbia and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia.

When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence,⁽¹⁾

^{(1) [cf.} Nos. one that I can only characterise as inhuman.⁽¹⁾

I, 5.] In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to divest Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably.

No. 4.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 4, 1914.

TO-DAY I communicated to M. Poincaré the thanks of the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy.

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Serbia among us, he mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Italians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the part of the people.

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Serbia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No State could divest itself of this duty.

No. 5.

Herr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold.

Nish, July 6, 1914.

THE news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word. There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the predominant mood was one of

satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way.⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 1, 3.] This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles—the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occupied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude.

All explanations made by official Serbian circles or individual higher personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated Serbian people.

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his first information as to the very definite rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real delight seized the numerous visitors who were present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out—even one who has long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he observed.

No. 6.

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

AFTER the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now been back at my post for some time, and I am able to give some judgment as to the tone which prevails here.

After the annexation crisis the relations between the Monarchy and Serbia were poisoned on the Serbian side by national chauvinism, animosity and an effective propaganda of Great-Serbian aspirations⁽²⁾ carried on in that part of our territory where there is a Serbian population; since the last two Balkan Wars, the success of Serbia has increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in some cases bears the mark of insanity.

I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of this ; they can be had easily everywhere among all parties, in political circles as well as among the lower classes. I put it forward as a well-known axiom that the policy of Serbia is built up on the separation of the territories inhabited by Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on the abolition of the Monarchy as a Great Power ; this is its only object.

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part in political circles here for a week can be blind to this truth.

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further intensified as a result of the latest events which influence political opinion here ; among them I count the crime of Serajevo,
⁽¹⁾ [cf. S. 21, 23, 30.] the death of Hartwig⁽¹⁾ and the electoral campaign.

The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Serbians an expectation that in the immediate future the Hapsburg States will fall to pieces ; it was this on which they had set their hopes even before ; there has been dangled before their eyes the cession of those territories in the Monarchy which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a revolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the Slav regiments —this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought system and apparent justification into their nationalist madness.

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the Serbians as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with ; contempt is mingled with hatred ; she is ripe for destruction, and she is to fall without trouble into the lap of the Great-Serbian Empire, which is to be realised in the immediate future.

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerlessness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand. They do not even stop short of the exalted person of our ruler. Even the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of being called to account. For decades the people of Serbia has been educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent on the party press ; the Great-Serbian propaganda and its monstrous offspring the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education.

I pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to

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the death of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and were characterised by *The Times* as "ravings" *; I do not mention the lying campaign in the press which, however, might strengthen Serbians in the conviction that the Government and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are outlaws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, cursed Austrian, &c., are suitable stock epithets for us.

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity of this loss to the Serbian political world, have let loose a fanatical cult of the deceased; in this people were influenced not only by gratitude for the past, but also by anxiety for the future, and outbid one another in servile submissiveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill in time to come.

As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all parties on a platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. None of the parties which aspire to office will incur the suspicion of being held capable of weak compliance towards the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is conducted under the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary.

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy is held to be powerless and incapable of any energetic action, and it is believed that the serious words which were spoken by leading men among us are only "bluff."

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister of War and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious.

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience of Your Excellency, not because I thought that in what I have said I could tell you anything new, but because I considered this picture led up to the conclusion which forces itself upon me that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.⁽¹⁾

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia, we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the

⁽¹⁾ [cf. S. 52
(p. 115).]

* "The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Serbian newspapers) is that M. de Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the disgust of cultivated people[s], whatever their political sympathies may be."—*The Times*, July 16, [1914].

unfavourable situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried through.

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative of Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia, the question takes the form that we cannot any longer put up with any further injury to our prestige.

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-reaching requirements joined to effective control—for this alone could clear the Augean stable of Great-Serbian intrigues—then all possible consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 45
and note.]

Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in Europe.

No. 7.

Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Austrian Note to Serbia.

[See B. 4.]

No. 8.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.⁽²⁾

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 9.]

⁽³⁾ [B. 4.
From this point
this despatch
is a duplicate
“obser-
vations” 1914].

(Translated from the French.)
THE Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Royal Serbian Government on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade (see instructions of the to the Imperial and Royal Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd,

in B. 4 (vol. I., p. 85.) On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

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[R. 8]

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Serbian frontier.

Serbia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomats, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Serbian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Serbian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Serbian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Serbian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Serbian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909,⁽¹⁾ and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the ⁽¹⁾[See B. 4, vol. I., p. 81.]

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent

attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the . . .^{*} Government a ⁽¹⁾[No. 19.] *dossier* elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* [This blank, left vacant in the original Austrian text, is filled up by the word "British" in the official British translation.]

No. 9.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

AS among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the step which we are to-day taking at Belgrade, I request Your Excellency in the conversation⁽¹⁾ which you will have on the 24th instant on the occasion when you hand in our circular note at the Foreign Office, to point out among other matters that it would have been within the power of Serbia to render less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, by spontaneously doing what is necessary⁽²⁾ in order to start an inquiry on Serbian soil against the Serbian accomplices in the crime of the 28th June, and by bringing to light the threads, which, as has been proved, lead from Belgrade to Serbia [sic].⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ See B. 5.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. B. 3. 5.]

⁽³⁾ [Should be "to Serajevo." So in German text.]

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. No. 2.]

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious indications point to Belgrade, the Serbian Government have not taken any steps in this direction ;⁽⁴⁾ on the contrary, they have attempted to wipe out the existing traces.

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at Belgrade, it is to be gathered that the Serbian civil servant Ciganović, who is compromised by the independent testimony of the affidavits of both criminals, on the day of the outrage was still in Belgrade, and three days afterwards, when his name was mentioned in the papers, had already left the town. As is well known also, the director of the Serbian press declared that Ciganović is completely unknown in Belgrade.

With regard to the short time limit attached to our demand, this must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.

The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfil, and which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in the intercourse between States which are to live in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise ; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen.

No. 10.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

London, July 24, 1914.

⁽¹⁾[B. 4.]

HAVE just handed the circular note⁽¹⁾ to Sir Edward Grey,⁽²⁾ who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant; to introduce officials of our Government in Serbia would be equivalent to the end of Serbian political independence. I answered that co-operation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satisfactory.

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, &c.)

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time limit, but recognised that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified.

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, however, very "apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for ourselves some sort of guarantees,⁽³⁾ as hitherto Serbian promises have never been kept. I understood that in the first place he considered the question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situation.

⁽²⁾[cf. B. 93
(1) and
note.]

He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in Serbia.

No. II.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant⁽¹⁾ to the ⁽¹⁾[No. 8.; Minister of Justice, who is entrusted with the representation *cf. Y. 25.]* of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the contents of our *démarche* at Belgrade through this morning's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. Without entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Serbian Government made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible.

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice.

The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said, would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue directly between Serbia and us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by Serbian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situation.

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Serbia completely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands.

The Minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary,

and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Serbia.

No. 12.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 24, 1914.

BARON SCHOEN will, in accordance with instructions, make a communication here to-day⁽¹⁾ that according to the view of the Berlin Cabinet, our controversy with Serbia is a matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her alliance, would be on our side.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ [See Y. 28.]
28.]
16, 26;
W. exh. 2;
also
German
Chancellor,
p. 354.]

No. 13.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 24, 1914.

BARON SCHOEN has just made the *démarche* as he was instructed.⁽³⁾

M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Serbia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Serbian Minister here had already been advised that his Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible, with the limitation, however, "so far as their sovereign rights were not affected."

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with.

No. 14.

Count Szapáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude towards my *démarche*. I began by reading out my instructions. The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had originated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang from Serbian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said that he knew what it was all about: we wanted to make war on Serbia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against Serbia. The formal declaration which is required did not elicit any objection from the Minister; he only continued to maintain that Pasić had already expressed himself to this effect. This I corrected. "*Il dira cela 25 fois si vous voulez,*" said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Serbia would never undertake. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the part of the Minister. Serbia then will no longer be master in her own house. "You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Serbia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto.

The commentary⁽¹⁾ added to the communication of the note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is

most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchical side of the question.

⁽¹⁾[No. 19.] With regard to the dossier⁽¹⁾ which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further information if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the observation that we certainly had created a serious situation.

In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister was throughout unaccommodating and hostile.

No. 15.

Communiqué of the Russian Official Gazette.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

THE St. Petersburg telegraphic agency announces:—

The official journal publishes the following communiqué:—⁽²⁾

Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

⁽¹⁾[Duplicate of O.
10, but
date
differs.]

No. 16.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

AFTER a Council of Ministers which lasted for five hours, M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a long conversation with him.

The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be considered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict was not a matter confined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909 by the Serbian declaration had been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.]

17.]

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagreeably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered a dossier⁽²⁾ for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power.

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary "*de dévorer la Serbie.*" Count Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary was "*d'infliger à la Serbie le châtiment justement mérité.*"⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [cf. B. 18, 32.]

M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this point had been made.

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. No. 12 and note.]

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Germany should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace. The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally.⁽⁴⁾

No. 17.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

IN answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday :

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.] I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey⁽¹⁾ that
^{14.]} our *démarche* of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered
 as a formal ultimatum, but that it is merely a *démarche* with
 a time limit, which, as Your Excellency will be good enough
 to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence, will—if
 the time limit expires without result—for the time be followed
 only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the
 beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are
 absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands.

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Serbia, after
 the expiration of the time limit, were only to give way under
 the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed
 have to demand that she should make good the expenses which
⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 20.] we had incurred ;⁽²⁾ as is well known, we have already had
 twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because of Serbia.

No. 18.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I RECEIVED the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the
⁽³⁾ [cf. B.] morning of the 24th,⁽³⁾ and assured him that I attached
^{18; S. 52} special importance to bringing to his knowledge as soon as
^(p. 119.) possible the steps we were taking in Belgrade, and explaining
 to him our point of view as regards them.

Prince Kudachef, while thanking me for this courtesy,
 did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against
 Serbia, and he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Petersburg that our *démarche* might take the
 form of a humiliation of Serbia, which must have an echo in
 Russia.

I took the opportunity of reassuring the Russian Chargé
 d'Affaires as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable

position of Serbia as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Government of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the Great-Serbian propaganda, and how all the dynasties and, not least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity.

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory,⁽¹⁾ but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government.

Prince Kudachef remarked on this that he did not know the view of his own Government, and also did not know what position Serbia would take towards individual demands.

At the conclusion of our interview the Chargé d'Affaires expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humiliation of Serbia was intended by us.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 90 and note.]
⁽²⁾ [See Y. 45 and note.]

No. 19.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

YOUR EXCELLENCY will find herewith the dossier mentioned in the circular note to the Powers⁽³⁾ with reference to the Great-Serbian propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder.

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

⁽³⁾ [No. 8; cf. S. 25.]

⁽¹⁾ [Duplicate of Y. 75 (encl.), but a different translation. This *dossier* was made public in Vienna on July 27; see footnote to p. 148.]

ENCLOSURE. ⁽¹⁾

THE Serbian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite them with the Serbian State, dates from far back.

This propaganda on Serbian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Serbian Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Serbian press was calling for war against the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed to prepare for this war.

The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation of Serbian military and civil officials wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its founders one may mention : General Božo Janković, ex-ministers Ljuba Jovanović, Ljuba Davidović, and Velislav Vulović, Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tankosić and Milan Pribičević. This association aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Appendix 2.)

A convincing description of the activity at that time of the Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko Krstanović, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the district court at Serajevo ; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy, as a komitadji. At the beginning of 1909, Krstanović had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a school established for the formation of new bands at Čuprija (in the district of Jagodina), managed by Captains Voja Tankosić and Dušan Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Serbian officers. General Božo Janković and Captain Milan Pribičević inspected the three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals.

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.

By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Serbian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared for guerrilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced, as Serbian emissaries, systematically to practice under-hand attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 31st March, 1909,⁽¹⁾ in which the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in municipal and international law by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and solemnly promised to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

⁽¹⁾[See B. 4, vol. I., p. 81.]

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an end, and the road to an amicable *rapprochement* between Serbia and the Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement of the Serbian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav districts of the Monarchy and Serbia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interests.

These hopes, however, have not been realised.

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under the eyes of the Serbian Government, who have done nothing to suppress this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Serbian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were summoned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary. Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited to treason against their country.

Above all, the Serbian press has since then worked incessantly in this spirit.

Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers appearing in Serbia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law.

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or

the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Serbian papers.

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in Appendix I.

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of Serbian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Serbia, it has never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Serbia for which reparation is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modulation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the *Samou-prava*, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of Belgrade. (See Appendix I (b).)

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajić against the Feldzeugmeister von Varešanin, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press.

As is known, Zerajić had killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Serbian press from celebrating the criminal as a national Serbian hero and from glorifying his deed. Indeed, the *Politika* protested strongly against the idea that Zerajić was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Serbian hero whose name all Serbians will repeat with respect and grief."

The *Politika* considers the 18th August* of the same year as a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajić, "whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).)

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance of these ideas and by the glorifying of Žerajić, murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy reappears later in the press in discussing the

* Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty.

attempt made by Jukić against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. (See Appendix I (c).)

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Serbia but also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organisers, the most violent opponents of the Monarchy; General Božo Janković, Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors Milan Pribičević and Voja Tankosić. Organised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the "shooting federation" (*Schützenbund*), (762 societies), the great Sokol* Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the association of horsemen (*Reiterverein*), "Prince Michael," the society of sportsmen (*Jägerbund*), and the league of development (*Kulturliga*), as well as numerous other associations all of which, subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Serbia a close network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those who were receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it.

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society" (*Kulturverein*) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical improvement of the Serbian population and its material progress, the Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "reorganised programme": to preach to the Serbian people the sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the

* Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem. [Note added in official English translation.]

pretence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Serbian liberty and language and even to destroy her"; that it is an essential necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy," "a war of extermination with rifle and cannon," and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are suffering in bondage."

All the efforts "at an educational programme" (*Kulturbestrebungen*) of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the same spirit; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as an example (see Appendix 3).

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovačević, opened the annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains."

In the administrative reports of this association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the administration," namely, the preparation of national development and the strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task," and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "falcons must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers still in bondage."

As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words.

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the Serbian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Serbian territories." (See Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also

expected to take part in this "national work." This "healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Serbian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation.

But in order to incite "brothers outside Serbia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publications of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work" which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged."

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Odbrana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated branches is extremely varied.

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished members of the Narodna Odbrana in the south-eastern parts of the Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated.

Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), already several times alluded to; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an "appeal" to the Serbian people in which he called Austria-Hungary the enemy of Serbia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dačić undertook tours of this nature in the south-eastern districts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language.

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy formed by Serbian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture; for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Serbians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Association at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna

Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representative of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the "brothers in Bosnia" at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful"—a thought which in confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Serbia, the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Serbia in April, 1912, who received from the Serbians an official military reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : " This event marks the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the Serbian Sokol associations have succeeded in inducing similar societies in the Monarchy to establish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the information obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Serbian Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved V.B., D.K., V.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie V.K., led astray by Milan Prvićević, left the service of the army of the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to Serbia ; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams

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unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning to the Fatherland they have betrayed.

The agitation introduced from Serbia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration; what is less known is that people who have been expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, are received in Serbia with open arms, and often even protected by the State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Serbian schools with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dismissed on account of a strike. They went to Serbia, where some of them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Serbian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal Serbian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Serbian passports in which he falsely described them as Serbian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested.

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete representation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria-Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the usual guerrilla manner to destroy means of transport and equipment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.)

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at Serajevo against Jovo Jagličić and his associates for espionage (Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for guerrilla warfare still figures in the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be further added a complete system of espionage.

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, described as "reorganised," is in reality an extended programme

which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of the "ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility; in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any sense of shame common acts of murder.

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukić shot von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor (*Banalrat*) Von Hervoić, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded. Jukić, in his flight, shot a policeman who was pursuing him, and wounded two others.

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukić was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna Odbrana, and that although Jukić had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy celebrations in honour of the visitors, Jukić had entered into relations with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Serbian major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out his crime.

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made in an arsenal for military purposes.

Jukić's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of August, 1913, Stephen Dojčić, who had returned from America, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz, at Agram—an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Serbians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates.

A pamphlet by the Serbian, T. Dimitrijević, printed in Chicago, and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vaše," with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its appeal to the Serbians of the Monarchy with reference to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Serbia, demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked in America from Serbia, and that carried on from Serbia in the territory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schäfer made an attempt at the Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Serbia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukić, Hercigonja fled to Serbia (October, 1912), where together with his accomplice Marojan Jakšić, he consorted with the komitadjis and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hungary must be separated from it and re-united to the Serbian kingdom. He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining this end.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka Aljinović for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceedings three witnesses declared that Aljinović had told him that in the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts, the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Serbia, which were grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna limits itself in this way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this propaganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has excited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June (see Appendix 8).

⁽¹⁾[cf. B. 4, annex.] Princip⁽¹⁾ and Grabež⁽¹⁾ are characteristic examples of young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna Odbrana.

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the Serbian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories.

He was joined by Čabrinović, who moved in the same circles, and whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading of the Serbian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action.

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabež succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered.

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukić, to provide the accomplices with means of committing their crime. For, as Princip and Čabrinović have expressly admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to purchase them.

It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure their arms. Milan Pribičević and Živojin Dačić, the two principal men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless baulked this plan. However, Princip and Čabrinović were not at a loss in finding other help, that of Milan Čiganović, an ex-komitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil at the school (*Bandenschule*) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip and Čabrinović were not deceived in their expectations, as they at once received the necessary help from Čiganović.

⁽²⁾[cf. B. 4, annex.] The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosić,⁽²⁾ of the Royal Serbian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija (see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers

in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti-Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give every assistance. Tankosić produced four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Serbian army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition and origin recalls the case of Jukić. Anxious about the success of the attempt, Tankosić had the conspirators instructed in shooting, a task which Čiganović carried out with a success which has since been fully proved. Tankosić and Čiganović were further anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bargained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the Narodna Odbrana, as was already known.

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into Bosnia. There again Čiganović gave all the assistance in his power ; he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and assured them of the collusion of the Serbian Customs officials for getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Šabac and Ložnica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret transport with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Serbian authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Čiganović. However, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission" of the Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers caused the excise-man Grbić merely to smile good-naturedly and approvingly—sufficient proof of how accustomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Serbian Government have taken a grave responsibility on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against the Monarchy ; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revolution ; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, who share in the direction of its military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low murder appears as the best weapon.

APPENDIX I.

OPINIONS OF THE SERBIAN PRESS.

(a) The *Politika* on the 18th August, 1910, on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajić, who, two months earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, Freiherr Von Varešanin. In the article dealing with this, the following observations were made :—“ Two months ago, on the 2nd of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a young Serbian, the student Bogdan Zerajić, made an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Marian Varešanin. Zerajić fired five shots at this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon the brave and composed Zerajić fired the sixth and last bullet through his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings which had induced Zerajić to make his attempt, but that he acted thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up the whole matter as quickly as possible, and—contrary to their custom—to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, it was desired that every memory of Zerajić should be extinguished, and that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this fear of the dead Zerajić, and the prohibition against mentioning his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever.

" To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry ' Honour to Zerajić ! ' "

To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows :—

" Bosnia lives and is not dead yet,
 In vain have you buried her corpse ;
 Still the chained victim spits fire,
 Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge.
 With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her
 But the living dead will not descend into the vault ;
 Emperor, dost thou hear ?
 In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about
 thy throne !
 These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom
 Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed !
 Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder ?
 Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence,
 His hand fell, but out of the blood
 A thousand brave hands will rise ;
 That shot was only the first herald
 Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments."

(b) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the *Politika* and the *Mali Journal*, the last of which appeared with a black border, published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Serbian people still think always of the " *revanche*." The day of the " *revanche* " must come ; for this the feverish exertions of Serbia to organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Serbian people and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee.

On the same occasion the *Samouprava* wrote on the 9th October, 1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ; quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal."

(c) On the 18th April, 1911, the *Politika* said : " Except for a few cynics, no one in Serbia would be glad to see King Peter proceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Serbian feels that."

(d) The *Beogradske Novine* wrote on the 18th April, 1911 :— " Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indignation which has seized the whole of the Serbian race on account of the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible."

(e) The *Mali Journal* of the 19th April, 1911, says: "A visit of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult to all Serbs. By this visit, Serbia would forfeit the right to play the part of Piedmont. The interests of Serbia can never coincide with the interests of Austria."

(f) On the 23rd April, 1911, the *Politika*, the *Mali Journal*, the *Tribuna*, the *Beogradske Novine*, and the *Večernje Novosti*, commented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna: "Between Serbia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Serbia a 'shameful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Serbia,' 'a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Serbia and the Serbian people.'

(g) On the 18th April, 1912, the *Trgovinski Glasnik* wrote in an article headed, "The decay of Austria":—

"In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Serbians can observe such a development of affairs in Austria with satisfaction."

(h) The *Balkan*, in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania," in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect: "If Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Serbia will do it, saying to Austria, 'Halt! no further!' A war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dismembered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We have finished one war, we are now facing a second."

(i) The *Večernje Novosti*, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the Serbian travelling public and to Serbian traders to boycott the *Donau Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft* (The Danube Steam Navigation Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with fines by a committee. The monies would flow to the funds of the Komitadjis which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria."

(k) The *Tribuna* of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes: "The criminal black and yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with one dinar."

(l) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary in Agram by the student Luka Jukić, the Serbian newspapers published memorial articles. An article in the *Pragda* stated that: "It must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not

acted like our Jukić. We have no longer a Jukić, but we have the hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukićs. We are convinced that soon Jukić, through his prison window, will hear the last cannon shot of freedom."

(m) The *Mali Journal* of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive campaign contemplated by Serbia.

(n) The *Piémont* writes on the commemoration day of the annexation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the sovereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Serbian people groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom. To-day when Serbian graves adorn the ancient Serbian territories, when the Serbian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old Serbia, the Serbian people having ended their task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Serbian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Serbian soldiers who to-day in Dušan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the ' second Turkey ' even as with God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Serbian God will grant that the ' second Turkey ' will vanish too."

(o) The *Mali Journal* of the 4th November, 1913, writes : " Every effort towards a *rapprochement* with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to a betrayal of the Serbian people. Serbia must understand the facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obligation of every Serbian Government to fight this enemy."

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the *Pragda* said : " Our new year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under a foreign yoke. Let the Serbians endure ; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended."

(q) The *Novosti* of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text : " Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Serbians preserve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom dawns."

(r) The *Zastava* confesses in January, 1914 : " Serbia incites the Austro-Hungarian Serbians to revolution."

(s) The *Mali Journal* of the 9th March, 1914, writes : " Serbia can never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattling in the Skutari affair."

(t) On the 4th April, 1914, the *Zastava* writes : " The Austrian statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the ruin of their State."

(u) The *Pravda* of the 8th April, 1914, says : " Austria has now lost her right to exist."

(v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Serbian newspapers expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection.

(w) In the *Tribuna* of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that : " The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the 'patriotism of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when Austria is partitioned."

(x) The *Mali Journal* of the 12th May, 1914, writes : " What are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria."

APPENDIX 2.

EXTRACT FROM THE " NARODNA ODBRANA," AN ORGAN PUBLISHED BY
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA SOCIETY.
(NARODNA ODBRANA IZDANJE STREDISNOG ODBORA NARODNE
ODBRANE. BEOGRAD, 1911. " NOVA STAMPARIJA " DAVIDOVIĆ,
DEČANSKA ULICA BR. 14, LJUB. DAVIDOVIĆA.)

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet " does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither permissible nor possible to do this."

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies abroad.

In the first chapter, " Origin and activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a consequence of the popular movement arising in Serbia on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects :—

- (1) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nationality.
- (2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers.
- (3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed action.

(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and other things necessary for the realisation of its task.

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action.

(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Serbian people in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence of a similar occasion, "the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana would again be unfurled."

At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation, experience had shown that Serbia was not ready for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which Serbia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it was thought to be; the annexation was only one of the blows which the enemies of Serbia have aimed at this land, many blows have preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Serbia equally unprepared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of every class is stated to be "the preparation of the people for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are "strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, &c. . . . so far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these spheres."

The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in Serbia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of the oppressed Serbian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper utilisation of these activities learned in the field of sport.

In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circumstances of Serbia, where the military training only lasts six months. These observations conclude with the sentence :

"A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Serbia, in which every Serbian, from child to greybeard is a rifleman."

The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States depend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said :

"The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisation and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Serbian people are faced by the question 'to be or not to be ?'"

"'What is the object of the Lectures' is the title of the seventh chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following sentences :

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was developed. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions of our social and national life."

In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, "Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter ("New Obiliće and Singjeliće") runs as follows :—

"It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the Germans, Austrians and 'Schwabas,' with their onward pressure against our Serbian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to

* Miloš Obiliće (or Kobilic) crept—according to Serbian tradition—into the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselheld, and there murdered the Sultan Murad (Von Kállay "Geschichte Der Serben," Vol. I). Stephan Singjelić, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 1807-1810. In 1809, Singjelić defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kállay "Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes.")

the heroic deeds of Obiliće and Singjeliće, the necessity of sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against gloom and ignorance there is need of such heroes. The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against the 'Schwabas' and the other enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Serbia and beyond the frontier."

The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following sentences :—

"The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Serbia. It hopes that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers outside Serbia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a powerful Serbian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Serbian territories."

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks," proceeds as follows :—

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Serbian people as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the following expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows :—

"Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position."

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance,

which conduct " makes obligatory a war of extermination against Austria."

After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the remark is made that in speaking of " freedom and unity," too much is mere talk. The people must be told that :—

" For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Serbian territories and their union with Serbia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connection with the sea.

The " two tasks " of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought together in the following concluding sentence :—

" In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and union."

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the Government and people of Serbia to prepare themselves in all ways for the struggle " which the annexation has foreshadowed "

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitulated in the following sentences :—

" While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connections made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana (defence) ; to-day, too, Narodna (of the people) ; to-day, too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Serbia as it gathered them at the time of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs (*Komitees*), weapons and bombs were asked for ; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come."

The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following information as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana :—

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are

subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections :— for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for foreign affairs.

District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs ; some District Committees have also a section for Foreign Affairs.

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions.

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns and villages.

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary.

Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every respect are the following :—

The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association "Dusan the Strong" with 2,500 members, the Olympic Club, the Horsemen's Society "Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association and the Culture League.

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses, libraries, &c. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

APPENDIX 3.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOKOL SOCIETY DUSAN THE STRONG IN KRAGUJEVAC IN THE YEARS 1912-13." (Kragujevac Printing Office "Budućnost" Tih. Lekić 1914.)

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the President, Major Kovačević of the Serbian Army, greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914.

"It is known to you," the President began, "that Sokolism, which arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic institution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the Slavonic brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for the struggle against the enemy of Slavism.

" We Serbians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our own and our brothers' welfare and happiness.

" We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the weak and the troubled, to free the imprisoned and the enchained. We have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part of our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We have struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and given them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and brotherhood."

After giving a few words of praise to this " noble work " which " realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovačević proceeded :

" Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisation and his economic position.

" This enemy is insatiable in his lusts ; he holds millions of our brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call and beg for still quicker help.

" We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many brothers live in slavery, suffer and murmur ?

" Brothers and sisters !

" The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever be on our guard.

" Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice. Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true and enduring.

" Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol idea.

" Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts, and let us always remember that truth which the Serbian Sokols wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle, and to conquer."

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech of the President. After a description of the successes in the last wars, which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, it is stated that " the day arrived when we returned to our work, because our programme was not yet fulfilled, because our task was not yet ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of the crucified Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the Drina ; we have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inheritance of

St. Sava* ; we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj and of the old Vujadin ; we must cross the mountains of Romanija and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must end at last : ‘ Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou nowhere people of thy race’ ”

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in Serajevo. On this the report remarks : “ By sending representatives to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them—we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty.” After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram students to Serbia† and of the dedication of the flag of “ the Young People’s Temperance Association,” the report of the executive concludes with the following sentences :—

“ These manifestations—the coming of the brother Croats to Sumadija and the meeting of the ‘ temperate youth ’ from all Serbian regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future.

“ They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more, there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was always the aim of the actions of our leaders.”

The treasurer’s report enumerates first of all those who have supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the Kragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and thanked :—

The District Committee of the “ Narodna Odbrana ” at Kragujevac, particularly its “ Ritter ” section, which often assisted the Sokol

* St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina is the name of *Ducatus Santi Save*. The “ inheritance of St. Sava ” is, therefore, equivalent in meaning to Herzegovina.

† This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, Semendria, &c., was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration of hostility to the Monarchy. The excursionists were accorded military honours, and lunches and balls took place in the Military Academy and the Officers’ Club. In Nish, indeed, a military parade was held in honour of the visitors.

Society with substantial support ; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium at Kragujevac, who " always showed his fatherly care " to the Sokols ; the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially supported the society ; the President of the District Court at Kragujevac ; the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragujevac.

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen in war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words :—

" After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, will devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's eyrie who, at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft, and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all our brothers who are not yet free."

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovačević, President, by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzaković, as secretary, and by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two professors (Emil Lukić and Milan Janković), as well as a further officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasic).

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed by Major M. J. Kovačević and Brzaković, Secretary of the Law Courts, and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the " Srpski Soko " in Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Serbia stand in close relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy to an extent not hitherto known.

APPENDIX 4.

THE SERBIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE IN THE SERVICE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA.

An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement to the Serbian Official Gazette, *Srpski Novine*, of 28th June, 1914 (new style), and was supplied to all subscribers to the paper.

The following passages occur in this appeal :—

" Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the territories reach where our people's speech is heard—the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian—from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this territory ; so many fetters of our brothers clank ; so much work is yet to be done ; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have already gone so far in the new history of the people ; when behind

us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater and more glorious events await us ; to-day when we stand in the midst of the creation of a great national State ; to-day St. Vitus' Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that which has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of that which will come. Men and women of Serbia ! Millions of our brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbians beyond our frontiers, look to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the national cause. God helps the brave ! Forward all ! That part of our sacred task which is as yet unrealised calls us. Belgrade, St. Vitus' Day, 1914."

APPENDIX 5.

DEPOSITION OF TRIFKO KRSTANOVIC, CONCERNING THE NARODNA ODBRANA.

The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanović, of Zavadonici, was arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July, 1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the murderous attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack was to be expected, and because this remark brought him under suspicion of having had knowledge of the plot.

He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it, founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on account of the agitation developing in Serbia against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against Krstanović were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness.

An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914, which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows :—

" In the autumn of the year 1908, I crossed the frontier to Serbia on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to Bagina Bašta in the district of Užice, and as I found no work there, I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement, and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial

and Royal Consulate and tried to get myself sent home. There I was told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme seized me on the street, and asked me where I came from; under the impression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower (*Karaula*). Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me: Why should I now want to go out of Serbia which now needed more people because a war with Austria would come? When I said to him that I had nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, and a gendarme took me to the inn 'Zelenom Vijencu' ('The Green Wreath'), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosić, the leader of the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the 'Green Wreath' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, other members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosić told me that the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a war between Serbia and Austria could easily arise. On this a man took me to a small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to the Treasury, where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in the office I met Milan Pribičević, who enrolled me in the Komitee. At this enrolment, Milan Pribičević asked me whether Voja Tankosić had told me the obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. To this I answered 'Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be efficient, strong, and self-sacrificing. 'There were then about 70 of us enrolled. In Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks our leader Tankosić informed us that the Great Powers had prohibited our Komitee, and that we must leave Belgrade and hide ourselves somewhere in an out-of-the-way place not visited by foreigners. In this way they sent us to the town of Čuprija. Here we were drilled by the officers Voja Tankosić, Dušan Putnik, Zivko Gvosdić and Mitar Djinović, who was involved in the Montenegrin bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. In order that no one should become aware of our objects, or know anything of our numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with outsiders. We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of mines, and the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribičević, General Božo Janković, the pharmacist Škarić, the deputy Zivko Rafajlović, and a certain Glišić Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and paid for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, when war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the volunteers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at Čuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a day for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until

March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the dissolution of the Komitee, General Božo Janković told me to enter the service of Božo Milanović at Šabac, where I should receive wages of 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service would be. I accepted, because, as a member of the Komitee, I regarded myself as bound to obey General Janković, and also because I had nothing to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this way I came to Šabac in March, 1909, and reported myself to Božo Milanović, a tradesman of Šabac. General Janković had told me that Božo Milanović was chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Šabac, and that I should assist him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana. When I had given Božo Milanović the General's letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve him faithfully and carry out his orders. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wheresoever they were addressed. It would cost me my life if I failed to carry a letter to its destination, and if any one else got hold of it. On the next day, Božo Milanović gave me a closed letter which I was to take to Čedo Lukić, Superintendent of Excise at Serbisch-Rača. On the road to Rača, at the village of Bogatić, the District Captain stopped me, took the letter from me, opened it and read it. In the letter it said that Lukić should immediately buy three boats so that they should be ready if they were required. 100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. On this occasion the Captain told me that the Ministry had given strict orders that the Komitadji were to do nothing without orders, so that international diplomatic intervention should not be provoked. I returned to Šabac and told Božo Milanović what had happened to me. Božo Milanović applied to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the Captain at Bogatić had taken from me, should be returned. He also gave orders that the Captain should send the letter to Čedo Lukić to whom it was addressed. I carried letters of this sort from March, 1909, until October, 1910, and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisch-Rača, 55 to Ložnica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know how many to Koviljača. I noticed how often I was in each place because these places are a very long way from Šabac. I took the letters to the chiefs of the Customs houses in the various places, and from them I received letters in reply and took them to Božo Milanović. I recollect that on a few occasions I took letters to Šepačka Ada. My assistant in letter carrying was one Vaso Erić, a native of Srebrenica. Every week I took letters from Božo Milanović to Belgrade, and delivered them to Milan Pribičević and Božo Janković. I knew nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about them. So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Božo

Milanović were not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the Customs houses were written in special characters, a fact which I observed when Božo Milanović opened them. Once I brought one of these cipher letters to Božo Milanović, I think it was from Zvornik, and he sent me with the letter to Mika Atanasijević, Professor at Šabač, to decipher. He did this, as he usually did ; but perhaps he forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, that it was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be stamped with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. After about eight months of my service with Božo Milanović, Božo gave me his visiting-card with a death's head drawn upon it ; on it was written that I was designated an initiate (*povjerenik*) of the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me, that the business was spying. . . .

"On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dušan Opterkić, member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 23 branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know what organisation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. From time to time, Milan Pribičević gave me a revolver, or money for the purchase of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers on the frontier who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor any money to buy a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that Milan Pribičević gave them these things as an honour, just because they were Komitadjis. I had nothing else to do with arms.

"On one occasion, during my service with Božo Milanović, I was ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnicia on the Drina, who would give us all necessary information and show us everything, so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanarić, a Serbian officer of Reserve, who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana had learnt that Ljubo Stanarić was dangerous to the Serbian State, and had resolved that he should be put to death.

"That man and I received instructions from Božo Milanović to go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanarić, who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina, but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that peasant's house. As I saw that we could not kill him with the knife, I sent that man to Šabač to tell Božo Milanović that it was not possible to kill Stanarić in the manner he desired, namely, with the knife. On this, I received orders from Božo Milanović that we should kill him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun. According to Božo's instructions, the man who was with me was to shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions

were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Šabać that we were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we returned to Šabać.

"In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Božo Milanović, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Šabać I went to Belgrade, where I met General Janković, and he had me arrested for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities decided to send me to Bosnia. In Šabać a prisoner told me that my life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came to Bosnia in December, 1910.

"I know nothing of any 'Black Hand,' with the exception of what I have read of it in Serbian newspapers. I can't remember now what was written in the newspapers about the 'Black Hand.' Nor do I know anything of the 'Black List.' After the annexation there prevailed in Serbia universal anger and hatred against the person of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn enemy of the Serbians."

Beyond this, Krstanović referred to his earlier statements, of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing testimony.

The Komitee into which Milan Pribičević introduced Krstanović was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Čuprija there were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Čiganović was also one of the pupils.

In the school at Čuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders.

APPENDIX 6.

EXTRACT FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SERAJEVO IN THE PROSECUTION OF JOVO JAGLIČIĆ AND OTHERS FOR ESPIONAGE.

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jagličić and several accomplices were carrying on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of Serbia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded *inter alia* opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of the Great-Serbian propaganda, and more especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

Jovo Jagličić made a statement that in the month of August or September, 1912, he for the first time met Peter Klarić, known as Pešut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foča, who had fled to Montenegro in 1912 and then became a Komitadži.

At their first meeting Klarić asked Jagličić whether he knew Rade Milošević of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milošević was lying very ill in hospital : " It would be a pity if he were to die, we have spoken of great matters, has he never said anything to you about them ? " On receiving a negative answer Klarić went on : " I had something important to tell you, we are Serbians, and must do something important for Serbia. Come to my office." There the following conversation ensued between them :—

" Jovan, I will tell you something ; I don't know you yet and whether you will betray me. I tell you, nevertheless, and if you have the heart, betray me ! "

On Jagličić asking him what it was all about, Klarić answered, " Brother, in Serbia there is a society called the ' Narodna Odbrana.' Many people must join this society ; many have been enrolled already in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy ; among them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help a bit ? "

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klarić answered :—

" The Society has this object : for instance, you are in Kalinovik ; you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves, and so on. We have a secret writing, ' cipher,' and use it for correspondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too."

Jagličić was frightened that Klarić was merely sounding him for the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him the names of some of the members, on which Klarić reflected for some time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence.

Heron Klarić said to him : " Shall I give you the ' cipher ' ? " Jagličić agreed. Klarić, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out on a slip and gave it to Jagličić.

On another occasion Klarić gave an account of his stay at Banja-Koviljača (near Ložnica) where he was instructed by the Serbian captain Todorović* in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused why he learnt this he answered : " If anything such as I have spoken of to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to

* Captain Kosta Todorović was then in fact Boundary Commissioner and Director of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from Rača to Ljubođija.

handle bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, so that powder magazines and other important objects should be blown up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Serbia."

Klarić then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that he had already enrolled people who, in case of war, would cut telegraph and telephone wires.

At these meetings Jagličić learnt from Klarić that it also appertained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist volunteers (Komitadjis), to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klarić also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bosnian and Serbian members would not be entrusted to the post, but despatched across the frontier by reliable messengers.

Klarić further told Jagličić that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta celebration (in September, 1912) a Serbian major had stayed in the Hotel "Europe" with the Serbian deputation which was sent to it,* that Klarić had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and that he had sworn them in.

From a spy Jagličić learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo, or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of soap,† and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that he would fetch them.

APPENDIX 7.

FROM CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS ON THE NARODNA ODBRANA.

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representatives of all parties, so as to win over both the progressives and those who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is Pribičević, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by an officer on leave.

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective propaganda in military and civilian circles in the Southern-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution, interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initiation of panics, revolts, etc.

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal propaganda.

* The Serbian major, Mika Janković, appeared as a delegate at the Prosvjeta celebration.

† The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as well as those found in the Save, near Brčko, in the year 1913, which came from the Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be compared with pieces of soap.

Some are sent specially—to enlist a few men—preferably railway officials—in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junctions, etc., whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out the directions they have received, or to get them carried out.

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is, so far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each other.

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as members.

APPENDIX 8.

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORDS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AT SERAJEVO, TOUCHING THE PROCEEDINGS THERE INSTITUTED AGAINST GAVRILO PRINCIP AND CONFEDERATES ON ACCOUNT OF THE CRIME OF ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED ON THE 28TH JUNE, 1914, ON HIS IMPERIAL AND ROYAL HIGHNESS THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND OF AUSTRIA-ESTE AND HER HIGHNESS THE DUCHESS SOPHIE OF HOHENBERG.

I. The deed and the perpetrators.

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, Trifko Grabež, Vaso Čubrilović and Četres Popović confess that in common with the fugitive Mehemed Mehmedbašić they contrived a plot for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the case of some of them with Browning pistols, laid wait for him on the 28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of carrying out the planned attack.

Nedeljko Čabrinović confesses that he was the first of the conspirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which missed its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants of the carriage following the Archducal motor car.

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received fatal wounds.

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to murder.

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the investigations which have taken place, and it is established that the deceased Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at them by Gavrilo Princip.

II. Origin of the plot.

The accused have made the following declarations, which are essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate :—

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he associated with a number of Serbian students in the cafés of the town, conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this intention to his acquaintance Čabrinović, who also was in Belgrade at the time. The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was ready at once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an attempt on the Archduke's life was a frequent topic of conversation in the circle in which Princip and Čabrinović moved, because the Archduke was considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Serbian people.

Princip and Čabrinović desired at first to procure the bombs and weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Serbian Major Milan Pribičević or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they themselves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however, Major Pribičević and the authoritative member of the said association, Živojin Dačić, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Čiganović, who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the employment of the State railways.

Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of Čiganović, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon Čiganović called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for the attempt. Čabrinović also talked with Čiganović on the subject of the weapons.

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabež, who also was in Belgrade, into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession to have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt.

In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with Čiganović about the execution of the attempt.

Meanwhile Čiganović had reached an understanding on the subject of the planned attack with the Serbian Major Voja Tankosić, who was a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object the Browning pistols.

Grabež confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip and Čabrinović that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Čiganović, visited Major Tankosić at the latter's request at his rooms. He says that after he had been introduced Tankosić said to him : "Are you the man ? Are you determined ?" Whereupon Grabež answered :

" I am." Tankosić next asked : " Do you know how to shoot with a revolver ? " and when Grabež answered in the negative Tankosić said to Čiganović : " I will give you a revolver, go and teach them how to shoot."

Hereupon Čiganović conducted Princip and Grabež to the military rifle range at Topčider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved himself the better shot of the two. Čiganović also familiarised Princip, Grabež and Čabrinović with the use of the bombs which were later given to them.

On the 27th May, 1914, Čiganović handed over to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs, four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition as well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the secret might be kept. Moreover, Čiganović gave them some money.

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilić, at Easter, of his plan of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of the attempt. Hereupon Ilić according to his confession enlisted Jaso Čubrilović, Četro Popović and Mehemed Mehmedbašić in the plot.

III. Origin of the bombs.

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession of the police at Serajevo.

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Serbian hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in the Save at Brčko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from the Serbian arsenal of Kragujevac.

It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores of the Army Dépôt at Kragujevac.

Grabež quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed over to him and his accomplices " Kragujevac bombs."

IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons from Serbia to Bosnia.

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement :—

Čiganović told Čabrinović, Grabež and Princip that they were to make their way via Šabac and Ložnica to Tuzla and there to betake

themselves to Miško Jovanović who would take over the weapons. Next they were to go to Šabac and report themselves to the frontier captain, Major Rade Popović, to whom he gave them a note, of which Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left Belgrade with the weapons. At Šabac Princip handed over the note which he had received from Čiganović to Major Popović, who thereupon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time Major Popović handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at Ložnica, whose name was Pravanović, Prdanović or Predojević.

Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež passed the night at Šabac and went by train the next morning to Ložnica, with a half-price ticket, it may be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popović had drawn up for them. They reached Ložnica at noon and delivered to the frontier captain at that place Major Popović's letter, in which were the words : " See that you receive these people and bring them on their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made an appointment with the three accomplices for 7 o'clock the next morning in his office.

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Čabrinović should take Grabež's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that Princip and Grabež should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that an exciseman from Lješnica called Grbić was to take Princip and Grabež with him to his tower (*karaula*) and bring them over the frontier. Čabrinović accordingly walked to Banja Koviljača in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabež drove with the exciseman Grbić to Lješnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room in a hotel. While they were doing so the exciseman Grbić caught sight of these objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious.

Grabež's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbić laughed when he saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of Bosnia they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly thought that Grabež and Princip were travelling on a mission.

Grbić and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabež in a boat to an island in the Drina. There Grbić instructed them to wait for a peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbić had directed them ; next day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj,

where he handed them over to the local teacher Čubrilović, who seemed to have been already waiting for them, to see them further on their way.

He took them on to Miško Jovanović at Tuzla.

Čabrinović's statement about the events of the journey up to the point at which he parted with Princip and Grabež conformed in essentials with those of the latter, and only added by way of supplement that Major Popović told them that he did not reach Šabac from Belgrade till the day before their arrival.

In Ložnica, Čabrinović, Princip and Grabež decided to separate, as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier captain at Ložnica, whom they informed of this, applauded their plan and gave Čabrinović a letter for M. Jaklojević, the teacher at Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Čabrinović handed over the bombs, Browning pistol and ammunition which he had been carrying, to Princip and Grabež, and went to Mali-Zvornik with an exciseman who had been told off to accompany him.

There he found the teacher Jaklojević, to whom he handed the letter from the frontier captain of Ložnica. Hereupon the former notified the Serbian frontier guard. When Čabrinović, with the teacher, reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there for them, who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik in Bosnia.

Čabrinović then proceeded to Miško Jovanović at Tuzla.

Supplement.

Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force, who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from laying the information.

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can be expressed at the present stage on their reliability. In view of the investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details of the evidence cannot be published more exactly at present.

APPENDIX 9.

THE SERBIAN PRESS ON THE ASSASSINATION.

(a) The Belgrade newspaper *Balkan* writes on the 29th June, with regard to the two perpetrators :—

" Nedeljko Čabrinović, a compositor by profession, was full of anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade. He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended the gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time as Čabrinović, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent, nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow students who came, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as latterly with Čabrinović. He inclined towards socialistic ideas, although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive Party. Princip, like Čabrinović, was brought up at Serajevo ; the two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their childhood."

(b) The *Piémont*, of the 1st July, points out that Princip's protest was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajić. The explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manoeuvres, made the desperate act of the young martyr more intelligible and more natural. (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account of this article ; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day after by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.)

(c) The Young Radical *Odjek*, of the 3rd July, says :—" The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of national enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of violence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge."

(d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, *Srpska Zastava*, of the 3rd July, says in an article entitled " Suspicions and Threats " :—" The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the outcome of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other

hand, the savage persecution of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world."

(e) The Progressive newspaper, *Pravda*, of the 3rd July, writes :—The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of the unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Serbian people."

(f) The *Agence des Balkans*, of the 3rd July, says :—"The crimes which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbians have been carried out under the auspices and at the direct instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."

(g) The *Pravda*, of the 4th July, says :—"All the murders and assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of assassinations should have firmly established itself."

(h) The *Balkan*, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary "must be placed under international control, because of its persecution of the innocent"; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than Turkey.

(i) The *Mali Journal*, of the 7th July, writes :—"A sprig of the Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few days. He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslavement of his immediate Fatherland (*engeres Vaterland*) amounted to a paroxysm, that grief which the robbers of the land of his fathers had brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official Austria-Hungary to this? It has answered with general massacres, plunderings and destruction of Serbian life and property. Only the worthless distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are always mighty heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Čabrinović with these heroes, and you will at once see the great difference between them. Civilisation and justice are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary."

(j) The *Tribuna*, of the 7th July, says :—"We are of the opinion that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination of the Serbians at one blow."

(k) The *Piémont*, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the Christians.

(l) The *Balkan*, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under the title "St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a general boycott against all the Austrians living in Serbia.

(m) The *Mali Journal*, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the title "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the *Tribuna*, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and Hungarian Spas, and from calling in doctors from Austria-Hungary. It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the direction suggested. The State and the Government offices must not mix themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the citizens.

(o) The *Stampa*, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended to base complaints against the Serbian people.

(p) The *Agence des Balkans*, of the 9th, reports from Belgrade:—"Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general massacre of Serbians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

(q) The *Balkan*, of the 9th July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of humanity,* publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40 years, from which it deduces that the Serbian people during this period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hungary's Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons of Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the principle, "The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria-Hungary will also fall. But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind have accompanied the news of the murder with the words, "I am no longer anxious for the fate of humanity."

(r) The *Politika*, of the 9th July, expresses itself in a leading article under the heading, "Shameless Lies," as follows:—"The manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them, other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the murder, but at the same time to implicate all those persons who were objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment

* "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind."

Mr. Asquith's Speech, *Times*, July 1, 1914. [Note added in official English translation.]

because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to state, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once spread to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of shame, and thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of this sort."

(s) The *Stampa*, of the 9th, says that not everything which has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the truth will sooner or later come to the surface; blood-thirsty Austria will drink, nay, is drinking, Serbian blood, till she can drink no more. It is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and dead in Bosnia.

(t) The *Politika*, of the 10th July, hurls extravagant abuse against the members of the Imperial House.

(u) The Commercial journal, *Trgovinski Glasnik*, of the 10th July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonourable. It is a warning to the Serbian people in Austria-Hungary that they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the Government. After the latest occurrences, the Serbian people ought no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance.

(v) In the *Stampa*, of the 10th July, we find:—"Nothing lasts for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Serbians who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle round the Ivan Planina on the Trebević."

(w) The *Pravda*, of the 10th July, under the title "Boycott against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out.

(x) The *Zvono*, of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

(y) The *Mali Journal*, of the 19th July, publishes a report which says:—"Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro-Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found."

(z) The leading Young Radical organ, *Odjek*, of the 20th July, writes:—"Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will

inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Serbia not a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Serbia stands than Austria-Hungary."

APPENDIX 10.

THE LOCAL COMMITTEE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA AT NISH, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME AGAINST THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND.

A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jaša Nenadović, director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : " Serbia was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Archduke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent and deadly danger for Serbia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Serbia to war or attacked it, in which case Serbia, which was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now Serbia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dangers which threatened Serbia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way. Serbia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his predecessor.

" Though he was aware," continued the speaker, " that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had. Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to overstep the mark in the measures they took; unfortunately however, these friends, and through them, we too had been disappointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real rôle.

Whatever the God of Serbia has in store, things cannot go on as at present."

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval by his hearers.

APPENDIX II.

SUPPLEMENTS AFTER GOING TO PRESS.

1.—*To Appendix 8.*

The teacher, Čubrilović, who undertook the guidance of Princip and Grabež at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important facts emerge:—

In the year 1911, Čubrilović, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition to Šabac, was initiated by Božo Fović, a member of the managing committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that association, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Miško Jovanović was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabež to Čubrilović, with the information that he was bringing two Serbian students with weapons to him. When he learned this, he knew that it was a "mission" from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabež told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

2.—*Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the Monarchy.*

There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception hall of the Royal Serbian War Office, of which three are representations of Serbian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Serbia.

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (South Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Serbian hopes. In the foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names of all the "provinces still awaiting liberation": Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

No. 20.

Count Berchtold to the Under Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.)

Lambach, July 25, 1914.

RUSSIAN Chargé d'Affaires telegraphs to me⁽¹⁾ that he⁽¹⁾ [O. 11, 12] has received urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Serbia. I request Your Excellency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a prolongation of time-limit.⁽²⁾ Your Excellency will add, that Serbia, even after⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 9] breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we shall be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Serbia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures.⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [cf. No. 17]

No. 21.

Count Berchtold to Count Szapáry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Bad Ischl, July 25, 1914.

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance :—

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called this morning on the Under Secretary,⁽⁴⁾ in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Serbia might be prolonged.

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. O. 11]

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other Cabinets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were given to the former to examine the data on which our communication to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier.⁽⁵⁾

⁽⁵⁾ [No. 19]

The Under Secretary replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge ; but that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a prolongation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in support of the wish they had

expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken hypothesis. Our note to the Powers was in no way intended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter concerning us and Serbia alone, which action, notwithstanding the patience and longsuffering we had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests.

No. 22.

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

CABINET Council met yesterday evening and early this morning; form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I hear that Royal train is being made up; gold belonging to the National Bank and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular.

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the fortress were evacuated. Railway station thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the

¹¹ [cf. No 6.30 train. ⁽¹⁾
24; B. 23.]

No. 23.

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

⁽²⁾ [See foot-

note, p. (Telegraphic.)

Semlin, July 25, 1914.

^{126.}

cf. G. 5; ORDERS for general mobilisation were issued in Serbia

S. 41.] at 3 p.m. ⁽²⁾

No. 24.

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Semlin, July 25, 1914.

AS a result of the Royal Serbian Government's unsatisfactory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced⁽¹⁾ that diplomatic relations are broken off with Serbia, and have left Belgrade⁽²⁾ with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six p.m.⁽³⁾

No. 25.

Note of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 July, 1914.

[See No. 34, enclosure, p. 254, et seq.]

No. 26.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

WE were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility that the Serbian dispute might develop into a collision with Russia.⁽⁴⁾ We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we took up towards Serbia, because fundamental considerations of national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without punishment and without the possibility of punishment.

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived, and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed superfluous.

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Serbia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion, presents itself.

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circumstances, has established a close understanding with your German colleague, who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria-Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand alone.⁽¹⁾

I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become inevitable.

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circumstance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement of her differences with Serbia.

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire for Serbian possessions. If a conflict with Serbia is forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, but merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation.

⁽²⁾ [No. 8.] The contents of the circular note,⁽²⁾ which in itself is sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier⁽³⁾ relating to the Serbian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th.

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular attention to this dossier and impress upon him that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Serbia.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 12 and note.]

⁽²⁾ [No. 8.]

⁽³⁾ [No. 19.]

We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore—notwithstanding that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Serbian promises—suffered Serbia to increase her territory after the annexation crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent.

Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered in Serbia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive proportions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities of Serbia.

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic measures on our part against this menace to all public order will appear intelligible and indeed necessary.

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your explanation of our motives and intentions the hint that we—as your Excellency will have already been in a position to explain—aim at no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands.

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 years, and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for himself the glorious title of “Protector of the Peace.”

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.

Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would undermine our existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia’s own interests,

as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe.

No. 27.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

⁽¹⁾[See B. 4, vol. I., p. 84. *cf.* No. 31; also No. 34 (encl.), pp. 262-263.] AS point 5 of our demands,⁽¹⁾ namely, the participation of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia has given rise to special objection on the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confidence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia.

By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establishment of a private "Bureau de Sûreté" at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the Serbian police and administration.

No. 28.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

⁽²⁾[See W. exhs. 6, 7.] AS the result of reports⁽²⁾ about measures taken for mobilisation of Russian troops, Count Pourtalès has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question

by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 46.]

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [Mobilisation in these districts, B. 70(1).]

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attaché received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof, the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtalès had spoken with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed information. In the following telegram from Count Pourtalès to Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communications from Major von Eggeling are collected:

"The Military Attaché reports with regard to a conversation with the Russian Minister of War.⁽³⁾ M. Sazonof had asked him to make the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisation against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly, and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for peace."

⁽³⁾ [cf. W. exh. II also Nos. 33, 42.]

No. 29.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

HERR VON TSCHIRSKY informed me to-day in pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Serbia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenor of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at 3 p.m. yesterday, Serbia had already ordered the general mobilisation of her army,⁽¹⁾ which proves that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

No. 30.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

WE have broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia after she had refused the demands we had addressed to her.⁽²⁾ I beg your Excellency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect :

The Royal Serbian Government have refused to accept the demands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure permanently our most vital interests which

⁽¹⁾ [No. 23.]⁽²⁾ [S. 40.]

were menaced by them, and have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy.

Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find ourselves obliged to compel Serbia by the sharpest measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now pursued.

No. 31.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

JUST had a long conversation with M. Sazonof.⁽¹⁾ Told the Minister I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be.

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been

⁽¹⁾ [cf. O. 25 (dated July 26).]

studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty; only the two points dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and Royal Officials in Serbia and the point dealing with the

⁽¹⁾ [See foot-note to No. 34, pp. 260-1.] removal of officers and civil servants⁽¹⁾ to be designated by us seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form.

⁽²⁾ [No. 27.] With regard to the first two points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram of the 25th instant;⁽²⁾ with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion.

⁽³⁾ [They issued orders for mobilisation on July 25; see No. 23.] The Serbians had mobilised on the previous day⁽³⁾ and I did not know what had happened since then.

No. 32.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remains localised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way

⁽⁴⁾ [*cf.* B. 90 at territorial acquisitions of any sort.⁽⁴⁾ and note.]

No. 33.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

M. SAZONOF explained to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had been begun; though it was true that certain necessary military precautions were being taken."⁽⁵⁾

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK

[R. 34]

The German military attaché at St. Petersburg reports⁽¹⁾ [See No. 28.] that "the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobilised; however, naturally, certain military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the German military attaché adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching."

No. 34.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

ANNEXED you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of the note which the Royal Serbian Government on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

(See next page.)

ENCLOSURE.*

Reply of the Royal Serbian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, 1914.

⁽¹⁾[For the original French text see B. 39.]

⁽²⁾[B. 4.]

TRANSLATION.⁽¹⁾

THE Royal Serbian Government have received the communication⁽²⁾ of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,† and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupshtina‡ and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Serbian Government on the 18th † March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events,

* [cf. the same document in W. (p. 140), where the English translation is made by the German authorities.]

† Old style.

‡ The Serbian Parliament.

ENCLOSURE.

REMARKS.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [See
Italian
comment,
B. 64.]

THE Royal Serbian Government confine themselves to asserting that, since the declarations on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Serbian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our *démarche* was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Serbian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

The proposition of the Royal Serbian Government that utterances in the press and the activities of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations ; this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Serbian institutions themselves contemplate some

TRANSLATION.

and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them.

Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration :—

" The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary—i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the

REMARKS.

such control. The complaint against the Serbian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

This proposition is incorrect; the Serbian Government were accurately informed of the suspicions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction.

Our demand ran :—

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary. . . ."

The alteration made by the Royal Serbian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that they are cognisant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Serbian Government reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on.

The wording demanded by us ran :—

"The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and functionaries . . . participated. . . ."

TRANSLATION.

above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian

⁽¹⁾ [See B. 4, Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration⁽¹⁾ of the
vol. I., p. 31st March, 1909.*
81.]

"The Government, &c...." (identical with the text as demanded).

The Royal Government further undertake:—

I. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina† a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

* New style.

† The Serbian Parliament.

REMARKS.

By the adoption of this wording with the addition "according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government" the Serbian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future.

We had demanded of them :—

I. "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discontinued in future ; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz. :—

(a) A law under which the press publications in question which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on their merits (*subjectiv*) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of press offences on their merits (*subjectiv*) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained ; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain.

(b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation—a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government to apply it ; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory—all the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupshtina—apart from the possible resignation of the Government—everything would be as it was before.

TRANSLATION.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military service* all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity

* [The German version in the Austro-Hungarian Red-book reads "*aus und civil services*"—and this reading is copied in the German White-book for the insertion of the words "and civil" in the Serbian reply—see B. 39, see B. 4,

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The whole of the public life of Serbia teems with the propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana and of societies affiliated to it ; it is therefore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Serbian Government when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not entirely complied with, as we further required :—

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

In this case also the Serbian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Serbia, when they must know that the school books which have been introduced into the Serbian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the Serbian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Moreover, here, too, the Serbian Government have not complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required, inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired " both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction "—an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Monarchy in the Serbian schools is to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Serbian Government attach to their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service* the condition that

dem Militär- und Zivildienste zu entlassen—"to remove from the military (p. 145)—see also R. 31. But the French text appears to give no warrant vol. I., p. 114—although they were included in the Austrian demand—vol. I., p. 77.]

TRANSLATION.

of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall

⁽¹⁾ [See No. 27.] undertake to accept the collaboration ⁽¹⁾ of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases ("dans des cas concrets" communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

* Old style.

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these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punishable by law in Serbia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Serbia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misrepresentation.⁽¹⁾ We desired :—

^{(1) [cf. No.}
27.]

(1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration⁽¹⁾ of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto ("recherches" as opposed to "enquête judiciaire").

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Serbian judicial proceedings ; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the collection and verification of the material for the enquiry.

If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between "*enquête judiciaire*" and simple "*recherches*" must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the preliminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for such police intervention), they have adopted a standpoint which

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7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosić. As regards Milan Ziganović, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

* Old style.

REMARKS.

is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justification and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

This answer is disingenuous.

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Čiganović was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Čiganović had left the Serbian State Service on the 25th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Čiganović and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Čiganović existed in Belgrade.

The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Serbian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made

⁽¹⁾ [See B. 4, vol. I., p. 81.]

No. 35.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

⁽²⁾ [B. 36.] THE proposal for mediation made by Great Britain,⁽²⁾ that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at London, is declined so far as Germany
⁽³⁾ [*cf.* B. 43.] is concerned⁽³⁾ on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European Court in her settlement with Serbia.

No. 36.

Freiherr Von Müller to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Tokio, July 28, 1914.

TO-DAY'S semi-official *Japan Times* contains a leading article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned—Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia—while it is in no way interested in Serbia. In the case of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, maintain the strictest neutrality.

No. 37.

Count Berchtold to the Royal Serbian Foreign Office at Belgrade.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 50.]

(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

[See S. 45.]

No. 38.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

FOR Your Excellency's information and for communication to the Secretary of State :—

I have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff, dated the 27th inst. :—

" I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir Edward Grey,⁽²⁾ that our action is not one of aggression but of self-defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Serbian independence. What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has passed, and guarantees for the future.

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szápáry.⁽³⁾ [cf. No. 26.]

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we were treating the Serbian answer as if it were a complete refusal.

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference.⁽⁴⁾

[B. 36.]

The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue.

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day⁽¹⁾ amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refraining from military operations against Serbia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State expressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war with Serbia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable.

As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day, would for the present remain there. 'We had not called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home again.'

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference necessarily breaks down."

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events.

No. 39.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

WE attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Serbia in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Serbian answer, and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of explaining to the Secretary of State⁽²⁾ in detail the dossier⁽³⁾ which is being sent to you by post, and that you will emphasise the specially salient passages; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the

⁽²⁾ [See B.

91.]

⁽³⁾ [No. 19.]

Serbian note (the text of the note with our observations⁽¹⁾ [No. 34.] has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday), and you should make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive⁽²⁾ Europe without giving any guarantee for the future.

As the Serbian Government knew that only an unconditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Serbian tactics can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfil her promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisation of the Serbian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th July at 3 o'clock,⁽³⁾ while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock.⁽⁴⁾ Up to then we had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian mobilisation we were compelled to do so.

⁽²⁾ [cf. Intro.
p. 177;
B. 32,
93 (1).]

⁽³⁾ [No. 23;
S. 41 and
note.]

⁽⁴⁾ [See No.
24 and
note, also
footnote
p. 126.]

No. 40.

Count Berchtold to Count Szapáry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

FOR your Excellency's information and guidance:

The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day⁽⁵⁾ [cf. B. 93 in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, (1).] and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th instant),⁽⁶⁾ in the course⁽⁶⁾ [No. 31.] of which he had discussed with great readiness the various points of the Serbian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion that Serbia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him under these circumstances that the

Serbian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency should receive instructions with this end in view.

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Serbia.

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations towards Serbia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our restless neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because

⁽¹⁾[No. 23; S. 41 and note; also footnote p. 126.] Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation,⁽¹⁾ and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday

⁽²⁾[cf. No. 41] hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier⁽²⁾ on the part of Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown towards Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Serbia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Serbian provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.

No. 41.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

THE British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day⁽¹⁾ has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Serbia as follows:—

The British Government have followed the previous course of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach importance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely understand the grievances which we have against Serbia.

If England has no ground for making our dispute with Serbia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this conflict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe.

To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation⁽²⁾ to the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in common with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual contact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Governments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and if this were not possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision involving bloodshed; if necessary, by the Serbians withdrawing without

⁽¹⁾[cf. B.
62.]

accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Serbia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between us and Serbia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Serbian frontier,⁽¹⁾ and to-day war has been declared by us against Serbia.⁽²⁾ I had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Serbian answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ultimatum. Serbia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by subterfuges. We knew these Serbian methods only too well.

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate representation of the facts.

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Serbia, and directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment.

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agreement, Serbia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace.

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully understood our point of view but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to

remain in constant communication with me as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European conflagration, to be of special value.

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end.

No. 42.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following⁽¹⁾ in my name :

" According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered ; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the military districts which border on Austria-Hungary—Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan—will be mobilised, should our troops cross the Serbian frontier.

" Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire."

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany.

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 28, 33 ; W. exh. II.]

No. 43.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

INFORMATION has been received from the Imperial German Ambassador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government⁽¹⁾ to use their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for their con-

⁽²⁾ [Austrian consideration.⁽²⁾ reply,

No. 44.]

No. 44.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

FOR your Excellency's information.

I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the following memorandum in answer to a *démarche* made

⁽³⁾ [See No. here by him :⁽³⁾ 43.]

Memorandum.

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst. with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Government should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky,⁽⁴⁾ the Imperial and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact that the Serbian answer in no way

contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their astonishment at the assumption that their action against Serbia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely a Serbian but a Russian origin. The basis of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Monarchy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against Serbia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly.

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Serbian reply in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time of the *démarche* made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Serbia had already arisen,⁽¹⁾ and the [S. 45.] Serbian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of observing that the Royal Serbian Government, even before they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation of the Serbian forces,⁽²⁾ and thereafter [No. 23; S. 41 and note.] they allowed three days to elapse without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view contained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war⁽³⁾ followed on our [S. 45.] side.

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this.

No. 45.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 29, 1914.

¹⁾ [cf. W. tions⁽¹⁾ as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a
exh. II.] certain exaggeration.

" [cf. Y. to-day,⁽²⁾ and to point out that in these circumstances
101.] Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous.

Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France.

No. 46.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

" [July 26.] AS early as Sunday⁽³⁾ the German Government declared at St. Petersburg that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German mobilisation.⁽⁴⁾

" [cf. No. 33.] 28.] Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced in my telegram of the 27th inst.⁽⁵⁾ Following this a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures
" [cf. Y. 100; O. 58.] of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobilise.⁽⁶⁾

No. 47.

Count Szapáry to Count Berchtold.⁽⁷⁾

" [Reply, No. 49.] (Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

AS I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your

Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist.

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July⁽¹⁾ that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remained localised, of annexing Serbian territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Serbia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Serbia our conditions would result in Serbia becoming a vassal State.⁽²⁾ This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Serbia. I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against Serbia.⁽³⁾ M. Sazonof assured me that it was

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B. 97; also Tsar to King George, p. 310.]

not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition (*Lizithieren*) which now threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very characteristically expressed the view that *he could communicate this*

¹⁾ [i.e., the to the Chief of the General Staff, for he⁽¹⁾ saw His Majesty every chief of the day.

General Staff.]

²⁾ [See B.
70 (1).]

The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat extended form.⁽²⁾ He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's attention to the impression which such a measure would make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness(!) of this measure.

No. 48.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised.⁽³⁾ He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power, and

³⁾ [See B.
70 (1).]

was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial and Royal Military Attaché, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied.

I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at once.⁽¹⁾

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are accredited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian mobilisation would have as a result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences.

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, in our military operations against Serbia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declaration as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions.

No. 49.

Count Berchtold to Count Szapáry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

IN answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July.⁽²⁾

[No. 47.]

I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to Serbia which however has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through M. Schébéko, also to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which

⁽¹⁾ [cf. O. 24, 47.]

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 50, 56; B. 110; O. 66.] Nos. affect directly our relations towards Russia.⁽¹⁾ From this ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object.

No. 50.

Count Berchtold to Count Szapáry at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance :—

⁽¹⁾ [cf. O. 66.] I have to-day explained to M. Schébéko⁽²⁾ that I have been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal⁽³⁾ of his proposal as to a discussion with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M. Schébéko.

⁽⁴⁾ [No. 49.] With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your Excellency by telegram⁽⁴⁾ to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired with regard to the note—which in any case appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorised your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our special relations towards Russia.

⁽⁵⁾ [cf. No. 56; B. 137.] That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had taken place between M. Schébéko and myself must rest on a misunderstanding,⁽⁵⁾ as M. Schébéko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before,⁽⁶⁾ a fact which the Ambassador confirmed with the observation ⁽⁶⁾ [See No. 40.] that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.

M. Schébéko then explained why our action against Serbia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we were a Great Power which was proceeding against the small Serbian State, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were ; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground.

Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate of Serbia,⁽¹⁾ which was linked to Russia by historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions afterwards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with reference to these demands they would do everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasised the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in Serbia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Serbia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Serbia. I also gave M. Schébéko clearly to understand to how large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible authorities.

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the Russian mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against Serbia ; against Russia not a single man ; and this would be observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schébéko to announce this to his Government, and this he promised to do.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. O.
10.]

No. 51.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I AM telegraphing as follows to Berlin :—

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky⁽¹⁾ in which the British Secretary of State made the following announcement to the German Ambassador :—

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary, and he therefore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of mediation. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a condition precedent to this.

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky⁽²⁾ that Great Britain thought of a mediation *à quatre*, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to be prevented.

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude.

No. 52.

Count Szapáry to Count Berchtold.(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*THE order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army
and Fleet was issued early to-day.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.
113; Y.
118; W.
exh. 24.]

No. 53.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic
Representatives.*(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 31, 1914.*FOR your information and for use in your dealings with
the Government to which you are accredited.As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Govern-
ment on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military
measures in Galicia.These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise
exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures,
which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggres-
sive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the
continuation of the former neighbourly relations.*Pourparlers* between the Cabinets at Vienna and St.
Petersburg appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being
continued,⁽²⁾ and from these we hope that things will quieten
down all round.

⁽²⁾ [cf. B.
110; O.
66.]

No. 54.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July 31, 1914.*GERMAN Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions
of his Government has declared here that if the general
mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not
stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobilise.⁽³⁾ At
the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will
remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and
Russia.⁽⁴⁾ An answer to this is requested within eighteen
hours. The time-limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at
1 o'clock in the afternoon.

⁽³⁾ [cf. O.
70 and
note; W.
exh. 24.]

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. Y.
117, 125.]

No. 55.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

⁽¹⁾ [Nos. 49, 50.] YOUR Excellency's telegram of the 30th July⁽¹⁾ has been received.

You will have gathered from my telegram of the 29th⁽²⁾ [No. 47.] July, ⁽²⁾ that without waiting for instructions I again resumed⁽³⁾ [*cf.* B. 110; O. 66.] conversations with M. Sazonof⁽³⁾ more or less on the basis which has now been indicated to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other.

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the territory of the Serbian Kingdom nor infringe on Serbian sovereignty, nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere; since then moreover⁽⁴⁾ [No. 52.] a general mobilisation has been ordered on the part of Russia.⁽⁴⁾

No. 56.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

I VISITED M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received instructions, but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in Vienna by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the

⁽⁵⁾ [Nos. 49, 50.] two instructions of Your Excellency⁽⁵⁾ dealt with the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, assured him. Your Excellency was not only quite

⁽⁶⁾ [*cf.* B. 137, 161; Y. 120.] prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned.⁽⁶⁾

I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency afforded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was unknown to me; but I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral *terrain* of London.⁽¹⁾ I replied that Your Excellency, as I [cf. Y. 98 and note.] had already observed, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your Excellency.

No. 57.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

THE Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand.⁽²⁾

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (south-east of Bialla).

Russia has thus attacked Germany.⁽³⁾

Germany, therefore, regards herself as at war with Russia.⁽⁴⁾

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports; he intends to leave to-day.

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 54; O. 70.]

⁽³⁾ [cf. W. P. 135.]

⁽⁴⁾ [Declaration of war, O. 76.]

No. 58.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

London, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent to Germany an ultimatum on account of Belgium.⁽⁵⁾ [B. 159.] They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night.

Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the formality of a previous declaration of war.⁽¹⁾ He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

⁽¹⁾[Reply,
No. 60.]

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to co-operate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

No. 59.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.
(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

⁽²⁾[Pre-sented
Aug. 6—
see O. 79.] I ASK Your Excellency to hand over the following note⁽²⁾ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

“ On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows :—

“ In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment.”

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that passports may be prepared, and you will leave without delay with the entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schébéko is being furnished with his passport by us.

No. 60.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 6, 1914.

I HAVE received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾[No. 58.]

I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostilities against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act against us before formally declaring war.

No. 61.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.⁽²⁾⁽²⁾[Reply,
No. 62.]*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 8, 1914.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive information which has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency.

No. 62.

Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen at Paris.⁽³⁾⁽³⁾[Reply,
No. 63.]

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 9, 1914.

WITH reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 8th instant.⁽⁴⁾

⁽⁴⁾[No. 61.]

After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency to inform the French Government that the information regarding the participation of our troops in the ⁽¹⁾[*cf.* No. 64.] Franco-German war is a complete invention.⁽¹⁾ I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. Dumaine.

No. 63.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 10, 1914.

⁽²⁾[No. 62.] I HAVE received your telegram of the 9th August⁽²⁾ and communicated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Germany, and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw her troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is undeniable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to

⁽³⁾[See No. 64.] ⁽³⁾In these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use; indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occasion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of ⁽⁴⁾[*cf.* No. 64.] M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared.⁽⁴⁾

No. 64.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

Vienna, August 11, 1914.

THE French Government have commissioned their Ambassador here to ask for his passports⁽¹⁾ on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from those German districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assistance to Germany.

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British Government that according to information obtained from a reliable source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. No. 63.]

⁽²⁾ [cf. No. 62.]

No. 65.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.)

London, August 12, 1914.

I HAVE just received from Sir E. Grey the following communication :—

At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you the following communication :—

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Serbia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, extended the war to France :—

(1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the conflict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting on the side of France.

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to France.

In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these threats.

Sir E. Grey adds :—

As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.
161.]

No. 66.

The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.

(Translated from the English.)

MY LORD,

Vienna, August 20, 1914.

YOUR Excellency will doubtless have already received information from his Excellency Baron Müller of the communication which was addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst.⁽²⁾ Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excellency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which I have received from Tokio.

⁽²⁾ [cf. Nos.
68, 69.
For
text of
Japanese
ultima-
tum as
given in
D.O.W.,
see p.
295.]

Enclosure.

The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to

take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before proceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Government, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following words :—

“ (1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed.

(2) The German Government must unconditionally and without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory back to China.

The Japanese Government have informed the German Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them.

It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German Government ; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end.”

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree.

No. 67.

Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels.

(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 22, 1914.

I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once :—⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. G. 77.]

Reply, G. 78.] “ I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Government :—

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity,⁽²⁾ and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium.

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the United States in Belgium.

Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports from the Imperial and Royal Government.

No. 68.

Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 23, 1914.

THE Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum.⁽³⁾ The German Government have instructed their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan, at

12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same time, furnish the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires here with his passports.

At mid-day the Chargé d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy.

No. 69.


Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Müller at Tokio.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 24, 1914.

THE Commander of S.M.S. "Elisabeth" has been instructed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau.⁽¹⁾ I ask your Excellency, in view of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished with his passports.

⁽¹⁾[cf. Nos. 66, 67; also pp. 301, 302.]



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Japanese Foreign Office Statement.⁽¹⁾

Tokio, August 5.

THE Imperial Government entertains the deepest anxiety regarding the political and economic situation arising from the latest developments of European politics. It hopes that peace will be quickly restored and that the war will not extend and that Japan will be able to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality. It is necessary, however, that the closest attention be paid to future developments.

In the event of Great Britain becoming involved, the terms of the Japanese Alliance ⁽²⁾ will be affected and Japan will take the necessary measures to discharge her obligations under the treaty. The Imperial Government, however, sincerely trusts that this contingency may never arise.

(Reuter.)

Telegram from the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, to the German Ambassador in Tokio, August 12, 1914.

EAST Asiatic Squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government. No answer to this has been received from Japan.

(D.O.W.)

Ultimatum⁽³⁾ presented to the German Government by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, Baron Funakoshi, on August 17,⁽⁴⁾ 1914.

CONSIDERING it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East, and to safeguard the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure

⁽¹⁾ [cf. fuller statement quoted by Baron Kato, p. 298.]

⁽²⁾ [For declaration accompanying the ultimatum, see R. 66.]

⁽³⁾ ["Handed over to the German Government on the 15th August." —Baron Kato, see p. 300; cf. R. 66.]

a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions :—

(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

(D.O.W.)

Speech by the Japanese Prime Minister.

THE Japanese Prime Minister⁽¹⁾ in a speech last night⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ [Count Okuma.] said :

⁽²⁾ [Aug. 19.]

Japan's object is to eliminate from continental China the root of German influence, which constitutes a constant menace to the peace of the Far East, and thus to secure the aim of the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for territorial aggrandisement and entertains no desire to promote any other selfish end.

Japan's warlike operations will not, therefore, extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object and for the defence of her own legitimate interests. Accordingly the Imperial Government has no hesitation in announcing to the world that it will take no action such as to give to the Powers any cause for anxiety or uneasiness regarding the safety of their territories or possessions.

(*Press Bureau, August 20, 1914.*)

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*Japanese Imperial Rescript declaring War upon Germany,
August 23, 1914.*

WE, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects :—

We, hereby, declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We, on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, Our Government, and that of His Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance,⁽¹⁾ and We on Our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded Our Government to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German Government.⁽²⁾ By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice.

It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while we are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother.

It is Our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valour of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced.

(The Times, August 24, 1914.)

(1) [See
p. 504.]

(2) [See
p. 295.]

⁽¹⁾ [Minister for Foreign Affairs.] SPEECH OF BARON KATO⁽¹⁾ IN THE IMPERIAL DIET, TOKIO, ON SEPTEMBER 5TH, 1914.

(Translation from Japanese Official Gazette. Courteously supplied by H.E. the Marquis Inouyé, Japanese Ambassador in London.)

AFTER a brief survey of the multifarious circumstances which led up to the present war, Baron Kato said :

Thus finding the peace of Europe hanging in the balance, the Imperial Government could not view, but with grave concern, the further developments of the situation. Deeming it necessary in these circumstances to make their attitude clear to the public, the Imperial Foreign Office issued a statement couched in the following terms⁽²⁾ on the 4th August.

"The Imperial Government can hardly view the recent developments of the European situation but with grave anxiety both out of political and economical considerations. It is needless to say that it is the most earnest wish of the Imperial Government to see the present conflict brought to a happy conclusion and peace restored at the earliest possible moment. In case, however, the present war is to be protracted against our desire, the Imperial Government sincerely hope that the conflagration could in all probability be confined to the localities now affected by it and that they could maintain strict neutrality. As to the further developments of the situation, however, we feel it our duty to follow them with the closest possible attention. If England were forced to enter into the rank of combatants and the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance⁽³⁾ were jeopardised in consequence, the Imperial Government might be obliged to resort to a measure they deem fit for discharging the obligations laid upon them by the agreement of the Alliance. It can scarcely be predicted at the present moment whether the events would take such a course as to bring about such a contingency. While entertaining the most ardent wish that things of this kind may never happen, the Imperial Government are nevertheless following the development of events with the closest attention."

As clearly stated in this statement, the Imperial Government desired from the outset that the European conflagration

⁽¹⁾ [cf. condensed statement transmitted by Reuter, p. 295.]

⁽²⁾ [See p. 504.]

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should never spread so widely as to involve the Far East in its calamities. Great Britain, however, having been compelled to participate in this war, at the beginning of August requested the Imperial Government under the agreement of the Alliance to render them assistance in the matter. At that time, the British trade in the Far East was exposed to great danger owing to the presence of the German war vessels in the Eastern Seas, and our oversea trade was also impeded to no small extent, while at the same time, in Kiau-chao, the German leased territory in the Far East, every possible effort was made, day in and day out, to complete the warlike preparations, with a view to making it the basis of Germany's military operations in the Orient. The maintenance of peace was thus rendered very difficult. As you are well aware, the agreement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has for its object the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in Eastern Asia, the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of China, the consecration of the principle of equal opportunity in China, and, further, the maintenance of the territorial rights of Great Britain and Japan in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their special interests in these regions. Now owing to the fact that her trade and commerce in the Orient—to which great importance is attached by her as one of her special interests in common with Japan—were menaced by her enemies, Great Britain addressed her request to us to render her such assistance as was in our power, and the Imperial Government, whose foreign policy is based upon the Alliance, had no alternative but to accede to this request and lend her their helping hand in her hour of need. Moreover, the Imperial Government deemed it not only a great impediment to the consolidation of general peace in the Far East, but also prejudicial to the interest of this Empire, that Germany, whose policy is prone to be at variance with the aims of the Alliance, should possess a base for her influence in the Far East. In these circumstances the Imperial Government could not escape from the conclusion that it was inevitable that they should draw the sword against Germany in compliance with the demand of Great Britain. After having laid their view before His Majesty the Emperor, and having obtained the Imperial approval thereof, the Cabinet made a communication to this effect to the British

Government. Following upon the heels of this communication, a frank and full exchange of views took place between the two Governments, which confirmed the Imperial Government in the view that it was a matter of supreme importance that they should at once take suitable measures for the protection and defence of general interests as contemplated in the agreement of the Alliance. It need hardly be said at this juncture that the Imperial Government had not the slightest idea of plunging themselves into the turmoil of the present struggle, but they deemed it their duty that they should endeavour to ensure permanent peace in the Orient, safeguard the special interests of our Ally, and uphold the spirit of the Alliance, thereby consolidating its strength. The Imperial Government, actuated as they were by the idea that it was best calculated to realise the object in view if the settlement of the matter were achieved by peaceful means even at the eleventh hour, decided to offer sincere advice to the Imperial German Government. Accordingly the note couched in the following terms⁽¹⁾ was handed over to the German Government on the 15th August⁽²⁾:

⁽¹⁾ [cf. text
in
D.O.W.,
see p. 295.]

⁽²⁾ [Pre-
sented to
the
German
Govern-
ment by
Baron
Funakoshi on
Aug. 17,
according
to
D.O.W.,
see p. 295;
cf. R. 66.]

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver, on a date not later than 15th September, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiau-chao, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

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The Imperial Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon of August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying the unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

The date prescribed in the above note, namely, 23rd August, passed, but no reply was received from the German Government. The result was the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the state of war was brought into existence. As is still fresh in your minds, the Imperial Rescript declaring war against Germany⁽¹⁾ was issued in the afternoon of 23rd August.

[See p. 297.]

In regard to Austria-Hungary, her interests in the Orient are, so to speak, infinitesimal. Besides, the Imperial Government, having no interest in the Austro-Serbian dispute, which, as you know, is the genesis of the present European conflict, had entertained the hope that they could continue peaceful relations with the Dual Monarchy, and they were given to understand that this hope was reciprocated on the part of the latter, as is illustrated in the following instance. On the eve of the outbreak of war against Germany, the Government of Austria-Hungary, pointing out the presence of her cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*⁽²⁾ in the Far East, which she feared might constitute the only and sole chance of creating hostile relations between the two countries, signified her willingness to instruct the said cruiser to proceed to Shanghai, a neutral port, and remain there entirely dismantled for the duration of war between Japan and Germany, and expressed the hope, at the same time, that the Imperial Government would give the said cruiser suitable guarantee, so as to enable her to sail from Kiau-chao to Shanghai in peace. Having no occasion whatever to wage war against Austria-Hungary, still less any necessity therefor, the Imperial Government had the intention to let the *Kaiserin Elizabeth* sail to Shanghai in peace as desired by Austria-Hungary, but just at that moment the British men-of-war, placed under the Commander-in-Chief of our Fleet, were already afloat for action in certain seas. We feared, therefore, that, even though our warships

⁽¹⁾ [cf. R. 69, p. 293.]

did nothing towards the Austrian cruiser, a British war vessel might open action against her and frustrate our plan of letting her ply her course to Shanghai. Under these circumstances, before giving consent to the Austrian request, the Imperial Government brought their desire to the notice of the British Government and obtained the reply from that quarter to the effect that, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Government, they were ready to accede to the request of the Austrian Government under certain conditions. Having thus procured a satisfactory answer from our Ally, I was just on the point of intimating our decision in regard to this matter to the Austrian Ambassador here, when he informed me that he was in receipt of instructions from his Government charging him to leave Tokio and return home forthwith, and applied

⁽¹⁾ [See R. 69.] to me for the passports.⁽¹⁾ It was much against my liking, but in these circumstances I had no alternative but to meet his request by handing him over the required passports. Simultaneously, I sent instructions to our Ambassador at Vienna to address a similar request to the Government to which he was accredited and return home. These are the circumstances which led up to the outbreak of war against Germany and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and Austria-Hungary.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I should like to make reference to the courtesy shown by the Government of the United States of America towards the Imperial Government in connection with the present crisis. No sooner had the diplomatic relations with Germany entered upon a very acute and critical stage than the Imperial Government requested the American Government that, in the event of the outbreak of war between Japan and Germany, they would have the goodness to place all our public establishments and our countrymen in Germany under their protection. Later on, upon the rupture of diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary, we addressed a similar request to that Government. On both occasions they readily acceded to our request with willingness, and since then they have spared no pains in looking after the welfare of our countrymen remaining in the enemy countries. I feel sure I am giving a voice to the sentiments of the House when I express, in the name of the Imperial Government, the deep sense of gratitude

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for these acts of courtesy and good will manifested by the Government of the United States of America. It is a cause of profound regret on my part that our Empire was forced to employ her arms against Germany, but I am fully convinced His August Majesty's Army and Navy will in no circumstance fail to achieve acts of bravery and loyalty, as they have done on the previous occasions, and I pray with you all that a day may soon come when peace will be restored.

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARÉ.

LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

(Published officially in Great Britain on February 20, 1915.)

No. I.

⁽¹⁾ [Men-
tioned in
Y. 110,
(vol. I.,
p. 376).]

The President of the French Republic to the King.⁽¹⁾

Paris, le 31 juillet, 1914.

DANS les circonstances graves que traverse l'Europe, je crois devoir communiquer à votre Majesté les renseignements que le Gouvernement de la République a reçus d'Allemagne. Les préparatifs militaires auxquels se livre le Gouvernement Impérial, notamment dans le voisinage immédiat de la frontière française, prennent chaque jour une intensité et une accélération nouvelles. La France, résolue à faire jusqu'au bout tout ce qui dépendra d'elle pour maintenir la paix, s'est bornée jusqu'ici aux mesures de précaution les plus indispensables. Mais il ne semble pas que sa prudence et sa modération ralentissent les dispositions de l'Allemagne ; loin de là. Nous sommes donc, peut-être, malgré la sagesse du Gouvernement de la République et le calme de l'opinion, à la veille des événements les plus redoutables.

De toutes les informations qui nous arrivent, il résulte que si l'Allemagne avait la certitude que le Gouvernement anglais n'interviendrait pas dans un conflit où la France serait engagée, la guerre serait inévitable, et qu'en revanche, si l'Allemagne avait la certitude que l'entente cordiale s'affirmait, le cas échéant, jusque sur les champs de bataille, il y aurait les plus grandes chances pour que la paix ne fût pas troublée.

Sans doute nos accords militaires et navals laissent entière la liberté du Gouvernement de votre Majesté, et, dans les lettres échangées en 1912 entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul

4] KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARÉ

Cambon, l'Angleterre et la France se sont simplement engagées, l'une vis-à-vis de l'autre, à causer entre elles en cas de tension européenne et à examiner ensemble s'il y avait lieu à une action commune. Mais le caractère d'intimité que le sentiment public a donné, dans les deux pays, à l'entente de l'Angleterre et de la France, la confiance avec laquelle nos deux Gouvernements n'ont cessé de travailler au maintien de la paix, les sympathies que votre Majesté a toujours témoignées à la France, m'autorisent à lui faire connaître, en toute franchise, mes impressions, qui sont celles du Gouvernement de la République et de la France entière.

C'est, je crois, du langage et de la conduite du Gouvernement anglais que dépendent désormais les dernières possibilités d'une solution pacifique.

Nous avons nous-mêmes, dès le début de la crise, recommandé à nos Alliés une modération, dont ils ne se sont pas départis. D'accord avec le Gouvernement Royal et conformément aux dernières suggestions de Sir E. Grey, nous continuerons à agir dans le même sens.

Mais si tous les efforts de conciliation partent du même côté, et si l'Allemagne et l'Autriche peuvent spéculer sur l'abstention de l'Angleterre, les exigences de l'Autriche demeureront inflexibles et un accord deviendra impossible entre la Russie et elle. J'ai la conviction profonde qu'à l'heure actuelle, plus l'Angleterre, la France et la Russie donneront une forte impression d'unité dans leur action diplomatique, plus il sera encore permis de compter sur la conservation de la paix.

Votre Majesté voudra bien excuser une démarche qui n'est inspirée que par le désir de voir l'équilibre européen définitivement raffermi.

Je prie votre Majesté de croire à mes sentiments les plus cordiaux.

R. POINCARÉ.

(TRANSLATION.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

Dear and Great Friend,

IN the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which

the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us, it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged⁽¹⁾; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon,⁽²⁾ Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the *entente* between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.
17; Y. 63.]

⁽²⁾ [See B.
105
(enclos.)]

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARÉ

they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestion, we will continue to act on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

R. POINCARÉ.

No. 2.

The King to the President of the French Republic.

Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914.

Dear and Great Friend,

I MOST highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military

KING GEORGE V. AND M. POINCARÉ [AUGUST

measures on the frontier, and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia⁽¹⁾ and of Germany⁽²⁾ towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

Believe me,

M. le Président,

(Signed) GEORGE R.I.

(*British White-paper, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1915) Cd. 7812.*)

914]

KING GEORGE V. AND THE TSAR.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND HIS MAJESTY THE TSAR.

(Published officially in Great Britain on August 5, 1914.)

No. I.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan (St. Petersburg.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

YOU should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King:—

" My Government has received the following statement from the German Government:—

" On July 29th the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria.⁽¹⁾ The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so.⁽²⁾ He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor⁽³⁾ that hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Government continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning.⁽⁴⁾ During the deliberations of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported

⁽¹⁾ [W. exh. 21; Y. app. V. (II.).]

⁽²⁾ [W. exh. 22; Y. app. V. (III.).]

⁽³⁾ [W., p. 133; Y. app. V. (VII.).]

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. B. 110.]

KING GEORGE V. AND THE TSAR

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⁽¹⁾ [cf. W. the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet.⁽¹⁾
 ex. 24.] Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany—that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore
⁽²⁾ [O. 70 ; informed Russia⁽²⁾ that, unless she were prepared to suspend
 R. 54.] within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain
⁽³⁾ [Y. 117.] neutral during a German-Russian war.'⁽³⁾

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world."

No. 2.

His Majesty the Tsar to His Majesty King George.

August 1, 1914.

I WOULD gladly have accepted your proposals had not
⁽⁴⁾ [“at 7.¹⁰ p.m.”] German Ambassador this afternoon⁽⁴⁾ presented a note to
 O. 76.] my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of
⁽⁵⁾ [cf. B. 55, 97; R. 47.] the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Serbia and make her a vassal⁽⁵⁾ of Austria. Effect of this would

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have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilisation,⁽¹⁾ [B. 70 (1).] though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation,⁽²⁾ [O. 47.] of the bombardment of Belgrade,⁽³⁾ [Y. 113.] of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia,⁽⁴⁾ [O. 76.] and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war,⁽⁵⁾ [Y. app. V. (VI.).] which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you.

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICES.

I.—GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

A STATE OF WAR.

HIS Majesty's Government informed the German Government on August 4th, 1914, that, unless a satisfactory reply to the request of His Majesty's Government for an assurance that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium was received by midnight of that day, His Majesty's Government would feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold that neutrality and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as Great Britain.

The result of this communication having been that His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin had to ask for his passports, His Majesty's Government have accordingly formally notified the German Government that a state of war exists between the two countries as from 11 p.m. to-day.

Foreign Office,

August 4th, 1914.

(London Gazette, August 5, 1914.)

II.—GREAT BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

NOTICE.

DIPLOMATIC relations between France and Austria being broken off, the French Government have requested His Majesty's Government to communicate to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London the following Declaration :

“Après avoir déclaré la guerre à la Serbie et pris ainsi la première initiative des hostilités en Europe, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois s'est mis, sans aucune provocation du Gouvernement de la République Française, en état de guerre avec la France ;

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICES

1°.—Après que l'Allemagne avait successivement déclaré la guerre à la Russie et à la France, il est intervenu dans ce conflit en déclarant la guerre à la Russie qui combattait déjà aux côtes de la France.

2°.—D'après de nombreuses informations dignes de foi, l'Autriche a envoyé des troupes sur la frontière allemande, dans des conditions qui constituent une menace directe à l'égard de la France.

En présence de cet ensemble de faits, le Gouvernement français se voit obligé de déclarer au Gouvernement austro-hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les mesures qui lui permettront de répondre à ces actes et à ces menaces."

In communicating this Declaration accordingly to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, His Majesty's Government have declared to His Excellency that the rupture with France having been brought about in this way, they feel themselves obliged to announce that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary as from midnight.

Foreign Office,

August 12th, 1914.

(London Gazette, August 13, 1914.)

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS.

(a) DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY GERMANY.

⁽¹⁾[So
headed in
D.O.W.
For
British
reply see
p. 329;
Belgian
reply,
p. 350,
also
p. 341.]

“THE BRUSSELS DOCUMENTS I.”⁽¹⁾

(North German Gazette, October 13, 1914.)*

THE assertion of the British Government that the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany was the cause of England's participation in the present war, has already been proved untenable by Sir Edward Grey's own declaration. Certain documents discovered by the German military authorities in the archives of the Belgian General Staff in Brussels throw a new and somewhat peculiar light upon the pathetic moral indignation at the German invasion of Belgium, with which the English tried to stir up the feeling in neutral countries against Germany.

From the contents of a portfolio bearing the inscription, “Intervention anglaise en Belgique,” it is evident that the despatch of an English expeditionary corps to Belgium in the event of a Franco-German war was already contemplated as far back as the year 1906. According to a report of April 10th, 1906,⁽²⁾ addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, which was found there, the chief of the Belgian General Staff, after repeatedly conferring with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, then English Military Attaché in Brussels, worked out upon the latter's initiative and in conjunction with him, a detailed plan for joint operations against Germany of the Belgian Army and an English expeditionary force of 100,000 men. This plan met with the approval of Major-General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff. Full information as to the strength and organisation of the British troops, as to the composition of the expeditionary corps, as to the places of disembarkation and the exact time of the despatch of the troops, &c., was communicated to the Belgian General Staff. On the ground of this information, the Belgian General Staff

^(*)[For text
of this
report see
pp. 331
et seq..]

* [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.]

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

thoroughly prepared for the transport of the British troops to the basis of their strategical operations against Germany, and also for the housing and feeding of the troops. All the details of the co-operation of the latter with the Belgians were carefully worked out. Thus a large number of interpreters and Belgian gendarmes were to be placed at the disposal of the British Army, and the necessary maps were to be supplied to them. Provisions were even made for the care of the British wounded.

Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne were selected as ports of disembarkation for the British troops. From these places they were to be transported by Belgian trains into the fighting zone. The fact that the disembarkation at French ports and the transport through French territory were planned, proves that the Anglo-Belgian arrangements were preceded by arrangements with the French General Staff. These three Powers drew up the exact plans for the co-operation of the "allied armies," as the document says. This is further substantiated by the fact that among the secret documents there was also found a map showing the French lines of deployment.

The report mentioned above contains some remarks of special interest. It is said there that Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had remarked that Holland's support could not be relied upon at the time (1906), and that he had further given the confidential information that the British Government intended to transfer to Antwerp the basis for provisioning the British Army, as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. The British Military Attaché also suggested the establishment of a spy service in the Prussian Rhine Province.

A valuable supplement to the military documents discovered, was found amongst the secret papers in the shape of a report by Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, addressed to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In it Baron Greindl reveals with great acumen the real reasons which prompted England to make her offer, and he points out the dangerous situation in which Belgium had placed herself by taking sides with the Entente Powers. In this very detailed report, dated December 23rd, 1911, the full text of which may at the Government's discretion be published in due course, Baron Greindl points out that the plan, drawn

up by the Belgian General Staff for the defence of Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war and communicated to him (the Minister), had bearing only on the question of what military measures should be taken in the event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, whereas the hypothesis of a French attack upon Germany through Belgium was equally within the range of possibilities. The Minister then proceeds as follows⁽¹⁾:

"VON der französischen Seite her droht die Gefahr nicht nur im Süden von Luxemburg. Sie bedroht uns auf unserer ganzen gemeinsamen Grenze. Für diese Behauptung sind wir nicht nur auf Mutmassungen angewiesen. Wir haben dafür positive Anhaltspunkte.

"Der Gedanke einer Umfassungsbewegung von Norden her gehört zweifellos zu den Kombinationen der *Entente cordiale*. Wenn das nicht der Fall wäre, so hätte der Plan, Vlissingen zu befestigen, nicht ein solches Geschrei in Paris und London hervorgerufen. Man hat dort den Grund gar nicht verheimlicht, aus dem man wünschte, dass die Schelde ohne Verteidigung bliebe. Man verfolgte dabei den Zweck, unbehindert eine englische Garnison nach Antwerpen überführen zu können, also den Zweck, sich bei uns eine Operationsbasis für eine Offensive in der Richtung auf den Niederrhein und Westfalen zu schaffen und uns dann mit fortzureißen, was nicht schwer gewesen wäre. Denn nach Preisgabe unseres nationalen Zufluchtsortes hätten wir durch unsere eigene Schuld uns jeder Möglichkeit begeben, den Forderungen unserer zweifelhaften Beschützer Widerstand zu leisten, nachdem wir so unklug gewesen wären, sie dort zuzulassen. Die ebenso perfiden wie naiven Eröffnungen des Obersten Barnardiston zur Zeit des Abschlusses der *Entente cordiale* haben uns deutlich gezeigt, um was es sich handelte. Als es sich herausstellte, dass wir uns durch die angeblich drohende Gefahr einer Schließung der Schelde nicht einschüchtern liessen, wurde der Plan zwar nicht aufgegeben, aber dahin abgeändert, dass die englische Hilfsarmee nicht an der belgischen Küste, sondern in den nächstliegenden französischen Häfen gelandet werden sollte. Hierfür zeugen auch die Enthüllungen des Kapitäns Faber, die ebensowenig dementiert worden sind wie die Nachrichten

⁽¹⁾ [For translation of Baron Greindl's remarks, see p. 328.]

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der Zeitungen, durch die sie bestätigt oder in einzelnen Punkten ergänzt worden sind. Diese in Calais und Dünkirchen gelandete englische Armee würde nicht an unserer Grenze entlang nach Longwy marschieren, um Deutschland zu erreichen. Sie würde sofort bei uns von Nordwesten her eindringen. Das würde ihr den Vorteil verschaffen, sofort in Aktion treten zu können, die belgische Armee in einer Gegend zu treffen, in der wir uns auf keine Festung stützen können, falls wir eine Schlacht riskieren wollen. Es würde ihr ermöglichen, an Ressourcen aller Art reiche Provinzen zu besetzen, auf alle Fälle aber unsere Mobilmachung zu behindern oder sie nur zuzulassen, nachdem wir uns formell verpflichtet hätten, die Mobilmachung nur zum Vorteil Englands und seines Bundesgenossen durchzuführen.

“Es ist dringend geboten, im voraus einen Schlachtplan für die belgische Armee auch für diese Eventualität aufzustellen. Das gebietet sowohl das Interesse an unserer militärischen Verteidigung als auch die Führung unserer auswärtigen Politik im Falle eines Krieges zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich.”

These remarks, made by an unbiased personality, prove conclusively that the same Great Britain who is now pretending to be the protectress of Belgian neutrality induced Belgium to side with the Entente Powers, and that at one time England even thought of infringing on the Netherlands' neutrality. Moreover it is clearly shown that the Belgian Government itself, by lending its ear to the British proposals, has rendered itself guilty of a grave offence against the obligations resting upon it as a neutral power. Had the Belgian Government acted in full accordance with the duties of a neutral country, it would have come to an arrangement with Germany similar to the one made with France and England. The papers discovered supply the documentary proof of the fact, known to the German authorities long before the outbreak of war, that Belgium was conniving with the Entente Powers. These papers may serve as a justification of our military action, and also as a confirmation of the reports received by the German military authorities regarding the intentions of France. May they open the eyes of the Belgian people as to whom the catastrophe is due which has overtaken their unfortunate country!

⁽¹⁾ [So
headed
in
D.O.W.]

"THE BRUSSELS DOCUMENTS II."⁽¹⁾

(*North German Gazette*,* November 25, 1914, Special Supplement.)

THE BREACH OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY BY ENGLAND AND BELGIUM.

⁽²⁾ [See
p. 329.]

The British Government has confined its answer⁽²⁾ to our revelations from the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War, concerning the Anglo-Belgian military agreements in 1906, to the statement that Major-General Grierson, who took part in their formulation, had died; that Colonel Barnardiston was away as chief of the English troops before Kiao-chau; and that it was possible that an academic discussion had taken place between those two British officers and the Belgian Military authorities, concerning the assistance which the British Army would be able to give to Belgium in case her neutrality were violated by one of her neighbours.

⁽³⁾ [See
p. 350.]

The Belgian Government has observed⁽³⁾ that it could only be considered as natural that the English Military Attaché in Brussels should, during the Algeciras crisis, have asked the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures which were to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality guaranteed by England. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ducarme,⁽⁴⁾ had answered, that Belgium would be capable of warding off an attack, no matter from which side it might come. The Belgian Government adds to this the following remark:⁽⁵⁾ "Did the conversation exceed these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston explain the war plan which the British General Staff wished to follow in case our neutrality should be violated? We doubt it." Demanding the unabridged publication of the material found in the

⁽⁴⁾ ["Du-
carne" in
"Alman-
ach de
Gotha"
for 1907,
and in
British
docu-
ments.]

⁽⁵⁾ [See p.

351.] the solemn assertion that it was never asked directly or indirectly to take sides with the Triple Entente in case of a Franco-German war.

As may be seen from these declarations, the British Government from the beginning has failed to dispute the statements

* [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

of the Imperial Government. It has limited itself to minimising them. It perhaps suggested itself to the British Government that, owing to the overwhelming abundance of evidence, a denial of the facts would be useless and risky. The discovery, in the meantime, of an Anglo-Belgian military news service, and of Belgian war maps prepared by the British Authorities, prove anew how far the preparations for the Anglo-Belgian war plan against Germany had proceeded.

We reproduce herewith in facsimile the text of the rough draft discovered of the report of General Ducarme⁽¹⁾ to the Belgian Minister of War of April 10th, 1906, which can hardly be unknown to the Belgian Government, inasmuch as the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Greindl, expressly referred to its contents in his report of December 23rd, 1911.⁽²⁾ If, however, the memory of the Belgian Government should be faulty, its doubts concerning the themes treated in the conversations of General Ducarme⁽¹⁾ with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston may be dissipated by the following text of the report which was preserved in the Belgian Ministry of War, in an envelope containing the inscription, "Conventions⁽³⁾ anglo-belges."

The report of General Ducarme⁽¹⁾ reads, in translation, as follows :—

[For the original French text and English translation of General Ducarne's report see pp. 331-339.]

The *North German Gazette* gives the document in facsimile, and also prints in facsimile, as the inscription on the cover of the report, the words "Conventions anglo-belges." But as to the word "Conventions" see British official comment, vol. I., p. 23, footnote.]

It will be noted that the following note appears on the margin of the document : "L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne." (The entry of the English into Be'gium shall not take place until after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.) How the matter really stood appears from a note found in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, concerning a conversation of a successor of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, the British Military Attaché in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, with the Belgian Chief of the General Staff,

⁽¹⁾ [See note p. 318.]

⁽²⁾ [See p. 328.]

⁽³⁾ [See British official comment, vol. I., p. 23, footnote.]

ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

[NOVEMBER]

⁽¹⁾[In
C.D.D.
it is
officially
dated
“April
24,
1912.”]

General Jungbluth. The document, which is dated April 23rd and probably dates from the year 1912,⁽¹⁾ bears the inscription “confidentielle” in the handwriting of Count van der Straaten, Director in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, and reads in translation as follows :

[For the French original and English translation of this document see pp. 339-341.]

Here it is plainly stated that the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, to send troops to Belgium immediately, that is to say, to violate Belgian neutrality and do the very thing which England, at the time when Germany, justified by reasons of self-protection, anticipated her, used as a pretext for declaring war on Germany. Moreover, the British Government, with a cynicism that is unparalleled in history, has taken advantage of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality for the purpose of raising sentiment against us all over the world and of posing as the protector of small and weak States.

As regards the Belgian Government, it was its duty not only to reject most emphatically the British insinuations, but also to point out to the other signatories of the London Protocol of 1839,⁽²⁾ and especially to the German Government, that England had repeatedly tempted Belgium to disregard the duties incumbent upon her as a neutral power. The Belgian Government, however, did not do so. That Government considered itself justified in taking, in agreement with the British General Staff, military precautions against the supposed plan of a German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government has never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government or the military authorities of Germany, defensive measures against the possibility of an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium. Yet the documentary evidence which has been found proves that Belgium was fully informed that such an invasion was intended by the two Entente Powers. This shows that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies and to make common cause with them.

⁽²⁾[See
P. 487.]

I.] ANGLO-BELGIAN RELATIONS

"BRITISH ESPIONAGE IN BRUSSELS."⁽¹⁾

(*North German Gazette*,* November 6, 1914.)

⁽¹⁾ [So
headed in
D.O.W.]

E. M. de l'ARMEE ANGLAISE

Je soussigné DALE LONG, attaché à l'E. M. réquisitionne ..

.....
.....
.....

A le 1914



A whole package of formulas like the one printed above was found in the writing-room of the British central office for espionage in Brussels.

Long before the war it had become known that a certain Dale Long lived in Brussels and carried on espionage against Germany for England. It has also been possible to bring a great number of his agents before the court, but it was never possible to establish definitely that Dale Long belonged to the British General Staff. From the formulas found, however, it appears that Dale Long was to join the British General Staff in case of war, that he was authorised, as a member of the British Army, to make requisitions in Belgium, and that this authorisation was attested by the British Legation in Brussels, as the seal indicates. The presence of a great pile of blank formulas of this sort moreover proves in quite unimpeachable manner that this was a measure of mobilisation which would be impossible without the consent of the Belgian Government.

* [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

⁽¹⁾ [So
headed
in
D.O.W.]

" NEW DOCUMENTS CONCERNING ENGLAND'S
BREACH OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY."⁽¹⁾

(*North German Gazette*,* December 2, 1914.)

EVIDENCE is accumulating that England, working in conjunction with Belgium, had done its utmost, not only diplomatically, but also in a military way, to prepare for war against Germany. Our troops recently captured secret military handbooks dealing with Belgium's roads and rivers, which the English General Staff had published (Belgium, Road and River Reports prepared by the General Staff, War Office). Four volumes of this handbook are in our possession, of which the first volume was printed as long ago as 1912, the second in 1913, the third (in two parts) and the fourth in 1914.

They are marked : Confidential. This Book is the property of H.B.M. Government, and is intended for the personal information of . . . who is personally responsible for its safe custody. The contents are to be disclosed only to authorised persons.

These handbooks contain the most exact descriptions of territory conceivable, based upon military investigations. The introductory notice reads : These reports can only give the state of the roads at the time they were reconnoitred. It will always be advisable to reconnoitre them immediately before using them, to make sure that they are not blocked owing to repairs or pipe-laying, apart from possible obstructions arranged by hostile forces or inhabitants.

Thus, for example, in volume I., pages 130 *sqq.*, the high road Nieuport — Dixmude — Ypres — Menin — Tourcoing — Tournai is dealt with as regards the nature of the road, the country traversed, tactical considerations, observation points and water conditions, and illustrated by special maps. The report includes an enumeration and description of places along the way. It contains their exact distances from each other, as well as exhaustive details concerning the roads under discussion, their grades, bridges, cross-roads, telephone and

* [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

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telegraph stations, railway stations, including the length of their platforms and embankments, narrow-gauge railways, oiltanks, etc. It is always stated whether all or part of the inhabitants speak French.

Let us, for example, give literally the tactical observations about Dixmuide found on page 151 :—

"Dixmuide would be difficult to take, whether attacked from the north or from the south. The best line to hold against an attack from the south would be the railway embankment W. of and up to the road, continuing along a line of knolls to the east of the road. West of the road the field of fire is good for 1,500 yards, east of it trees limit the view. A suitable garrison would be Hoogmolen and Veartkant. There is nothing else of tactical importance, nor is there anything likely to retard the rate of marching. Observation points : (a) the mill at Reencheeck, view all round ; (b) Koelberg ($7\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond Ypres) view to east and south. Incidentally it may be remarked that the church towers are, as a rule, noted as good observation points."

In a similarly thorough manner the whole course of the Scheldt is described, with all tributary rivers, villages, landing and fording places, breadth and depth, bridges, boats on hand, etc.

Thus the handy volumes form a splendid guide for commanders, General Staff officers, and subordinate leaders of every grade. There are appended :

(1) A list of billeting possibilities in the various communes and villages, giving figures on billets for men, transport facilities at hand, and all other details which a commander requires ;

(2) A Report on Belgium, south of the line Charleroi—Namur—Liège, and on Brussels from the point of view of aviation, containing valuable information for aviators.

This lucid report, compiled most carefully and supplemented by a map of landing-places, bears the inscription "secret," and was drawn up in July, 1914.

Now these handbooks drawn up from a military and geographical point of view were not made just a short time before or during the war. Except perhaps the printing of

them, that would not have been possible. The material on which they are based was, as may be gathered from the notes regarding the various parts, acquired since 1909 through careful and separate investigations. The first volume was then printed in 1912.

These reports therefore prove, that there has been going on for the last five years a thorough preparation for a campaign in neutral Belgium. They are nothing else than a set of secret regulations for an English army waging war in that country. Thus the British General Staff, for some considerable time, prepared for this eventuality to such an extent, and foresaw it so clearly, that it carried out the tedious work of the compilation of these military handbooks.

Such a work could not have been accomplished without the ready and most extensive support of the Belgian Government and military officials. Such exhaustive and detailed strategic and tactical information as that mentioned above, or such exact data concerning all the railways and the entire traffic, concerning the rolling stock, the locks and bridges systems, cannot be obtained in any other way. The lists of billeting possibilities drawn up for the British Army and which deal with Belgium as if it were their own country, can only have been supplied by the Belgian Government. Without question official Belgian material was used here. It was adapted to suit English purposes, or in many places simply translated into English.

Such was the thoroughness with which England and Belgium had arranged in time of peace for joint military action. Belgium was, politically and from a military point of view, nothing but England's vassal. The indignation exhibited before the world by England over Germany's alleged breach of neutrality, is shown by these documents to be absolutely groundless and unjustified. If anybody has a right to be indignant, it is Germany.

When, on the occasion of our operations on the coast, the English and French Press asserted contemptuously that we were not informed as to the dangers of the submergible territory in the so-called Polderland, it was correct in so far as we knew Belgian territory at the beginning of the war only through what we had been able to find in the sources available in the bookstores.

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For this reason, the English reports of their investigations and their excellent maps were valuable booty for us. We were able to make immediate use of this extraordinarily valuable material for our own purposes, and to fight England with her own weapons. In this fact may be found the best tribute to the painstaking work of our enemies.

" DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR. GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LEGATION."⁽¹⁾

(*North German Gazette*,* December 15, 1914.)

⁽¹⁾ [So
headed
in
D.O.W.]

NEW and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant-Watson,[†] the Secretary of the British Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Antwerp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and the defence of Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a conference of the "Commission de la base d'approvisionnements à Anvers," on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government had no military secrets to hide from the English Government, and that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very close touch with each other.

* [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

† [Much diplomatic correspondence subsequently passed between London and Berlin, through the hands of the United States Ambassadors, concerning the arrest and detention of Mr. Grant-Watson, Second Secretary of the British Legation at Brussels, and the charges brought against him by the Germans.]

There is also a handwritten note of especial interest which was found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to destroy. It reads as follows :—

Renseignements.

1°. Les officiers français ont reçu ordre de rejoindre dès le 27. après-midi.

2°. Le même jour, le chef de Gare de Feignies a reçu ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermés disponibles, en vue du transport de troupes.

Communiqué par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries.

Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the Belgian frontier. Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilometres from the French frontier.

From this notice it must be gathered that France had already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27th, and that the British Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian sources.

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valuable proof—if indeed any be needed—of the relations existing between England and Belgium. It shows anew that Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favour of the Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to fight the German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Belgian neutrality really was nothing but “a scrap of paper,” to which she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world and the British people.

(b) DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY GREAT BRITAIN.

[The documents that follow emanated from the British Foreign Office and were printed, in the order here preserved, in the Blue-book entitled: “Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War”]

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(Miscellaneous, No. 10 (1915). Cd. 7860), as an Appendix to the translation of the Belgian Grey-book [G]. They include, as will be seen, translations into English of a number of documents originally published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which reappeared in the "Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch," and in its English translation, "Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," both of which were published in Berlin by the German Foreign Office. It is the English version published by the British Foreign Office in the "Collected Diplomatic Documents" that is here reproduced.]

DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BELGIUM PREVIOUSLY TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

NO. I.

*Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.**

SIR,

Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.

IN speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for

* A record of this despatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

NO. 2.

Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 23, 1911.

(From the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13, 1914.)

(TRANSLATION.)⁽¹⁾

"From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon.

"The combinations of the *Entente cordiale* include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison without hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish

⁽¹⁾[For the German version, see p. 316; German comments, pp. 315-317.]

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as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the *Entente cordiale* showed us clearly what was intended. When it became evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threatening danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great Britain and her allies.

"I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the requirements of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between Germany and France."

No. 3.

*Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives Abroad.**

THE story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German Press,⁽¹⁾ and based on

* NOTE.—This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publication of the documents themselves.

⁽¹⁾ [On
Oct.
13,
1914.
See pp.
314-317,
"The
Brussels
Docu-
ments
I."]

documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attaché at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past, that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago. ■

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No. 4.

*Documents as published in facsimile in a special Supplement
to the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November
25, 1914.*

(I.)

Lettre à M. le Ministre de la Guerre au sujet des Entretiens confidentiels.⁽¹⁾

(Confidentielle.) *Bruxelles, le 10 avril, 1906.*

M. LE MINISTRE.

Bruxelles, le 10 avril, 1906.

M. LE MINISTRE,

J'AI l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications verbales.

La première visite date de la mi-janvier. M. Barnardiston me fit part des préoccupations de l'état-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Un envoi de troupes, d'un total de 100,000 hommes environ, était projeté pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.

Le lieutenant-colonel m'ayant demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable ; mais que cette question d'intervention relevait également du pouvoir politique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la Guerre.

M. Barnardiston me répondit que son Ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Il continua dans ce sens : le débarquement des troupes anglaises se ferait sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à hâter le plus possible le mouvement.* Le débarquement par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de temps, parce qu'il faudrait des transports plus considérables et d'autre pars la sécurité serait moins complète.

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile :—

"L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne."

⁽¹⁾ [For German comments on this document, see pp. 314-320.]

Ceci admis, il resterait à régler divers autres points, savoir : les transports par chemin de fer, la question des réquisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement supérieur des forces alliées.

Il s'informa si nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense du pays durant la traversée et les transports des troupes anglaises, temps qu'il évaluait à une dizaine de jours.

Je répondis que les places de Namur et de Liège étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, en quatre jours, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100,000 hommes, serait en état d'intervenir. Après avoir exprimé toute sa satisfaction au sujet de mes déclarations, mon interlocuteur insista sur le fait que : (1) notre conversation était absolument confidentielle ; (2) elle ne pouvait lier son Gouvernement ; (3) son Ministre, l'état-major général anglais, lui et moi étions seuls, en ce moment, dans la confidence ; (4) il ignorait si son Souverain avait été pressenti.

Dans un entretien subséquent, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais reçu de confidences d'autres attachés militaires au sujet de notre armée. Il précisa ensuite les données numériques concernant les forces anglaises ; nous pouvions compter que, en douze ou treize jours, seraient débarqués : deux corps d'armée, quatre brigades de cavalerie, et deux brigades d'infanterie montée.

Il me demanda d'examiner la question du transport de ces forces vers la partie du pays où elles seraient utiles et, dans ce but, il me promit la composition détaillée de l'armée de débarquement.

Il revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armée de campagne en insistant pour qu'on ne fit pas de détachements de cette armée à Namur et à Liège, puisque ces places étaient pourvues de garnisons suffisantes.

Il me demanda de fixer mon attention sur la nécessité de permettre à l'armée anglaise de bénéficier des avantages prévus par le règlement sur les prestations militaires. Enfin, il insista sur la question du commandement suprême.

Je lui répondis que je ne pouvais rien dire quant à ce dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres questions.

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Plus tard, l'attaché militaire anglais confirma son estimation précédente : douze jours seraient au moins indispensables pour faire le débarquement sur la côte de France. Il faudrait beaucoup plus (un à deux mois et demi) pour débarquer 100,000 troupes à Anvers.

Sur mon objection qu'il était inutile d'attendre l'achèvement du débarquement pour commencer les transports par chemin de fer, et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et à mesure des arrivages, à la côte, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me promit des données exactes sur l'état journalier du débarquement.

Quant aux prestations militaires, je fis part à mon interlocuteur que cette question serait facilement réglée.

A mesure que les études de l'état-major anglais avançaient, les données du problème se précisaien. Le colonel m'assura que la moitié de l'armée anglaise pourrait être débarquée en huit jours, et que le restant le serait à la fin du douzième ou treizième jour, sauf l'infanterie montée, sur laquelle il ne fallait compter que plus tard.

Néanmoins, je crus devoir insister à nouveau sur la nécessité de connaître le rendement journalier, de façon à régler les transports par chemin de fer de chaque jour.

L'attaché anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses autres questions, savoir : (1) nécessité de tenir le secret des opérations et d'obtenir de la presse qu'elle l'observât soigneusement ; (2) avantages qu'il y aurait à adjoindre un officier belge à chaque état-major anglais, un traducteur à chaque commandant de troupes, des gendarmes à chaque unité pour aider les troupes de police anglaises.

Dans une autre entrevue, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston et moi examinâmes les opérations combinées dans le cas d'une agression de la part de l'Allemagne ayant comme objectif Anvers et dans l'hypothèse d'une traversée de notre pays pour atteindre les Ardennes françaises.

Par la suite, le colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan que je lui avais présenté et m'assura de l'assentiment du Général Grierson, chef de l'état-major anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent également réglées, notamment en ce qui regarde les officiers intermédiaires, les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des uniformes, les tirés à part traduits en anglais de certains

règlements belges, le règlement des frais de douane pour les approvisionnements anglais, l'hospitalisation des blessés de l'armée alliée, &c. Rien ne fut arrêté quant à l'action que pourrait exercer sur la presse le Gouvernement ou l'autorité militaire.

Dans les dernières rencontres que j'ai eues avec l'attaché anglais, il me communiqua le rendement journalier des débarquements à Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'éloignement de ce dernier point, imposé par des considérations d'ordre technique, occasionne un certain retard. Le premier corps serait débarqué le dixième jour, et le second corps le quinzième jour. Notre matériel des chemins de fer exécuterait les transports, de sorte que l'arrivée, soit vers Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers Namur-Dinant, du premier corps serait achevée le onzième jour, et celle du deuxième corps, le seizième jour.

J'ai insisté une dernière fois et aussi énergiquement que je le pouvais, sur la nécessité de hâter encore les transports maritimes de façon que les troupes anglaises fussent près de nous entre le onzième et le douzième jour ; les résultats les plus heureux, les plus favorables peuvent être obtenus par une action convergente et simultanée des forces alliées. Au contraire, ce sera un échec grave si cet accord ne se produit pas. Le Colonel Barnardiston m'a assuré que tout sera fait dans ce but.

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus l'occasion de convaincre l'attaché militaire anglais de la volonté que nous avions d'entraver, dans la limite du possible, les mouvements de l'ennemi et de ne pas nous réfugier, dès le début, dans Anvers. De son côté, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me fit part de son peu de confiance actuellement dans l'appui ou l'intervention de la Hollande. Il me confia également que son Gouvernement projetait de transporter la base d'approvisionnements anglaise de la côte française à Anvers, dès que la mer du nord serait nettoyée de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

Dans tous nos entretiens le colonel me communiqua régulièrement les renseignements confidentiels qu'il possédait sur l'état militaire et la situation de notre voisin de l'est, &c. En même temps, il insista sur la nécessité impérieuse pour la Belgique de se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans les pays rhénans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser

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que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au delà de la frontière, au temps de paix, ne relève pas directement de notre état-major ; nous n'avons pas d'attachés militaires auprès de nos légations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer que j'ignorais si le service d'espionage, qui est prescrit par nos règlements, était ou non préparé. Mais il est de mon devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en état d'infériorité flagrante vis-à-vis de nos voisins, nos ennemis éventuels.

Le Général-Major, Chef d'É.-M.⁽¹⁾
(Initialled.)

⁽¹⁾ [General
Ducarne,
see
p. 318.]

Note.—Lorsque je rencontrais le Général Grierson à Compiègne, pendant les manœuvres de 1906, il m'assura que la réorganisation de l'armée anglaise aurait pour résultat non seulement d'assurer le débarquement de 150,000 hommes, mais de permettre leur action dans un délai plus court que celui dont il est question précédemment.

Fin septembre 1906.
(Initialled.)

(TRANSLATION.)

*Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff]⁽²⁾ to the⁽²⁾ [General
[Belgian] Minister of War respecting the confidential Inter-
views.*

(Confidential.)

Brussels, April 10, 1906.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversations which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally.

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men.

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could only be advantageous ; but that this

question of intervention had also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible way.* Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk would be greater.

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the allied forces.

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the British troops—a period which he estimated at about ten days.

I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liège were safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men would be ready to take the field. After having expressed his entire satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following points : (1) Our conversation⁽¹⁾ was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government ; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted.

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received any confidential information from other military attachés about our army. He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces ; we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed.

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile :—

(Translation.)

"The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany."

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He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the composition of the landing force.

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field army, and considered it important that no detachments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liège, as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons.

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command.

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised that I would study the other questions with care.

Later, the British military attaché confirmed his previous estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp.

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily disembarkation table.

With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed my visitor that that question would easily be arranged.

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later.

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway arrangements for each day.

The British attaché then spoke to me of various other questions, viz. : (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be in

attaching a Belgian officer to each British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit to help the British military police.

At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes.

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied army, &c. Nothing was settled as to the possible control of the Press by the Government or the military authorities.

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attaché he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-Louvain or towards Namur-Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth day.

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day; the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done with that end in view.

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In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of convincing the military attaché of our resolve to impede the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardistón, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the support or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships.

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any confidential information he possessed respecting the military condition and general situation of our eastern neighbour, &c. At the same time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our General Staff. We had no military attachés at our legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our possible enemies.

Major-General, Chief of General Staff. ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [General
Ducarne.]

(Initialled.)

Note.—When I met General Grierson at Compiègne at the manœuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated.

End of September 1906.

(Initialled.)

(2.)

(Confidentielle.)

L'attaché militaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth. Ces messieurs se sont rencontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges a dit au général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent, composée de six divisions d'infanterie et huit brigades de cavalerie, soit en tout 160,000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territoire insulaire. Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des derniers événements, aurait débarqué immédiatement chez nous, même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre consentement.

L'attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous, l'Angleterre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement, l'attaché militaire n'a pas précisé ; il a dit que la côte était assez longue ; mais le général sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Le général a ajouté que nous étions, d'ailleurs, parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

Le 24 avril, 1912.

(Translation.)⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [For German (Confidential.)

com-
ments on
this docu-
ment, see pp. 319-
320.]

The British military attaché asked to see General Jungbluth.⁽²⁾ These gentlemen met on the 23rd April.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Everything was ready.

[Chief of Belgian General Staff.] The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help.

The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this.

The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event.

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As to the place of landing, the military attaché was not explicit. He said the coast was rather long; but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays.

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through.

April 24, 1912.

No. 5.

Extract from a brochure entitled "On the Violation of Belgian Neutrality," by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister of State.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Belgian Answer, p. 350.]

(TRANSLATION.)

AN official communiqué appeared at once in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of the 13th October.⁽²⁾ The whole German press hastened to echo the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Large notices were posted on the walls in Brussels and innumerable little yellow notices made their appearance in the public places of other occupied towns. The discovery was of paramount importance; it was bound to prove to all impartial people the guilt of the Governments both of England and of Belgium and to show the foresight and correctitude of Germany.

⁽²⁾ [See pp. 314-7.]

According to the communiqué, it appeared from documents found in Brussels that, at the request of Great Britain, at the beginning of the year 1906, Belgium had, in anticipation of the violation of her neutrality by Germany, concluded with the Powers of the Entente a convention which had for its object the defence of her territory. Although a marginal note on the *dossier* of 1906 stated expressly that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of her neutrality by Germany,"⁽³⁾ the suggestion was that Belgium, in settling the arrangements for this contingent entry, had seriously misunderstood the duties of neutrals. Germany alone was the object of her suspicion and she had not "also foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and to provide for that event, concluded with Germany a convention analogous to that concluded with France and Great Britain."

⁽³⁾ [See p. 336.]

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The communiqué recognises that it was open to Belgium, in the interests of self-protection, to make arrangements with the Powers which had guaranteed her international position. Indeed a neutralised State retains the right of making defensive treaties. The fact that the inviolability of such a State is under the ægis or guarantee of certain Powers does not deprive her of this right. But the arrangements which such a State can make with the guaranteeing Powers to guard against a contingent invasion are, after all, nothing but measures for carrying out the pre-existing engagements of the guarantee.

The grievance alleged by the communiqué is that a convention should have been made by Belgium in anticipation of a penetration of hostile troops into Belgian territory, without notice being given to Germany, and without the latter Power being appealed to to make a similar convention in anticipation of an invasion of Belgium by French or British troops.

If a convention really existed, as the communiqué states, it is just to observe that a State which has prepared a plan of invasion is in an anomalous position in addressing reproaches to a State which limits its action to putting itself on guard and organising necessary measures of defence. And we must remember that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was, according to Herr von Jagow, forced upon the German General Staff by an event of long standing, namely, the Franco-Russian Alliance.

As a matter of fact the convention⁽¹⁾ which forms the gravamen of the German charges never existed.

Belgium did not make any special arrangements in anticipation of the violation of her territory by Germany, either with England or with France, either in 1906 or at any other date. It is in vain that Germany has searched and will search our archives, she will not find there any proof of her allegation.

The official communiqué of the 13th October published three documents; the second communiqué of the 24th November⁽²⁾ added a fourth document to the *dossier*. None of these documents establishes the existence of any convention whatever.

The first document is a report made to the Minister of War on the 10th April, 1906, by General Ducarne,⁽³⁾ Chief of the Belgian General Staff. It relates to the conversations which took place at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston.

⁽¹⁾ [See
footnote
vol. I.,
p. 23.]

⁽²⁾ [See pp.
318-20.]

⁽³⁾ [See
note,
p. 318.]

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the British military attaché, between himself and General Ducarne, on the subject of the arrangements that England might be disposed to make to assist Belgium in the event of a German invasion. According to the German notices :—

"The Chief of the Belgian General Staff worked out a comprehensive plan for joint operations by a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men with the Belgian Army against Germany in repeated conferences with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, at the instigation of the latter. The plan was approved by the Chief of the British General Staff, Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Staff were supplied with all data as to the strength and organisation of the British forces. . . . The latter thoroughly prepared for the transport. . . . Co-operation was carefully worked out in every detail. . . . Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were contemplated as the points of disembarkation for the British troops."

This document shows that though the Belgian General Staff did not take the initiative, yet it did not refuse to discuss with the British military attaché a plan for the help which Britain, acting as guaranteeing Power, would be able, in case of need, to send to Belgium to repulse a German attack.

But what accusation against Belgium can be based on this ?

Since it is recognised that Belgium has the right to make defensive agreements for putting into operation the guarantees given by the guaranteeing Powers, the Belgian General Staff would have found it difficult to refuse entirely to consider suggestions made by the military attachés of those Powers. Such discussions do not interfere in any way with the freedom or responsibility of the Government, and it is they alone who can decide whether it is expedient or opportune to enter into a convention and, if so, what convention they should make, having regard to the duties and interests of the country.

In 1906 the Government believed that it was proper for them to rest content, as they had rested for more than sixty years, with the general guarantee embodied in the Treaty of 1839,⁽¹⁾ and that the details of carrying out the guarantee could not be fixed beforehand, that in their very nature they must vary according to circumstances. Thus no convention was entered upon. The work of the British military attaché and the Belgian officers resulted in nothing but the submission

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 487.]

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of a report to the Minister of War by the Chief of the General Staff.

The second document is a military map. "A map showing the method of deployment of the French army was found in the secret *dossier*."

The only inference to be drawn from this document—which is not connected in any way with the report already mentioned—is that the Belgian General Staff has always sought, as is the duty of all General Staffs, to obtain the most precise information possible as to the military plans of neighbouring Powers.

But to pretend to argue from the mere possession of this map that France must have been a party to the alleged convention, of which Britain and Belgium are wantonly accused, is to transcend the bounds of fancy.

The third document is a report on the international position of Belgium sent by Baron Greindl,⁽¹⁾ Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels on the 23rd December, 1911.

Baron Greindl thought that a "French invasion was as probable as a German invasion."

"The combinations of the Entente Cordiale include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. . . . The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston . . . showed us clearly what was intended. . . . This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. . . .

"*I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also.*"

The inference to be drawn from this document is that the plans of the Belgian General Staff communicated to Baron Greindl dealt with the contingency either of an entry into Belgium through the gap of the Meuse or of an invasion of Luxemburg by one or other of the belligerents. Baron Greindl thought it his duty to lay stress upon another hypothesis, namely, the danger of an enveloping movement by the north of France, which he had so often heard talked about in Berlin. But the whole of this report rebuts the accusation that Belgium had formed any engagements either with

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 316; English translation, p. 328.]

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England or with France. Baron Greindl's attitude towards Barnardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that he knew that these suggestions had not resulted in any convention.

Such are the three documents published on the 13th October by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and placarded everywhere with such a flourish of trumpets. They do not contain the smallest scrap of evidence to support the German charge. No criticism adverse to Belgium can be based upon them. The German Government themselves understood this so well that they ordered fresh searches to be made in the archives.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 24th November⁽¹⁾ [November 25,
see p.
318.] gave us the result of this second search. It is a fourth document, reporting a conversation which took place between the British military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, and General Jungbluth. It bears date the 23rd April, 1912 :—

" Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that Great Britain had . . . an army of 160,000 men. . . . The British Government at the time of the recent events would have immediately landed troops in Belgium even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that *our consent would be necessary for this*. The military attaché answered that he knew that, but, that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing the military attaché was not explicit. . . . The general added that we were perfectly well able to prevent the Germans from going through."

The inference to be drawn from this document is that, in a private conversation between two officers of high rank, which had no reference to any official mission, the British officer expressed the personal opinion that in case of war Great Britain could land "immediately" troops in Belgium "even if we had not asked for help." The Belgian general at once protested. He insisted that "our consent" was necessary, and that there was all the less reason for dispensing with it since we "were perfectly well able" to stop the Germans; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient time to deprive them of the advantage of a sudden attack.

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How is it possible to draw any inference unfavourable to Great Britain from the personal opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges when, from what has since happened, it is certain that the British Government did not intend to send, and did not in fact send, troops in Belgium, except upon a request from the Belgian Government put forward after the violation of her territory?

How is it possible to draw an inference unfavourable to Belgium from this conversation? General Jungbluth defended her freedom and her neutrality. And the very fact that the discussion took place, and the vagueness which remained as to the places of landing, both prove that Belgium was not bound by any convention determining the manner in which help should be furnished by England.

Germany ought then to cease to accuse the Belgian Government of having given themselves since 1906 into the hands of the Powers of the Triple Entente. The first three documents which the Germans have taken from the files of the General Staff, like the fourth which has been brought up to support them, far from establishing any improper action whatever on the part of the Belgian authorities, show clearly that they have always taken the most scrupulous care to reconcile the precautions exacted by the necessity of safeguarding the independence and maintaining the honour of the country with the duties of the strictest neutrality.

The loyal attitude of Belgium and Great Britain is clearly shown by the action which preceded the German ultimatum.

When Belgium saw the storm-clouds gathering on the darkened horizon she wanted to accelerate her military re-organisation. She worked at it for years. In 1902 she strengthened her cadres. After two years of discussion in 1905 and 1906 she decided to finish the fortifications of the fortress of Antwerp and to raise her defensive organisation to a pitch commensurate with the offensive force then at the disposal of the armies of Europe. Then came the renewal of the artillery, then the introduction of *service personnelle*, finally the imposition of general liability to serve. These stages were arrived at with considerable difficulty because the nation, relying on treaties and determined herself to observe neutrality with the strictest impartiality, could not

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believe that in the twentieth century anyone could be cruel enough to think of violating the rights of a peaceful people.

In addition Belgium had faith in the energy and the valour of her army, and she counted on the help of her guarantors should need arise.

No. 6.

Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge.

November 14, 1914.

DEAR MASTER OF CHRIST'S,

THE enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question.*

Yours truly,

(Signed) HALDANE.

ENCLOSURE I.

MEMORANDUM.

IT is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military

* [Dr. Shipley's question was asked at the instance of President John Grier Hibben, of Princeton University, U.S.A., and was to the following effect, namely, whether the Foreign Office could supply some authoritative statement concerning the assertion that "it has been proved that France and England had resolved on a trespass in neutral Belgium, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so." This assertion was made in an appeal "To the Civilised World" signed by certain distinguished representatives of German science and art; and President Hibben, into whose hands the appeal had come, had asked Dr. Shipley, M.P., Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, if he could get from the British Foreign Office some authoritative statement concerning it. The facts are given in a letter from President Hibben to the *New York Times* of November 25th, 1914.]

discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France ; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government.

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government

⁽¹⁾ [B. 114.] made an appeal⁽¹⁾ for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French

⁽²⁾ [B. 125.] agreed,⁽²⁾ the Germans declined to agree.⁽³⁾ The appeal

⁽³⁾ [B. 122.] made by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White-paper published after the outbreak of the war (see No. 114 of British Correspondence) [vol. I., p. 179]. The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ; and it is recorded in the second White-paper (see No. 160 of British

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Correspondence) [vol. I., pp. 207-8] that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international Treaty.

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains ; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed, which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, 9th November, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2.

Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Grey-book.

(See pp. 29-31.)

ENCLOSURE 3.

Extract from "The Times" of 30th September, 1914.

NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

Official Statement.

THE German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received

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[OCTOBER 2

⁽¹⁾[*cf.* G. 22.] from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations.⁽¹⁾ It declares, on the one hand, that "before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:—

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter.

ENCLOSURE 4.

Circular telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad on the 14th October, 1914.

(See page 329.)

(c) DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY BELGIUM.

THE BELGIAN ANSWER.⁽²⁾

(From *The Times*, October 23, 1914.)

WE have received from the Belgian Legation the following statement, issued by the Belgian Government, replying to the article in the *North German Gazette* published in *The Times* of October 14th:—

⁽¹⁾[*See pp. 314 et seq.*] *The Times* of October 14th reproduces a long article from the *North German Gazette*⁽³⁾ commenting on the discovery in the archives at Brussels of a map entitled "English intervention in Belgium" and of a memorandum to the Belgian Minister of War which goes to prove that in the month of April, 1906, the Chief of the General Staff, on the suggestion of the British Military Attaché and with the approval of

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General Grierson had worked out a plan of co-operation between British Expeditionary Forces and the Belgian Army against Germany in the event of a Franco-German war. This agreement is assumed to have been preceded in all probability by a similar arrangement with the French General Staff.

The *North German Gazette* also publishes certain passages of a report⁽¹⁾ of the Belgian Minister at Berlin in December, 1911, relating to another plan of the Belgian General Staff, in which the measures to be taken in case of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany are discussed. Baron Greindl pointed out that this plan dealt only with the precautions to be taken in the event of an aggression on the part of Germany, while, owing to its geographical situation, Belgium might just as well be exposed to an attack by France and England. The *North German Gazette* draws from this discovery the strange conclusion that England intended to drag Belgium into the war, and at one time contemplated the violation of Dutch neutrality.

We have only one regret to express on the subject of the disclosure of these documents, and that is that the publication of our military documents should be mangled and arranged in such a way as to give the reader the impression of duplicity on the part of England and adhesion by Belgium, in violation of her duties as a neutral State, to the policy of the Triple Entente. We ask the *North German Gazette* to publish in full the result of its search among our secret documents. Therein will be found fresh and striking proof of the loyalty, correctness, and impartiality with which Belgium for eighty-four years has discharged her international obligations.

It was stated that Colonel Barnardiston, the military representative at Brussels of a Power guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, at the time of the Algeciras crisis, questioned the Chief of the Belgian General Staff as to the measures which he had taken to prevent any violation of that neutrality. The Chief of the General Staff, at that time Lieutenant-General Ducarne, replied that Belgium was ready to repel any invader. Did the conversation extend beyond these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in an interview of a private and confidential nature, disclose to General Ducarne the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would have desired to follow if that neutrality were violated? We

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 328.]

doubt it, but in any case we can solemnly assert, and it will be impossible to prove the contrary, that never have the King or his Government been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German war. By their words and by their acts they have always shown such a firm attitude that any supposition that they could have departed from the strictest neutrality is eliminated *a priori*.

As for Baron Greindl's despatch of December 23rd, 1911, it dealt with a plan for the defence of Luxemburg, due to the personal initiative of the chief of the 1st Section of the War Ministry. This plan was of an absolutely private character and had not been approved by the Minister of War. If this plan contemplated above all an attack by Germany, there is no cause for surprise, since the great German military writers, in particular T. Bernhardi, V. Schlülfelboch, and Von der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the coming war of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the outbreak of hostilities the Imperial Government, through the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, did not search for vain pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the victim. They justified it on the plea of military interests. Since then, in face of the universal reprobation which this odious action has excited, they have attempted to deceive public opinion by representing Belgium as bound already before the war to the Triple Entente. These intrigues will deceive nobody. They will recoil on the head of Germany. History will record that this Power, after binding itself by treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it, without even finding a pretext with which to justify itself.

THE ACTION OF GERMANY.

REPORT OF A SPEECH DELIVERED BY HERR VON
BETHMANN HOLLWEG, GERMAN IMPERIAL
CHANCELLOR, ON AUGUST 4TH, 1914.

[Published in British "Collected Diplomatic Documents,"
as an Appendix to the translation of the German
White-book [W.].]

SPEECH OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BEFORE THE GERMAN REICHSTAG, ON AUGUST 4TH, 1914.

A STUPENDOUS fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won the German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In the works of peace we have become strong and powerful, and have thus aroused the envy of others. With patience we have faced the fact that, under the pretence that Germany was desirous of war, enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West, and chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated everyone from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly from its scabbard.

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France —a war that has been forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. Allow me to emphasise the facts that determine our attitude.

⁽¹⁾ [Part of this speech is quoted in G. 35. Explanation, p. 382.]

THE ACTION OF GERMANY

[AUGUST]

From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict we
⁽¹⁾ [See B. 9 declared⁽¹⁾ that this question must be limited to Austria-
and note.] Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end in view.

All Governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in the settlement of this matter.

Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening head.

As soon as the first definite information regarding the military preparations in Russia reached us, we declared at St. Petersburg in a friendly but emphatic manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side

⁽²⁾ [cf. R. 12 of our ally,⁽²⁾ and that military preparations against ourselves and note; would oblige us to take counter-measures; but that mobilisation would come very near to actual war.
W. exh. rob.]

Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

⁽³⁾ [Y. app. V. (I.)] On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar⁽³⁾ asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to defend herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor drew the Tsar's attention to the solidarity of the interests of all monarchs in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked for the latter's personal assistance in smoothing over the difficulties existing between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time, and before receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to come to his aid, and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands.⁽⁴⁾ The Emperor accepted the rôle of mediator.⁽⁵⁾

V. (II.)] But scarcely had active steps on these lines begun, when
⁽⁵⁾ [Y. app. V. (III.)] Russia mobilised all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only those of her corps which were directed against Serbia. To the north she had mobilised only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier.

The Emperor immediately informed the Tsar that this mobilisation of Russian forces against Austria rendered the

⁽⁶⁾ [Y. app. V. (IV.)] rôle of mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's request, difficult, if not impossible.⁽⁶⁾

THE ACTION OF GERMANY

In spite of this we continued our task of mediation at Vienna, and carried it to the utmost point which was compatible with our position as an ally.

Meanwhile, Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be taken at Vienna. Through our representations we had already obtained the resumption of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, after they had been for some time interrupted. But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilised her entire forces, and that her mobilisation was therefore directed against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilisation on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilisation, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31st that the Emperor received a telegram from the Tsar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume a provocative attitude towards us.⁽¹⁾ But mobilisation on our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July 30th-31st.

⁽¹⁾[Y. app.
V. (VI.).]

While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along our extended and almost entirely open frontier, and France, though indeed not actually mobilising, was admittedly making military preparations. What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 31st we called upon Russia to demobilise as the only measure which could still preserve the peace of Europe.⁽²⁾ The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also instructed to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war (*Kriegszustand*) existed.

⁽²⁾[W. exh.
24; O.
70.]

The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instructions. We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to our demand for demobilisation. Telegraphic reports on this question

THE ACTION OF GERMANY

[AUGUST

have not reached us even though the wires still transmitted much less important information.

Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on the 1st August at 5 p.m.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [W.
p. 135.]

At the same time we had to make certain what attitude France would assume. To our direct question, whether she

⁽²⁾ [W. exh.
25.]

would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German War,⁽²⁾ France replied that she would do what her interests de-

⁽³⁾ [W. exh.
27.]

manded.⁽³⁾ That was an evasion, if not a refusal.

In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilised at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometres on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared on the territory of the Empire! Though war had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually attacked us.

Regarding the one exception on our side which I mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows:

"Only one of the French complaints about the crossing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to have been shot down, only one man having returned. But long before this isolated instance of crossing the frontier had occurred, French aviators had penetrated into Southern Germany and had thrown bombs on our railway lines. French troops had attacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht Pass. Our troops, in accordance with their orders, have remained strictly on the defensive." This is the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (*Notwehr*), and necessity (*Not*) knows no law.⁽⁴⁾ Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that

THE ACTION OF GERMANY

France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through (*durchhauen*).

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.

As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday⁽¹⁾ show the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the Emperor: "With a clear conscience we enter the lists." We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle—behind them stands the entire German nation—the entire German nation united to the last man.

Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly.

⁽¹⁾[See pp.
400 &
417.]

" DOCUMENTS ON THE POLITICAL EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND."⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [So headed in
D.O.W.
For Sir E.
Grey's
reply,
see pp. 438-
439.]

(*North German Gazette*,* August 21, 1914. English version published in D.O.W.)

OFFICIAL documents relating to the political exchange of views between Germany and England immediately before the outbreak of the war, are published below. These communications elucidate the fact that Germany was prepared to spare France, provided England remained neutral and guaranteed the neutrality of France.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN LONDON AND BERLIN,
30TH JULY-2ND AUGUST, 1914.†

No. I.

His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King George, dated July 30, 1914.

I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace [July 26.] last Sunday⁽²⁾ to William, who was very thankful to receive your message.

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas,⁽³⁾ who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken five days ago.⁽⁴⁾

We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war.

* [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

† [The text of these telegrams is here taken from the British "Collected Diplomatic Documents," not from the English version published by the German Foreign Office in "Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," where the substance is the same but the wording differs.]

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If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military preparations of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it.

(Signed) HENRY.

No. 2.

His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia, dated July 30, 1914.

THANKS for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war—the evil of which could not be remedied—may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

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[JULY

No. 3.

*His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George,
dated July 30, 1914.*

MANY thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army and fleet.⁽¹⁾ He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged,⁽²⁾ and he has left me completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position.

⁽¹⁾ [R. 52.]
⁽²⁾ [Y. app. V. (III. and VII.).]

(Signed) WILLIAM.

No. 4.

*His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William,
dated August 1, 1914.*

MANY thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram* to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the Powers concerned.

⁽³⁾ [Despatched from London at 11 a.m. Further telegrams followed at 1.15, 5.30, and 8.30 p.m. See pp. 363-5.]

(Signed) GEORGE.

No. 5.

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated August 1, 1914.⁽³⁾

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French.⁽⁴⁾ I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this.†

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

⁽⁴⁾ [cf. Nos. 8, 9, below.] * [See p. 309.]

† [For Sir E. Grey's statements in Parliament with regard to the misunderstanding that arose on this matter, see pp. 436-9.]

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No. 6.

*His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George,
dated August 1, 1914.*

I HAVE just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts—east and west—must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

No. 7.

German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, dated August 1, 1914.

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposal⁽¹⁾ [No. 5, above.] in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the 3rd August, at seven p.m., in case England's assent is received by that time.

(Signed) BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

No. 8.

*His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William,
dated August 1, 1914.*

IN answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I believe that there must be a misunderstanding⁽¹⁾ with regard to a suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey⁽²⁾ when they were discussing how an actual conflict between the German and the French army might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side.

(Signed) GEORGE.

No. 9.

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated August 2, 1914.

THE suggestions of Sir Edward Grey,⁽³⁾ based on the desire of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without any previous inquiry of France⁽⁴⁾ and without knowledge of the mobilisation, and have since been given up as quite impracticable.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

The pith of the declarations made by Germany lies in the telegram of the Emperor William to the King of England. Even if there had been a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the offer made by His Majesty nevertheless gave England an opportunity to prove honestly her love of peace and to prevent war between Germany and France.⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Nos. 5, 8.]
⁽²⁾ [See Sir E. Grey, Feb. 11, 1915, p. 439.]

⁽³⁾ [cf. Sir E. Grey, p. 439.]

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"NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH
SIR EDWARD GREY."*

(*North German Gazette*,† September 6, 1914. English version published in D.O.W.)

ACCORDING to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons⁽¹⁾ that the publication made by the German Government of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation immediately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, it is asserted, was not published. *The Times*, apparently upon information from official sources, made the same assertion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed by the German Government in order that it might accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace.

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non-existent. Apart from the telegram already published,⁽²⁾ which was despatched from London at 11 a.m., Prince Lichnowsky on August 1st sent the following telegrams:—

⁽¹⁾ [On Aug. 28, 1914. See p. 438.]

⁽²⁾ [No. 5, p. 360.]

TELEGRAMS FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT LONDON
TO THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, AUGUST 1,
1914.‡

No. 1.

August 1, 1.15 p.m.

. . . SIR EDWARD GREY'S Private Secretary has just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at once.

* [So headed in D.O.W.]

† [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

‡ [The text of the translations here given is taken from the British "Collected Diplomatic Documents," not from the German official "Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War."]

No. 2.

August 1, 5.30 p.m.

SIR EDWARD GREY has just read to me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet :—⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.
123.]

“The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.”

On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part.

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great

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Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides.

No. 3.

August 1, 8.30 p.m.

MY communication of this morning is cancelled by my communication of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent (*der mir erteilten Weisungen*)⁽¹⁾ is superfluous.

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ "along the line of the instructions given me"—
D.O.W.]

⁽²⁾ [See
Sir E.
Grey,
Feb.
11, 1915.
p. 439.]

"A BELGIAN DIPLOMAT'S VIEWS AS TO GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE."*

(North German Gazette,† September 12, 1914.)

ON July 31st, 1914, a letter was posted bearing the following address :—

" MADAME COSTERMANS,
107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles, Belgique."

Since, as is known, the territory of the empire was on the same day declared to be in a state of war, and the expedition of private letters to foreign countries therefore ceased, the letter was returned to the post office of origin bearing an inscription by the postal authorities, "returned because of state of war." The letter remained there and, after the expiration of the prescribed time, was officially opened by the

* [The English translation of this article from the *North German Gazette*, under the heading and in the form here preserved, appears in the German official "Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," but is not included in the British "Collected Diplomatic Documents."]

† [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

Imperial head postal authorities in order to discover the name of the sender. Inside the outer envelope there was a second envelope, addressed :—

“ SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR DAVIGNON,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.”

Inasmuch as the name of the sender did not appear on this envelope either, it was also opened. Therein was found an official report of the Royal Belgian Chargé d’Affaires in St. Petersburg, Mr. B. de l’Éscaille, concerning the political situation there on July 30th of this year. This report, in view of its political significance, was sent to the Foreign Office by the Imperial postal officials.

The report reads :—

Légation de Belgique à St. Pétersbourg.

795/402.

Le 30 juillet 1914.

Situation politique.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Les journées d’hier et d’avant-hier se sont passées dans l’attente d’événements qui devaient suivre la déclaration de guerre de l’Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie. Les nouvelles les plus contradictoires ont circulé sans qu’il soit possible de démêler exactement le vrai du faux touchant les intentions du Gouvernement Impérial. Ce qui est incontestable c’est que l’Allemagne s’est efforcée, autant ici qu’à Vienne, de trouver un moyen quelconque d’éviter un conflit général, mais qu’elle a rencontré d’un côté l’obstination du Cabinet de Vienne à ne pas faire un pas en arrière, et de l’autre la méfiance du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg devant les assurances de l’Autriche-Hongrie qu’elle ne songeait qu’à punir la Serbie et non à s’en emparer.

M. Sazonof a déclaré qu’il était impossible à la Russie de ne pas se tenir prête et de ne pas mobiliser, mais que ces préparatifs n’étaient pas dirigés contre l’Allemagne. Ce matin un communiqué officiel aux journaux annonce que “les réservistes ont été appelés sous les armes dans un certain nombre de Gouvernements.” Connaissant la discréption des

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communiqués officiels russes, on peut hardiment prétendre qu'on mobilise partout.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a déclaré ce matin qu'il était à bout des essais de conciliation qu'il n'a cessé de faire depuis samedi et qu'il n'avait plus guère d'espoir. On vient de me dire que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre s'était prononcé dans le même sens. La Grande Bretagne a proposé dernièrement un arbitrage, M. Sazonof a répondu : "Nous l'avons proposé nous mêmes à l'Autriche-Hongrie, elle l'a refusé." A la proposition d'une Conférence, l'Allemagne a répondu par la proposition d'une entente entre cabinets. On peut se demander vraiment si tout le monde ne désire pas la guerre, et tâche seulement d'en retarder un peu la déclaration pour gagner du temps.

L'Angleterre a commencé par donner à entendre qu'elle ne voulait pas se laisser entraîner dans un conflit. Sir George Buchanan le disait ouvertement. Aujourd'hui on est fermement convaincu à St. Pétersbourg, on en a même l'assurance, que l'Angleterre soutiendra la France. Cet appui est d'un poids énorme et n'a pas peu contribué à donner la haute main au parti de la guerre.

Le Gouvernement Russe a laissé dans ces derniers jours libre cours à toutes les manifestations pro-Serbes et hostiles à l'Autriche et n'a aucunement cherché à les étouffer. Il s'est encore produit des divergences de vues dans le sein du Conseil des Ministres qui s'est réuni hier matin ; on a retardé la publication de la mobilisation. Mais depuis s'est produit un revirement, le parti de la guerre a pris le dessus et ce matin à 4 heures cette mobilisation était publiée.

L'armée qui se sent forte est pleine d'enthousiasme et fonde de grandes espérances sur les énormes progrès réalisés depuis la guerre japonaise. La marine est si loin d'avoir réalisé le programme de sa reconstruction et de sa réorganisation qu'elle ne peut vraiment pas entrer en ligne de compte. C'est bien là le motif qui donnait tant d'importance à l'assurance de l'appui de l'Angleterre.

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le télégraphier aujourd'hui (T. 10) tout espoir de solution pacifique paraît écarté. C'est l'opinion des cercles diplomatiques.

Je me suis servi pour mon télégramme de la voie via Stockholm par le Nordisk Kabel comme plus sûre que l'autre.

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[SEPTEMBER 12,

Je confie cette dépêche à un courrier privé qui la mettra à la poste en Allemagne.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de mon plus profond respect.

(Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

[Chargé TESTIMONY OF THE BELGIAN MINISTER⁽¹⁾ IN ST. PETERSBURG.
d'Affaires.]

See p. Belgian Legation, St. Petersburg.

366.] 795/402.

July 30, 1914.

On the political situation.

To His Excellency M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

YESTERDAY and the day before yesterday have passed in the expectation of events that must follow Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. The most contradictory reports have been circulating ; it was impossible to make out what was true or not true as regards the intentions of the Imperial Russian Government. There is, however, no denying the fact that Germany has made serious efforts both here and in Vienna to find some way of avoiding a general conflict. On the one hand, however, it has met with the firm decision of the Vienna Cabinet not to yield a step, and on the other hand with the fact that the St. Petersburg Cabinet mistrusted the assurance made by Austria-Hungary that she only intended to punish Serbia, but not to annex her territory.⁽²⁾

M. Sazonof declared that it was impossible for Russia to avoid holding herself in readiness and not to mobilise, but that these preparations were not directed against Germany.⁽³⁾ This morning an official communication to the newspapers announced that "the reserves in a certain number of districts have been called to the colours." Anyone who knows the reservedness of the official Russian communications can safely maintain that a general mobilisation is taking place.

The German Ambassador declared this morning that the efforts which since Saturday he had been making incessantly to bring about a satisfactory arrangement had come to an end, and that he had almost given up hope.

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I have been told that the British Ambassador also expressed himself in the same way. England recently proposed arbitration.⁽¹⁾ Sazonof answered : " We have ourselves proposed it to Austria-Hungary, but she has rejected the proposal." ^{(1) [cf.]} B. 36.] To the proposal of a conference, Germany answered by proposing in turn a settlement between the Cabinets.⁽²⁾ One ^{(2) [cf.]} B. 43.] might truly ask whether the whole world does not wish war and only seeks to postpone for a while the formal declaration of it, in order to gain time.

England at first let it be understood that she did not wish to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said so quite openly. To-day in St. Petersburg one is fully convinced, and even the assurance has been given, that England will stand by the side of France. This support is of quite extraordinary weight, and has in no small degree contributed to give the war party the upper hand. The Russian Government have in these last days given free rein to all demonstrations friendly to Serbia and hostile to Austria, and have in no way attempted to suppress them. In the Cabinet Council, which took place yesterday morning, there were differences of opinion ; the notification of a mobilisation was postponed, but since then a change has taken place, the war party has obtained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the mobilisation order was published.⁽³⁾

The army, which is conscious of its strength, is full of enthusiasm, and bases great hopes on the extraordinary progress which it has made since the Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the completion of its projected reorganisation that it is scarcely to be taken into account. For this very reason, the assurance of English assistance is considered of such great importance.

As I had the honour of wiring you to-day (T. 10), all hope of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished ; such is the view of the diplomatic corps.

I have made use of the route via Stockholm by the Nordisk Cable for sending my telegram, as it is safer than the other.

I am entrusting this report to a private courier, who will post it in Germany.

Please receive, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my greatest respect.

(Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

Our enemies are to-day declaring to the whole world, slanderously and with a deliberate misrepresentation of the real facts, that the Powers of the Triple Entente had up to the last moment in view solely the maintenance of peace, but that they were forced into war through Germany's brusque attitude, which made any understanding impossible ; that Germany, in her wild desire for conquest, wanted war under all circumstances. In answer to this the foregoing document evidences that in diplomatic circles in St. Petersburg, as early as July 30th, that is to say, two days before the German mobilisation, the conviction prevailed that Germany had been at the greatest pains, in Vienna as well as in St. Petersburg, to localise the Austro-Serbian conflict and to prevent the breaking out of a general world-conflagration. It is furthermore important as evidence that the same circles were even then convinced that England, through the assurance that she would not remain neutral in an eventual war, but would support France against Germany, had stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and thus contributed largely to provoke the war. And, finally, this document is also of interest because its author felt that he must report to his Government that he considered untrustworthy the assurances of Russia that the troops were being called to the colours only in certain districts, and that no general mobilisation was taking place.

STATEMENT BY HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG,
THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR, TO THE DANISH
PRESS BUREAU, SEPTEMBER 13, 1914.

(From *The Times*, September 15, 1914.)

HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG has sent the following statement to the Danish Press Bureau for publication :

⁽¹⁾ [Sept. 4, see p. 439, et seq.] The English Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech,⁽¹⁾ reserved to England the rôle of protector of the smaller and weaker States, and spoke about the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland as being exposed to danger from

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the side of Germany. It is true that we have broken Belgium's neutrality because bitter necessity compelled us to do so, but we promised Belgium full indemnity and integrity⁽¹⁾ if she would take account of this state of necessity. If so, she would not have suffered any damage, as, for example, Luxemburg. If England, as protector of the weaker States, had wished to spare Belgium infinite suffering she should have advised Belgium to accept our offer. England has not "protected" Belgium, so far as we know; I wonder, therefore, whether it can really be said that England is such a disinterested protector.

We knew perfectly well that the French plan of campaign involved a march through Belgium to attack the unprotected Rhineland. Does anyone believe England would have interfered to protect Belgian freedom against France?

We have firmly respected the neutrality of Holland and Switzerland; we have also avoided the slightest violation of the frontier of the Dutch province of Limburg.

It is strange that Mr. Asquith only mentioned the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, but not that of the Scandinavian countries. He might have mentioned Switzerland with reference to France, but Holland and Belgium are situated close to England on the opposite side of the Channel, and that is why England is so concerned for the neutrality of these countries.

Why is Mr. Asquith silent about the Scandinavian countries? Perhaps because he knows that it does not enter our head to touch these countries' neutrality; or would England possibly not consider Denmark's neutrality as a *noli me tangere* for an advance in the Baltic or for Russia's warlike operations.

Mr. Asquith wishes people to believe that England's fight against us is a fight of freedom against might. The world is accustomed to this manner of expression.⁽²⁾ In the name of freedom England, with might and with the most recklessly egotistic policy, has founded her mighty Colonial Empire, in the name of freedom she has destroyed for a century the independence of the Boer Republics, in the name of freedom she now treats Egypt as an English colony and thereby violates international treaties and solemn promises, in the name of freedom one after another of the Malay States is losing its

⁽¹⁾ See G. 20.]

⁽²⁾ [For Mr. Asquith's reply, Sept. 18, see p.

independence for England's benefit, in the name of freedom she tries, by cutting German cables, to prevent the truth being spread in the world.

The English Prime Minister is mistaken. When England joined with Russia and Japan against Germany she, with a blindness unique in the history of the world, betrayed civilisation and handed over to the German sword the care of freedom for European peoples and States.

“ OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EVENTS
PRECEDING THE WAR.”*

(*North German Gazette*,† October 16, 1914.)

IN view of the apparent endeavours of our opponents to ascribe the responsibility for the present war to the German “military party” and German militarism, we publish below a number of reports made by German diplomatic representatives in foreign countries, which have for their subject the political and politico-military relations of the Entente Powers before the outbreak of the war. For obvious reasons the places from which the reports have been sent, and their exact dates, are not given. These documents speak for themselves.

I.

March . . . , 1913.

The meshes of the net into which French diplomacy is succeeding in entangling England are steadily growing narrower. Even in the first phases of the Morocco conflict, England, as is known, made concessions of a military nature to France which have in the meantime developed into concrete agreements between the General Staffs of both countries.

* [The English translation of this article from the *North German Gazette*, under the heading and in the form here preserved, appears in the German official “Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War,” but is not included in the British “Collected Diplomatic Documents.”]

† [*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.]

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In regard to the agreements concerning a co-operation at sea, I learn from a generally well informed source the following :—

The English fleet will protect the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean, in order to make it possible for France to concentrate her naval forces in the western basin of the Mediterranean, in connection wherewith Malta is placed at her disposal as a naval base. Details arrange for the employment of French torpedo flotillas and submarines in the channel, and of the English Mediterranean squadron, which, on the outbreak of war, is to be placed under the command of the French Admiral.

In the meantime the attitude of the British Government during the Moroccan crisis in 1911, during which it showed itself to be a tool of French politics, as uncritical as it was submissive, and which, through the speech made by Mr. Lloyd George, encouraged French chauvinism to new hopes, has given the French Government an opportunity to drive another nail into the coffin in which Entente politics have already buried England's freedom of political decision.

I obtain from a special source knowledge of an exchange of notes which took place in the autumn of the preceding year between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon, and which, with the request that it be employed in strict confidence, I have the honour to submit to you herewith. In the exchange of notes the British and the French Governments agree, in the case of an attack threatened by a third Power, to enter at once into an exchange of views as to whether joint action was indicated to repulse the attack, and, in that event, as to how and to what extent the existing military arrangements should be made use of.

The form of the agreements is calculated in such a way that the latter shall be in technical conformity with British neutrality. England does not formally assume in any manner the duty of furnishing military help. Under the wording she retains a free hand to act at all times in accordance with the demands of her own interests. It hardly requires, however, any special amplification to show that England, through these compacts, in conjunction with the military arrangements made, has already pledged herself *de facto* beyond redemption to the French *revanche* idea.

The British Government is playing a dangerous game. Through its policy in the Bosnian and Moroccan questions it has evoked crises which have twice brought the world to the verge of a war. The encouragement which it gives to French chauvinism directly and indirectly can one day lead to a catastrophe in which English as well as French soldiers will pay with their blood on French battlefields for the British policy which aims at the isolation of Germany.

The seed sowed by King Edward is sprouting.

[Here follow the letters exchanged between Sir E. Grey and M. Paul Cambon, November 22nd and 23rd, 1912. For text of these see B. 105, encls. 1 and 2, vol. I., pp. 170-2.]

II.

May . . . , 1914.

Concerning the political results of the visit of the King of England in Paris* I learn that a number of political questions were discussed between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [Minister for Foreign Affairs.] Moreover, a suggestion came from the French side to supplement the existing politico-military understandings between France and England by analogous understandings between England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey received the suggestion sympathetically, but declared that he was not in a position to undertake anything of binding force without consulting the British Cabinet. The reception given to the English guests by the French Government as well as by the people of Paris is said to have made a great impression on the Minister. It is to be feared that the English statesman, who visited a foreign country for the first time in an official capacity, and who, it is asserted, had never been out of England before, will in the future be even more subject to French influences than has already been the case.

III.

June . . . , 1914.

I have received confirmation of the report that military arrangements between England and Russia were proposed from the French side on the occasion of the visit of the King

* [King George and Queen Mary visited Paris, attended by Sir E. Grey, April 21-24, 1914.]

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of England in Paris. Concerning the preliminary events I learn from a reliable source that the moving spirit was M. Isvolsky.⁽¹⁾ It was the Ambassador's idea to make use of the anticipated festive spirit of the days in Paris in order to change the Triple Entente into an alliance analogous to the Triple Alliance. If however Paris and St. Petersburg have been finally satisfied with less, their attitude appears to have been dictated by the consideration that public opinion in England is in great part firmly opposed to entering into formal treaties of alliance with other Powers. In view of this fact, there was plainly some hesitation about going to the root of things, despite the numerous proofs of the utter lack of resistance of English politicians to French and Russian influences. (I may recall the support which Russia recently received from England in the matter of the German military mission in Turkey.) Therefore were the tactics of a slow, pace-by-pace advance decided upon. Sir Edward Grey warmly advocated the Franco-Russian suggestions in the British Cabinet Council, and the Cabinet adopted his ideas. It was decided to work, in the first place, for a naval agreement, and to cause negotiations to take place in London between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché.

The satisfaction of Russian and French diplomacy at having again taken the English politicians by surprise, is great. The conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance is now considered only a matter of time. To hasten this event, St. Petersburg would even be prepared to make certain sham concessions to England in the Persian question. The differences of opinion in this matter that have recently come to light between the two Powers have not yet been disposed of. On the Russian side the procedure is, for the time being, one of conciliatory promises, on account of the uneasiness which has been again manifested in England lately concerning the future of India.

IV.

June . . . , 1914.

There is much uneasiness in St. Petersburg and London on account of the French indiscretions concerning the Russo-English naval convention. Sir Edward Grey is afraid there will be interpellations in Parliament. The Naval Attaché,

(1) [Russian Ambassador in Paris.]

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Captain Wolkoff, who was in St. Petersburg for a few days, presumably to receive instructions for the negotiations, has returned to London. The negotiations have already begun.

V.

June . . . , 1914.

In the House of Commons the question was put to the Government from the Ministerial side as to whether Great Britain and Russia had recently concluded a naval agreement, or as to whether negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement had recently taken place between the two countries or were now taking place.

In his answer Sir Edward Grey referred to similar questions put to the Government last year. The Prime Minister, continued Sir Edward, had at that time replied that there existed for the event of the outbreak of a war between European Powers no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the free decision of the Government or of Parliament as to whether England should take part in the war or not. This answer was just as applicable to-day as a year ago. Since that time no negotiation which could now make the declaration less applicable had been concluded with any Power; no negotiations of the sort were in progress, and, so far as he could judge, it was not probable that any such would be entered into. If, however, any agreement should be concluded which should involve a retraction or an alteration of the above-mentioned declaration made by the Prime Minister the year before, it was his opinion that it would have to be submitted to Parliament, and that would doubtless be done.

The great majority of the English press refrains from commenting on the Minister's declaration in any way.

Only two Radical papers, the *Daily News* and the *Manchester Guardian*, express their opinion in short leading articles. The first named views Sir Edward Grey's words with satisfaction and thinks that they are definite enough to dissipate every doubt. England is not under the control of any other country. She is not the vassal of Russia, nor the ally of France, nor the enemy of Germany. The declaration, it says, is a wholesome lesson for that section of the English press which would create the belief that there was in

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existence a Triple Entente of the same nature as the Triple Alliance.

The *Manchester Guardian*, on the other hand, is not satisfied with the Minister's declaration. It finds fault with its obscure form and endeavours to show that it admits of interpretations which do not altogether exclude the existence of certain, perhaps conditional, agreements of a nature in conformity with that which rumour lends them.

The declarations by Sir Edward Grey are in accordance with a confidential statement made by a personage of the immediate entourage of the Minister, to the effect that "he could declare most emphatically and definitely that no agreements of military or naval nature existed between England and France, although from the French side the desire of such compacts had been repeatedly uttered. The British Cabinet would not grant to Russia what it had refused to France. No naval convention had been concluded with Russia, and none would be concluded."

VI.

June . . . , 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has plainly felt it necessary to take a stand immediately and emphatically against the comments of the *Manchester Guardian* on his answer to the interpellation in the matter of the alleged Anglo-Russian naval understanding. The *Westminster Gazette* publishes in a leading column a denial from the pen of Mr. Spender, who, as is well known, is one of Sir Edward Grey's most intimate friends ; this denial leaves nothing to be desired in the way of definiteness. It is remarked therein that there exists no naval agreement, and that no negotiations are in progress between Great Britain and Russia concerning a naval agreement, and that no one who knew the character and methods of Sir Edward Grey would even for a moment assume that the statement made by him was designed to cover up the truth.

VII.

June . . . , 1914.

The fact that Sir Edward Grey's statement in the English House of Commons concerning the Russo-English naval

agreement has been so readily accepted by public opinion in England, has brought about a feeling of great relief here and in St. Petersburg. The wirepullers in this matter had already feared that the lovely dream of the new "Triple Alliance" had come to an end. Moreover, I can hardly believe that the *Manchester Guardian* should alone have been able to see through the trick which Sir Edward Grey employed in not answering at all the questions put to him as to whether negotiations with Russia concerning a naval agreement were imminent or in progress, but rather in denying the question, which had never been put, as to whether England had entered into binding undertakings concerning participation in any European war. I am, rather, inclined to believe that the British press in this matter has again given a proof of its well-known discipline in the treatment of questions of foreign policy, and has, whether upon a *mot d'ordre* or out of political instinct, kept quiet. To what criticisms and fault-finding by the German people's representatives and the German press would not the Imperial German Government be exposed, what a cry over our foreign policy and our diplomacy would not be raised, if a similar declaration had been made before the Imperial Diet ! In parliamentary England everybody keeps quiet when a Minister seeks in such a barefaced manner to mislead his own party, the people's representatives, and the public opinion of the whole country. What does England not sacrifice to her Germanophobia ?

VIII.

June . . . , 1914.

From a quarter which has retained its old sympathy for Germany I have received, with request to keep the matter strictly secret, a note, which I most respectfully submit herewith, concerning a conference which took place on May 26th, of this year, with the chief of the Russian Naval Staff, and in which the foundations were laid for the negotiations concerning the Russo-English naval agreement. My informant did not yet know to what results the negotiations have thus far led, but he expressed very earnest concern about the benefit which would accrue to Russian nationalism if the agreement really came into being. As soon as the

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co-operation of England were assured, the notorious Pan-Slav agitators would not hesitate to employ the first opportunity offered to bring about war. M. Sazonof himself, he thought, was clearly being driven into the arms of the Russian war party.

ENCLOSURE.

St. Petersburg, May 13/26th, 1914.

Considering that an agreement between Russia and England is desired regarding the co-operation of their naval forces in the event of warlike operations of Russia and England with the participation of France, the conference arrived at the following conclusions :—

The projected naval convention shall in all details regulate the relations between the Russian and British armed forces at sea, and therefore an understanding concerning signals and special codes, wireless telegrams and the form of intercourse between the Russian and British naval staffs is to be brought about. The two naval staffs shall furthermore regularly make to one another reports on the navies of other powers and on their own fleets, especially as to technical data and newly introduced machinery and inventions.

As in the case of the Franco-Russian naval convention, there shall take place between the Russian and British naval staffs regular exchanges of opinions for the consideration of questions interesting the naval boards of both states.

The Russian naval agreement with England, like the Franco-Russian naval agreement, shall provide for separate actions of the Russian and British navies, which however shall be based on mutual understanding. In regard to the strategic aims a distinction must be made on the one hand between the maritime operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea, and on the other hand the probable naval war in the Mediterranean. In both places it must be Russia's endeavour to secure compensation from England in return for drawing off a part of the German fleet against the Russian.

In the region of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles temporary undertakings in the straits shall be kept in view as strategic operations by Russia in case of war.

The Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that England immobilise as great a part of the German fleet in

the North Sea as possible. In this way the great superiority of the German over the Russian fleet would be annulled and a Russian landing in Pomerania would perhaps be rendered possible. In this connection the British Government could render an important service by sending into the Baltic harbours before the beginning of war such a number of merchant ships as would compensate for the lack of Russian transports.

As to the situation in the Mediterranean, it is most highly important for Russia that the absolute superiority of the fighting forces of the Entente over those of Austria and Italy be assured. For if the Austro-Italian forces should dominate this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous blow for Russia. It must be surmised that the Austro-Italian forces are superior to the French. England would therefore have to leave the necessary number of ships in the Mediterranean to insure the superiority of the forces of the Entente Powers until such time as the Russian navy's development should have proceeded sufficiently far to enable it to take over the solution of this question itself. Russian vessels would have to use the British harbours in the Mediterranean as naval bases with England's permission, just as the French naval agreement permits Russia to use the French harbours in the Western Mediterranean as bases.

IX.

July . . . , 1914.

During my talk to-day with M. Sazonof the conversation turned to President Poincaré's visit.⁽¹⁾ The Minister emphasised the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could not refrain from calling M. Sazonof's attention to the fact that it was not the toasts exchanged at such visits that gave grounds for uneasiness, but rather the comments of the press on the matter. I said such comments had not been lacking this time, either, and that among them even the report of the alleged conclusion of a Russo-English naval convention had been published. M. Sazonof seized upon this sentence and declared angrily that such a naval convention existed only "in the mind of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and in the moon."

⁽¹⁾[To the Tsar, in July, 1914.]

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X.

July . . . , 1914.

I have the honour to send you herewith the copy of a letter which the adjutant of a Russian Grand Duke, who was at the time sojourning here, wrote from St. Petersburg under date of the 26th inst. to the Grand Duke, the important contents of which letter I have already been able to report by telegraph. The letter, of which I obtained knowledge in a confidential way, shows, in my respectful opinion, that Russia has been decided on war ever since the 24th of the month.

ENCLOSURE.

July 12/25th, St. Petersburg.

There have been great disorders among the workmen in St. Petersburg ; it is remarkable that they took place at the time of the visit of the French President to the Russian Capital, and of the Austrian ultimatum⁽¹⁾ to Serbia. Yesterday I [B. 4.] heard from the French military agent General de la Guiche that he had learnt that Austria was not without guilt in the matter of the disorder among the workmen. Now, however, everything is rapidly assuming normal conditions. And it appears that, encouraged by the French, our Government has stopped trembling before the Germans. It was high time ! It is better to express oneself clearly at last than everlastinglly to hide behind the "professional lies" of the diplomats. Austria's ultimatum is of unheard-of effrontery, as all the papers here unite in saying. I have just read the evening paper :—yesterday there was a sitting of the Council of Ministers ; the Minister of War spoke very energetically and confirmed the news that Russia was ready for war, and the other Ministers unanimously agreed with him ; a report to the Emperor in the same spirit was prepared, and this report was confirmed on the same evening. There was published to-day in the *Russian Invalid* a preliminary communication by the Government, stating that "the Government was greatly concerned about the events that had occurred and the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. The Government is following carefully the development of the Austro-Serbian conflict, with regard to which [See O. Russia cannot remain indifferent."⁽²⁾ This communication has

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been reprinted with most favourable comments by all papers. We are all convinced that no Rasputins will this time impede Russia from doing her duty. Germany, who is sending Austria on ahead, is firmly decided to fight us before we build up our fleet, and the Balkan States have not yet recovered from the last wars. We, too, must feel the danger and not hide our heads, as we did during the Balkan War, when Kokovtsof thought only of the Bourse. At that time, however, the war would have been easier, for the Balkan federation was fully armed. But we let the police scatter the street demonstrations directed against that miserable Austria! Now, however, such demonstrations would be joyfully greeted. Let us hope above all that the régime of the cowards (of the stamp of Kokovtsof) and of certain criers and mystics is over. War is a storm. Even if catastrophes were to come, it would still be better than to remain in this unbearably oppressive atmosphere. I know for a certainty, from experience, that the quietest place for me is at the front, where one sees danger in its natural proportions, and that is not so fearful; the worst place is the rearguard, in which the atmosphere of cowardice prevails, improbable rumours circulate, and panics arise. In the future war, however, the interior of Russia will be the rearguard.

"THE SCRAP OF PAPER."*

German Chancellor's Explanation and Great Britain's Reply.

[*British Foreign Office Communiqué.*]

I.

January 25, 1915.

THE Associated Press publishes the following account of an interview which its correspondent has had with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the German Imperial Chancellor:

"*German Field Headquarters of the German Armies.*

"I am surprised to learn that my phrase, 'a scrap of paper,' which I used in my last conversation with the British

* [See B. 160 (vol. I., p. 209); also G. 35.]

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Ambassador⁽¹⁾ in reference to the Belgian neutrality treaty⁽¹⁾ [See B. 160.] should have caused such an unfavourable impression in the United States. The expression was used in quite another connection and meaning from that implied in Sir Edward Goschen's report⁽¹⁾ and the turn given to it in the biased comment of our enemies is undoubtedly responsible for this impression."

The speaker was Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and the conversation occurred at the Headquarters in a town of Northern France, in a villa serving as office and dwelling for the Chancellor, Minister von Jagow, and the members of the diplomatic suite accompanying the Emperor in the field. The Chancellor had apparently not realised until his attention was called to it the extent to which the phrase had been used in the discussion on the responsibility for the war. He volunteered the explanation of his meaning, which, in substance, was that he had spoken of the treaty, not as a scrap of paper for Germany, but as an instrument which had become so through Belgium's forfeiture of its neutrality, and that England had quite other reasons for entering the war, compared with which the neutrality treaty, to which she appealed, had only the value of a scrap of paper.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

"My conversation with Sir E. Goschen," said the Chancellor, "occurred on the 4th August. I had just declared in the Reichstag⁽²⁾ that only dire necessity, only the struggle for existence, compelled Germany to march through Belgium, but that Germany was ready to make compensation for the wrong committed. When I spoke I already had certain indications, but no absolute proof, on which to base a public accusation that Belgium had long before abandoned its neutrality in its relations with England. Nevertheless, I took Germany's responsibilities towards neutral States so seriously that I spoke frankly on the wrong committed by Germany. What was the British attitude on the same question?" said the Chancellor. "The day before my conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament,⁽³⁾ wherein, [p. 400.] while he did not state expressly that England would take

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part in the war, he left the matter in little doubt. One needs only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason of England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful phrases about England's honour and England's obligations we find it over and over again expressed that England's interests—its own interests—called for participation in war, for it was not in England's interests that a victorious, and therefore stronger, Germany should emerge from the war. This old principle of England's policy—to take as the sole criterion of its actions its private interests regardless of right, reason, or considerations of humanity—is expressed in that speech of Gladstone's in 1870 on Belgian neutrality from which Sir Edward quoted.⁽¹⁾ Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was unable to subscribe to the doctrine that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding upon every party thereto, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for action on the guarantee arrives, and he referred to such English statesmen as Aberdeen and Palmerston as supporters of his views."

"England drew the sword," continued the Chancellor, "only because she believed her own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the war. That is what I meant when I told Sir E. Goschen, in that last interview when we sat down to talk the matter over privately man to man, that among the reasons which had impelled England into war the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value of a scrap of paper. I may have been a bit excited and aroused," said the Chancellor. "Who would not have been at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of my Chancellorship going for naught? I recalled to the Ambassador my efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany, an understanding which, I reminded him, would have made a general European war impossible, and have absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such understanding," the Chancellor interjected parenthetically, "would have formed the basis on which we could have approached the United States as a third partner. But England had not taken up this plan, and through its entry into the war had destroyed for ever the hope of its fulfilment. In comparison with such momentous consequences, was the treaty not a scrap of paper?"

⁽¹⁾ [p. 409.]

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THE BELGIAN PAPERS

"England ought really to cease harping on this theme of Belgian neutrality," said the Chancellor. "Documents on the Anglo-Belgian military agreement, which we have found in the meantime, show plainly enough how England regarded this neutrality. As you know, we found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office papers⁽¹⁾ which showed that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government if war had then broken out. In other words, do exactly the same thing for which, with all the pathos of virtuous indignation, she now reproached Germany. In some later despatch Grey, I believe, informed Belgium that he did not believe England would take such a step because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action,⁽²⁾ and still people in the United States wonder that I characterised as a scrap of paper a treaty whose observance, according to responsible British statesmen, should be dependent upon the pleasure of British public opinion, a treaty which England herself had long since undermined by military agreements with Belgium. Remember, too, that Sir E. Grey expressly refused to assure us of England's neutrality even in the eventuality that Germany respected Belgian neutrality. I can understand therefore English displeasure at my characterisation of the treaty of 1839⁽³⁾ as a scrap of paper, for this scrap of paper was for England extremely valuable, as furnishing an excuse before the world for embarking in the war. I hope, therefore, that in the United States you will think clearly enough and realise that England in this matter, too, acted solely on the principle, 'Right or wrong, my interests.'"

⁽¹⁾[See
"The
Brussels
Docu-
ments
II."
p. 318.]

⁽²⁾[See
p. 327.]

⁽³⁾[See
p. 487.]

THE UNITED STATES NOTE.*

The more immediate object of the interview had been to obtain the views of the Chancellor and Herr von Jagow on the Anglo-American negotiations regarding the neutral

*[The remainder of the interview, from this point on, relates to matters which do not concern the present volume; but the whole is here given just as it appears in the Foreign Office communiqué.]

shipping, and after an examination of the British note the Chancellor made the following statement :

" I shall not comment on the note of the 7th January which, so far as the facts and questions of trade are concerned, Sir Edward Grey, however, considered it appropriate to add two statements intended to carry weight far beyond the scope of this particular interchange of notes. I mean the paragraph where he speaks of leaving open the question of permitting the shipment of food supplies not intended for the enemies' armies or Government, and his slurs upon us for abandoning the rules of civilisation and humanity.

" It should not be forgotten that England in this war set out to starve over 65,000,000 of people directly by cutting off their food, and indirectly by closing the arteries of their commerce. In attempting this she did not refrain from destroying a considerable part of the trade of neutral nations. It is now beginning to dawn upon Great Britain that she cannot force us into submission by these methods. Sir Edward Grey inserted the sentences in question in the document to stand as a record of English magnanimity which actually never existed, and so tries to mould out of this note a precedent upon which he may some day fall back when the British may have ceased to hold the whiphand control of maritime avenues of supply.

EXORBITANT BRITISH DEMANDS.

" It will be well, then, to remember with what brutal means England tried to throttle us. The nation boasting the most powerful fleet and the strictest adherence to international agreements demands a greater control of neutral shipping than it would be allowed to command if it had declared an effective blockade, which, according to the Hague ruling, it should do, but which it cannot do, being powerless to uphold such a blockade. This is rather remarkable for a nation which vents its moral indignation upon us so frequently for the purpose of creating anti-German sentiment abroad, and so consolidating public sentiment at home ; but it is even more extraordinary how this time Sir Edward Grey overdraws his morality account by calling attention to what evil things we might do in the future.

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"I rather admire this facility which frequently enables the British Foreign Office to turn defeat ashore or on sea into a victory in the domain of public opinion. When our vessels successfully bombarded the towns on the east coast of England, towns equipped with defences, arsenals, batteries, and other military establishments, despite everything emanating to the contrary from London, no powerful fleet appeared to defend the coast, but all England was made to arise in indignation about our lack of civilisation. Recruiting lists bulged with new names, and reports were spread broadcast which shocked the world with horror at our alleged infamy."

EXPLOSIVE BULLETS.

"These reports defaming us gained in intensity when our dirigibles threw bombs over the fortified town of Great Yarmouth, and warded off attacks from below as they passed over British soil. Now is not this rather audacious diplomatic journalism, in view of the fact that British vessels bombarded the open cities of Dar-es-Salaam, Victoria, Swakopmund, and have often bombarded towns on the Belgian coast without previous announcement, destroying thereby private dwellings belonging to the subjects of the Allies without regard as to who might be living there, and that Great Britain supplies her troops with rifles and ammunition which only outwardly correspond with the rules of The Hague? Bullets with the core constructed in two parts in such a manner that in loading the soldier can easily wrench off the points by inserting them in a sharp-edged hole drilled in the lever attached to the rifle, thus becoming dum-dum ammunition, were produced in large quantities and were found. We have now in our possession many such rifles. We have them still loaded with dum-dum ammunition.

"Nor does Britain show so very delicate a sentiment as to the actions of its Allies. Great Britain claims to fight for the liberty of peoples, but she does not interfere with Russia, who even now is adopting in her own provinces of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic Provinces, and against the Jews a police terrorism barely equalled in history. England's other ally, France, time and again sent aviators to bombard towns which had no fortifications whatever, and no importance

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from a military point of view, prominent among these being Luxemburg and Freiburg in the Black Forest. Now, thousands of German women and children and a few old men have returned from France. Many are still there who for months and months have suffered in French concentration camps treatment so inhuman that it almost beggars description. No hostile civilian man or woman was ever put into a concentration camp in Germany until the beginning of November, when it was found necessary to retaliate against the British, and later the French, as these nations continued to refuse to let German civilians go free. No British, French, or Russian woman living in the Empire was ever put in a concentration camp in Germany.

"With such a score counting against England and the Allies, let nobody in the future ever be deceived by magnanimous appeals to civilisation and humanity, although they be so ingeniously inserted in diplomatic notes dealing with the throttling of neutral traffic."

II.

January 26, 1915.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorises the publication of the following observations upon the report of an interview recently granted by the German Chancellor to an American correspondent :

It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should show anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty being a mere "scrap of paper." The phrase has made a deep impression because the progress of the world largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between individuals and between nations, and the policy disclosed in Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's phrase tends to debase the legal and moral currency of civilisation.

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain, in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium, "was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap of paper"; that is, that Great Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded

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the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and Germany who "took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously." The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann Hollweg seeks to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of plain facts.

First, the German Chancellor alleges that "England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government." This allegation is absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906 and again in 1911.⁽¹⁾ The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British War Office or Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely informal character, and no military agreement of any sort was at either time made between the two Governments. Before any conversations took place between British and Belgian officers, it was expressly laid down on the British side that the discussion of military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium *for the defence of her neutrality*, and on the Belgian side a marginal note upon the record explains that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place *after the violation of our neutrality by Germany*." As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British, "You could only land in our country with our consent," and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical assurance⁽²⁾ that no British Government would violate the neutrality of Belgium, and that "so long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, "He did not believe England would take such a step, because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action." What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: "I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it."

⁽¹⁾[See pp. 314-320.]

⁽²⁾[See p. 327.]

If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him, namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract : railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it were previously violated by another Power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications. In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium having thereby "abandoned" and "forfeited" her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a "wrong" had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911. It would seem to follow, that according to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's code, a wrong becomes a right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it. Those who are content with older and more generally accepted standards are likely to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said in his Pastoral letter : "Belgium was bound in honour to defend her own independence. She kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath ; England kept hers." These are the facts.

In support of the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis, namely, that Germany "took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously," he alleges nothing except that "he spoke frankly on the wrong committed by Germany" in invading Belgium. That a man knows the right, while doing the wrong, is not usually accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness.

The real nature of Germany's view of her "responsibilities towards neutral States" may, however, be learnt, on authority which cannot be disputed, by reference to the English White Paper. If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously, why, when Germany was asked to

⁽¹⁾[B. 114.] respect the neutrality of Belgium⁽¹⁾ if it were respected by

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France; did Germany refuse? ⁽¹⁾ France, when asked the corresponding question at the same time, agreed. ⁽²⁾ This would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium. The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's colleague. It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare :

“Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just;
But four times he that gets his blow in fust.”

“They had to advance into France,” said Herr von Jagow, “by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.” ⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [B. 160.]

Germany's real attitude towards Belgium was thus frankly given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German Chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag, claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of “hacking a way through.” The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere scrap of paper. The truth was spoken in the first statements by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and arguments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts to excuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover, all attacks upon Great Britain in regard to this matter, and all talk about “responsibilities towards neutral States,” come badly from the man who on the 29th July asked Great Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. ⁽⁴⁾

⁽⁴⁾ [B. 85.]

The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his “efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany,” an understanding, he added, which would have “absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe.” He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, ⁽⁵⁾ that Germany required, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression against Germany; they were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. ⁽⁶⁾ An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have meant an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe; but it would

⁽⁵⁾ [See
p. 462.]

⁽⁶⁾ [B. 101.]

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[JAN. 26, 1914]

have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe.

The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the British Ambassador in August last he "may have been a bit excited at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of his chancellorship going for nought." Considering that at the date of the conversation (4th August) Germany had

⁽¹⁾[Y. 147.] already made war on France⁽¹⁾ the natural conclusion is that the shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted, not in the fact of a European war, but in the fact that England had not agreed to stand out of it.

The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the American correspondent may be brought to the very simple test, the application of which is the more apposite because it serves to recall one of the leading facts which produced the present war. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg re-

⁽²⁾[B. 36, 43.] fused the proposal, which England put forward⁽²⁾ and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a Conference at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and honourable terms without war. If he really wished to work with England for peace, why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known after the Balkan Conference in London that England could be trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the Reichstag to England's good faith in those negotiations. The proposal for a second Conference between the Powers was made by Sir Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in 1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of averting war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.

The second part of the interview with the American correspondent consists of a discourse upon the ethics of war. The things which Germany has done in Belgium and France have been placed on record before the world by those who have suffered from them and who know them at first hand. After this, it does not lie with the German Chancellor to read to other belligerents a lecture upon the conduct of war.

ITALY AND AUSTRIAN INTENTIONS AGAINST SERBIA.

[Documents published in the British "Collected Diplomatic Documents" as an Appendix to the translation of the Serbian Blue-book [S.].]

DESPATCH FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT
ROME CONTAINING A REPORT OF A SPEECH
DELIVERED ON THE 5TH DECEMBER, 1914,
BY SIGNOR GIOLITTI, FORMERLY PRIME
MINISTER OF ITALY.

No. I.

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, December 6, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date reporting the vote of confidence in the Government recorded in the Italian Chamber, I have the honour to inform you that in his speech which closed the discussion, Signor Giolitti stated, in illustration and justification of the attitude of Italy in separating herself from her allies and remaining neutral, that on the 9th August, 1913, being himself absent from Rome, he had received a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the late Marquis di San Giuliano, to the following effect :—⁽¹⁾

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such

⁽¹⁾ [*cf.* B.
152.]

action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that therefore we do not consider that the *casus foederis* arises."

Signor Giolitti's answer was as follows :—" If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a *casus foederis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."

This, he said, was done, and the action of Italy in no respect disturbed her relations with her allies. He explained this point in order to make it clear in the eyes of Europe that Italy had acted with entire loyalty, as she would do to the end.

It is interesting to notice that it was on the following day, the 10th August, that the peace of Bucharest, against which Austria was disposed to promulgate reserves, was signed.

NO. 2.

Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 5th December, 1914.

(TRANSLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CHAMBER.)

SIGNOR GIOLITTI : The President of the Council, when speaking of the declaration of neutrality made by Italy on the outbreak of war, recalled the fact that this decision was the subject of heated debates and divided counsels, but that later, both in Italy and abroad, the view gradually prevailed that we were only exercising a right secured to us.

ITALY, AUSTRIA, AND SERBIA

Therefore, inasmuch as I hold it necessary that Italy's loyal observance of international treaties shall be considered as being above any possibility of dispute—(*Hear, hear*)—I feel it my duty to recall a precedent, which proves that the interpretation placed by the Government on the Treaty of the Triple Alliance is the correct interpretation, and was admitted as correct in identical circumstances by the Allied Powers.

During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano, the following telegram :—

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. (*Sensation*.)

"I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the *casus foederis* arises.

"Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve."

I replied :—

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a *casus foederis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure." (*Hear, hear*.)

This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies.

I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely loyal to the observance of her pledges. (*Loud applause.*)

I should like now to make a very short statement in explanation of my vote on this question. I approve the Government's programme of an armed and vigilant neutrality for the guardianship of the vital interests of Italy. The Honourable President of the Council said truly that the vast upheaval becomes greater every day, and that it is given to none to foresee the end. The immense military and financial resources which the belligerent Powers have at their disposal exclude the possibility of an early termination of the conflict. As long as the necessity does not arise for us to come down into the arena to preserve our own vital interests, we ought all loyally to observe neutrality, since it is only by such loyal observance that we can preserve intact that great source of strength which is freedom of action. (*Loud applause.*)

In this conflict, which is without precedent in history, the political life of Italy may be at stake. The greatest prudence is therefore incumbent on all; and it is incumbent above all, not only on the Government and on Parliament, but also on that great force, the Press—(*Hear, hear*)—to keep a single eye to the great interests of Italy and to remember only that they are Italians. (*Loud applause.*)

In conclusion, I hope from the bottom of my heart that the men who at this supreme moment have the responsibility of Government may deserve the full gratitude of the country. (*Loud cheers and applause, during which many Deputies went up to the speaker and congratulated him.*)

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I.—IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

[Of these speeches in the House of Commons, the two statements made by Sir Edward Grey on August 3rd and the three statements by Mr. Asquith—on August 4th, August 5th and August 6th—were printed as Part II. of the British Blue-book “Great Britain and the European Crisis” [B.]. The other speeches and statements, here added, are taken from “Hansard.”]

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(1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, MONDAY, JULY 27, 1914.*

AUSTRIA AND SERBIA.

Mr. Bonar Law.—I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary a question of which I have given him notice: whether he would communicate any information to the House as to the situation which exists between Austria and Serbia?

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey).—The House will, of course, be aware through the public Press

* [This statement by Sir E. Grey is not printed in the British Blue-book, but there are several references to it: see B. 62, 83, and 161 (vol. I., p. 217).]

of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at this moment. I think that it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which His Majesty's Government have so far taken up.

⁽¹⁾ [July 24.] Last Friday⁽¹⁾ morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, which has appeared in the Press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government

⁽²⁾ [B. 4.] upon Serbia.⁽²⁾

⁽³⁾ [See B. 5, 10, 11.] In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors,⁽³⁾ and expressed the view that, as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone, I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that, if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe: a matter that concerned us all.

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said⁽⁴⁾ that, if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four Powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, who were not directly interested in the Serbian question—should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four Powers endeavoured to arrange a settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia, I made by telegraph yesterday afternoon the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed:—

⁽⁵⁾ [B. 36.] I instructed⁽⁵⁾ His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a Conference to be held in London immediately to endeavour to find a means of arranging the present difficulties. At the same time, I instructed His Majesty's Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorise their

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representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to inform the Governments there of the proposed Conference, and to ask them to suspend all active military operations pending the result of the Conference.

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is, of course, a proposal in which the co-operation of all four Powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this, the efforts of one Power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Serbian reply⁽¹⁾ as published this morning in the Press is accurate, ⁽¹⁾[B. 39.] as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of Powers, including Powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and becomes one in which another Great Power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow⁽²⁾: no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict, the consequences of it, direct and indirect would be incalculable. ⁽²⁾[cf. B. 46.] ⁽³⁾[cf. B. 9, 48.]

Mr. Harry Lawson.—May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it is true that this morning the German Emperor accepted the principle of mediation which he has proposed?

Sir E. Grey.—I understand that the German Government are favourable to the idea of mediation in principle⁽⁴⁾ as between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but that as to the particular proposal of applying that principle by means of a Conference which I have described to the House, the reply of the German Government has not yet been received.

⁽¹⁾ [See B. 46 and note.]

(2) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS, MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1914.

⁽¹⁾ [July 27, see p. 397.] LAST week⁽¹⁾ I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [O. 76.] Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most

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in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers⁽¹⁾ as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There has [sic] been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906.

That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question, whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I

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remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter⁽¹⁾ which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms⁽²⁾ in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments:—

" My dear Ambassador,

" From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

⁽¹⁾ [B. 105 (1).]
⁽²⁾ [B. 105 (2); cf. M. Viviani's speech, Y. 159 (vol. I., pp. 428-429).]

" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

" I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

Lord Charles Beresford.—What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey.—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and, *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic

support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us.⁽¹⁾ [For M. Viviani on this passage, see Y. 159 (vol. I., p. 429).]

For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries

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which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war,⁽¹⁾ and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement⁽²⁾ :—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the

⁽¹⁾ [B. 148;
Y. 137.
See foot-note to
the latter,
and cf. Y.
126, 143.]

support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839,⁽¹⁾ but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on August 8, 1870, used these words. He said:—

"We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country was bound either morally or inter-

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 487, cf. Treaty of 1870, p. 488.]

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nationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium ; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later :—

" There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which

benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris

⁽¹⁾ [B. 114.] and Berlin⁽¹⁾ to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply⁽²⁾ :—

⁽²⁾ [B. 125, and note.]

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

⁽³⁾ [B. 122.] From the German Government the reply⁽³⁾ was :—

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign.⁽⁴⁾ I telegraphed at

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the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government,⁽¹⁾ ⁽¹⁾[B. 115.] and I got the following reply⁽²⁾ from Sir Francis Villiers :—⁽²⁾[B. 128.]

" Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany,⁽³⁾ the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded⁽⁴⁾ in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied⁽⁵⁾ that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram⁽⁶⁾ had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George :—

" Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said :—

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything
⁽¹⁾ [See B. in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium,⁽¹⁾ asking her to
 153; text, compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have
 G. 20.] been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if
 that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of

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view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe

opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y.
126.]

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; ⁽²⁾ mobilisation of the army is taking place;* but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the

* [Mobilisation Orders were issued by the British Admiralty on Sunday, August 2nd; the Army Reservists were called up on Tuesday, August 4th.]

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House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 159 good deal has been happening on the French frontier.⁽¹⁾ We
(vol. I., p. 425.)] do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

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MR. BONAR LAW'S COMMENTS.

Mr. Bonar Law.—The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Grey) has made an appeal for support, and it is necessary I should say a word or two. They shall be very few. I wish to say, in the first place, that I do not believe there is a single Member of this House who doubts that, not only the right hon. Gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other course is taken, it is because it is forced upon them, and that they have absolutely no alternative. One thing only, further, I would like to say. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture⁽¹⁾ which only a day or two ago was a black spot on the political horizon. Everything he has said I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, that if the contingencies, which he has not put into words, but which are all in our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot, and that every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be behind us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This only I shall add: The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am Leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition.

⁽¹⁾[See p. 414.]

(3) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD
GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3,
1914.

GERMANY AND BELGIUM.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:—

“Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering

free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possessions at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours⁽¹⁾ was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means."

⁽¹⁾ [cf. B.
153; Y.
141 and
note; G.
23.]

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received. I make no further comment upon it.

(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law.—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this ⁽²⁾ [B. 153.] morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin.⁽²⁾ It was to this effect:—

"The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation

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of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply."

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram⁽¹⁾ :—

" German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."

⁽¹⁾ [B. 154;
G. 27.]

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterwards—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram⁽²⁾ :—

" General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle)."

⁽²⁾ [B. 159
G. 30.]

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory.⁽³⁾ We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms :—

⁽³⁾ [B. 157.]

" Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to

respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government : We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication.⁽¹⁾ [B. 159.] We have, in reply⁽¹⁾ to it, repeated the request we made last week⁽²⁾ [B. 114.] to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law.—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us to-day ?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.⁽³⁾

⁽³⁾ [B. 160
(vol. I.,
p. 211.)] We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram :—

"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs"

—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs—

⁽⁴⁾ [G. 40.
cf. G. 22,
23 ; Y.
152.]

"a note⁽⁴⁾ of which the following is a literal translation :—

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this morning armed

4] TOME I

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forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

“ Belgian Government are further ⁽¹⁾ resolved to resist ⁽¹⁾ For
by all means in their power. “further”
“ Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and read
Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence “firmly”
of her territory. *(fermement)*; see
“ There would be ⁽²⁾ concerted and common action G. 40.]
with the object of resisting the forcible measures
employed by Germany against Belgium, and at
the same time of guarding the maintenance for
future of the independence and integrity of
Belgium.
“ Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she
will assume defence of her fortified places.” ⁽²⁾[Trans-
lated
“ should
be ” *(il y
aurait)* in
G. 40.]

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels :—

“ The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attaché to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier.”

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000l.

(6) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914.

Motion made, and Question proposed, “ That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000 be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March

31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war."

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary

⁽¹⁾ [Aug. 3; see speech, p. 400.] two or three nights ago.⁽¹⁾ He stated—and I do not think

certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But,

⁽²⁾ [B
r-159.] Sir, the papers⁽²⁾ which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members show something more than that. They show what were the

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terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications⁽¹⁾ which [B. 85.
101.] passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.⁽²⁾ I think I must [B. 85.] refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on :—

“ He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government ”—

Let the House observe these words—

“ aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.”

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question :—

“ I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies ”—

What are the French colonies ? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

“ and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect.”

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely the position of the small States :—

“ As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany’s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty’s Government an assurance that she would do likewise.”

Then we come to Belgium :—

“ It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian neutrality would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.”

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality ; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added :—

“ Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances ”——

the assurances I have read out to the House—

“ might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired.”

What does that amount to ? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to ? In the first place, it meant this : That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions

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and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us⁽¹⁾ to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal⁽²⁾ addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper,⁽³⁾ puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says:—

“ His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view ”—

⁽¹⁾ See
p. 411;
B. 153;
G. 25.]

⁽²⁾ [B. 101.]

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language :—

“ such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded :—

“ Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.”

He then says :—

“ We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require.”

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate :—

“ You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it ”—

The statement was never more true—

“ as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our

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relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes,

and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if—in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war—we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of £100,000,000. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher

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point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications—whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise—for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning*—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is

* [Lord Kitchener was Mr. Asquith's successor at the War Office.]

no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking, on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in the

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general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

MR. BONAR LAW'S COMMENTS.

Mr. Bonar Law.—No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith). This is not a time for speech making, and I should have been quite ready to leave the statement which he has given to the Committee as the expression of the view, not of a party but of a nation. But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will be given for expressing the views of a large section of this Committee, I feel that I am bound to make clear to the Committee and to the country what is the attitude of His Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two things which I desire to impress upon the Committee. The first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace as strongly as any Member of this Committee; and the second is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our will, and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power to prevent such a condition of things arising. When this crisis first arose I confess I was one of those who had the hope that even then, though a European conflagration took place, we might be able to stay out of it. I held that hope strongly, but in a short time I became convinced of this, that into this war we should inevitably be drawn, and that it really was a question, and a question only, whether we should enter it honourably or be dragged into it with dishonour. I remember that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right hon. Friend,* when I had to speak on foreign affairs, I made this

* [Mr. A. J. Balfour resigned the leadership of the Unionist party on November 9, 1911, and Mr. Bonar Law was chosen to succeed him as Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, on November 14, 1911.]

statement, which perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I did not believe in inevitable war. I said it would be due to human folly. It is due to human folly, and to human wickedness, but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. What other course was open to us? It is quite true, as the Foreign Secretary explained to the House the other day,⁽¹⁾ that we were under no formal obligation to take part in such a struggle, but every Member in this House knows that the Entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of every other Government, that if any of the three Powers were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to step in to give their aid. The question, therefore, to my mind was this: Was this war in any way provoked by those who will now be our allies? No one who has read the White Paper can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done, but I would remind the House of this, that in this White Paper is contained the statement made by the German Ambassador, I think, at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and could not go to war, and in the same letter⁽²⁾ are found these words:

⁽²⁾[B. 32.]

"As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter."

⁽³⁾[B. 85.]

Every one for years has known that the key to peace or war lay in Berlin. Every one knew it, and at this crisis there is no one who can doubt that Berlin, if it had chosen, could have prevented this terrible conflict. I am afraid that the miscalculation which was made about Brussels was made also about us. The despatch which the right hon. Gentleman referred to⁽³⁾ is a despatch of a nature that I, at least, believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it had been believed that our hands were free, and that we held the position which we had always held before. That, at least, is my belief. Now what does this mean? We are fighting, as the Prime Minister said, for the honour, and with the honour is bound up always the interest, of our country. But we are fighting also for the whole basis of the civilisation for which we stand, and for which Europe stands. I do not wish, any

more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion, and I only ask the House to consider this one aspect.

Look at the way Belgium is being treated to-day. There is a report—if it is not true now, it may be true to-morrow—that the city of Liège is attacked by German troops, and that civilians, as in the days of the middle ages, are fighting for their hearths and homes against trained troops. How has that been brought about? In a state of war, war must be waged, but remember that this plan is not of to-day or of yesterday. It has been long matured. The Germans knew that they would have others to face, and they were ready to take the course which they took the other day of saying to Belgium,⁽¹⁾ “Destroy your independence and allow our ⁽¹⁾[G. 20.] troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with a might which it is impossible for you to resist.” If we had allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations of the world, and our honour as one of the nations of the world, would, in my opinion, have been gone. This is no small struggle. It is the greatest, perhaps, that this country has ever been engaged in, and the issue is uncertain. It is Napoleonism once again. Thank heaven, so far as we know, there is no Napoleon.

I am not going to say anything more about the causes of the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this subject. But, if I may be allowed to say so, I should like to say this, that I read yesterday with real pleasure an article in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me, the *Manchester Guardian*. In that article it still held that the war ought not to have been entered into, but it took this view, that that was a question for history, and that now we were in it, there was only one question for us, and that was to bring it to a successful issue. I have felt sympathy, far more than at any other time, for the Prime Minister and for the Foreign Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the Foreign Secretary should have a feeling that perhaps he has brought this country into an unnecessary war. No feeling can be worse. I can say this, and whether we are right or wrong, the whole House agrees with it I am sure, that that is a burden which the right hon. Gentleman can carry with a good conscience, and that every one of us can put up unhesitatingly this prayer, may God defend the right.

I should like, if I may, to go to another topic—this is the only opportunity I shall have, and I think it is worth saying—and to ask the House to consider the conditions under which this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech by the hon. Member (Mr. Arthur Henderson), and he has developed it in describing the terms of this Vote of Credit, that he realised, as we all must realise, that in a country situated like ours the development of industry and the supply of food at home is just as much an operation of war as is the conduct of our armed forces. I do not wish to minimise our difficulties, but I am quite sure, as sure as I can be of anything, that there is no danger of a scarcity of food, and that the only danger is the fear of scarcity of food. Everyone who has been in business knows that what causes panic prices is not actual scarcity at the time, but the fear of scarcity coming, and this is a case where every one of us must do what he can to impress upon the people of this country that there is, as I believe, no danger. Here I should like, if I may, to give one warning note. Remember, at least I believe it, this war, unexpected by us, is not unexpected by our enemy. I shall be greatly surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes there is a destruction of our property which might raise a panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us be prepared for it, and let us realise that it has no bearing whatever on the ultimate course of the war. There is something else which I think, if I am right, it is important to say. We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the basis of successful war, as it is of every branch of industry at this moment. I think the Government have taken the right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that they have been supported by those who best understand the situation. I think the danger is minimised as much as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of this war upon our trade and our industry. I hope the House will not think I am too optimistic, but I do think there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of what the effects may be, and by taking that gloomy view, helping to bring about the very state of affairs that we wish to avoid.

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Again, I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too hopeful. But let us look at the facts as if we were examining a chess problem. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going to happen? It all depends on that. I admit that if that goes the position is gloomy indeed, but of that I have no fear. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going to happen? Five-sixths of our production is employed in the Home trade. What goes abroad is very important, for, of course, if the population which supplied the sixth were thrown out of work, that would react upon the Home trade. But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the European countries which are now at war is only a small part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal policy. We are far beyond that. It is a fact. Our total exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in my belief—I have not looked into the figures—exceed our exports to India and Australia taken alone.

We shall have free trade, if the sea routes are maintained, with the Colonies and with the whole of the American Continent, and, unfortunately for them, both our allies and our enemies will not be competing with us in those markets. Look at it as a problem, and I think we have a right to believe, not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more nearly normal than is generally believed. I hope the House will not think that a useless thing to say. There is one thing more which I would desire to say. This is the affair of the nation. Everyone would desire to help. There is a great deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Government. I was glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham⁽¹⁾ and my right hon. Friend the Member for the Strand.⁽²⁾ They gave it gladly. But I am sure that I speak not only for this bench, but for the whole of our party, when I say that the Government has only got to requisition any one of us and we will serve it and our country to the best of our ability.

⁽¹⁾ [Mr.
Austen
Chamber-
lain.]

⁽²⁾ [Mr.
Walter
H. Long.]

(7) SIR EDWARD GREY, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR NEUTRALITY.

August 27, 1914.⁽¹⁾[i.e.,
B. 123.]

Mr. Keir Hardie asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the German Ambassador (White Paper, p. 66, item No. 123),⁽¹⁾ together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered by the Cabinet; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected?

⁽²⁾[B. 85.]

Sir E. Grey.—These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on August 1st, and without authority, to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85⁽²⁾ in the White Paper (Miscellaneous No. 6, 1914).

⁽³⁾[B. 101.]

The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning—that is Sunday, August 2nd—the conditions on which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. The German Chancellor had already been told on July 30th that we could not bargain that away.⁽³⁾

⁽⁴⁾[See
p. 400.]

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House accordingly.⁽⁴⁾ I had seen the German Ambassador again at his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and it does not therefore appear in the White Paper, but it was impossible to withdraw that condition without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the Treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

⁽⁵⁾[B. 153.]

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in No. 153⁽⁵⁾ in the White Paper about the neutrality of Belgium.

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Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the White Paper.⁽¹⁾

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123⁽²⁾ in the White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd. If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, I must have referred to No. 85,⁽³⁾ the proposals made not personally by the Ambassador but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently, and this would have made the case against the German Government much stronger than I did make it in my speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government: He worked for peace; but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed.

Mr. Keir Hardie.—May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with the German Government on the basis of the suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador?

Sir E. Grey.—The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions; it was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and the conditions were stated to the House and made known to the German Ambassador.

Mr. Keir Hardie.—May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated these suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put forward by their own Ambassador?

Mr. T. M. Healy.—Before the right hon. Gentleman answers that question may I ask him if Socialists in the Reichstag are asking any questions like this?

⁽¹⁾ [B. 160
is Sir E.
Goschen's
report.]

⁽²⁾ [B. 123.]

⁽³⁾ [B. 85.]

⁽¹⁾[B. 85.]

Sir E. Grey.—The German Ambassador—[HON. MEMBERS : “Do not answer !”]—I should like not to have any misunderstanding—did not make to us suggestions different from those which his Government made. The suggestions that his Government made were those in No. 85⁽¹⁾ in the White Paper. The German Ambassador never suggested to us that Germany would be able to agree to the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. On the contrary, he did suggest to me that we should not put that condition forward because he was afraid his Government would not be able to accept it.

August 28, 1914.

[cf. Questions and answers, pp. 436–437.]
⁽²⁾[See pp. 358–62.]

Lord Robert Cecil asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the publication by the German Government of certain proposals which are alleged to have been made to secure French and English neutrality during the War ;⁽²⁾ and whether the publication is complete and accurate ?

*Sir E. Grey**.—I have seen an incomplete publication. The circumstances were as follows : It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary, and told him that, as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published. This second telegram does not seem to have been published.

* [The German reply to this statement by Sir E. Grey will be found on pp. 363–5 above.]

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February 11, 1915.

Mr. Jowett asked whether the telegram relative to a guarantee by Great Britain of the neutrality of France, referred to in Appendix II. (b) of *Miscellaneous*, No. 15, 1914,⁽¹⁾ was communicated to M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, before August 3rd, to the French Government before August 4th, and to the British Cabinet before August 3rd?

Sir E. Grey.—I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to the noble Lord the Member for Hitchin⁽²⁾ on August 28th last, from which it is clear that there was a complete misunderstanding as to the nature of the suggestion made by the German Ambassador and that there was therefore nothing on the subject to communicate to the French Government or the Cabinet on the dates named. If the German proposal had been, as at first supposed, that Germany would remain neutral if France remained neutral, I should, of course, have submitted it to the French Government. But the German proposal was ascertained to be that France should remain neutral when Germany went to war with Russia. In other words, that France should be faithless to her alliance with Russia. I could not suggest that to the French and they would have rightly resented any suggestion of the kind.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ [i.e., translation of French Yellow-book [Y.-].]

⁽²⁾ [Lord Robert Cecil, see p. 438.]

⁽³⁾ [cf. p. 362.]

II.—PUBLIC SPEECHES.

MR. ASQUITH AT THE GUILDHALL, LONDON,
SEPTEMBER 4, 1914.*

MY LORD MAYOR AND CITIZENS OF LONDON :

IT is three and a half years since I last had the honour of addressing in this hall a gathering of the citizens. We were then meeting, under the presidency of one of your predecessors, men of all creeds and parties, to celebrate and

* "A Call to Arms." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. (London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

[The German Chancellor replied to this speech in a statement to the Danish Press Bureau, for which see pp. 370-372.]

approve the joint declaration of the two great English-speaking States that for the future any differences between them should be settled, if not by agreement, at least by judicial inquiry and arbitration, and never in any circumstances by war. Those of us who hailed that great eirenicon between the United States and ourselves as a landmark on the road of progress were not sanguine enough to think, or even to hope, that the era of war was drawing to a close. But still less were we prepared to anticipate the terrible spectacle which now confronts us—a contest, which for the number and importance of the Powers engaged, the scale of their armaments and armies, the width of the theatre of conflict, the outpouring of blood and loss of life, the incalculable toll of suffering levied upon non-combatants, the material and moral loss accumulating day by day to the higher interests of civilised mankind—a contest which in every one of these aspects is without precedent in the annals of the world. We were very confident three years ago in the rightness of our position when we welcomed the new securities for peace. We are equally confident in it to-day, when reluctantly, and against our will, but with clear judgment and a clean conscience, we find ourselves involved with the whole strength of this Empire in this bloody arbitration between might and right. The issue has passed out of the domain of argument into another field. But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would have been our condition as a nation to-day, if through timidity, or through a perverted calculation of self-interest, or through a paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough to be false to our word, and faithless to our friends? Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilised world to Belgium, a small State which has lived for more than seventy years under a several and collective guarantee, to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties. We should have seen, at the instance and by the action of two of those guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France. We, the British people, should at this moment have been standing by, with folded arms and with such countenance as we could

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command, while this small and unprotected State, in defence of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming force. We should have been admiring as detached spectators the siege of Liège, the steady and manful resistance of a small army, the occupation of Brussels with all its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their fatherland to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them, buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil population, and, finally, the greatest crime committed against civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years War, the sack of Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures, lit up by blind barbarian vengeance. What account could we, the Government and the people of this country, have been able to render to the tribunal of our national conscience and sense of honour, if, in defiance of our plighted and solemn obligations, we had endured, and had not done our best to prevent, yes, to avenge, these intolerable wrongs? For my part, I say that sooner than be a silent witness, which means in effect a willing accomplice, to this tragic triumph of force over law, and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history.

That is only a phase, a lurid and illuminating phase, in the contest into which we have been called by the mandate of duty and of honour to bear our part. The cynical violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not the whole, but a step, a first step, in a deliberate policy of which, if not the immediate, the ultimate and not far distant aim was to crush the independence and the autonomy of the Free States of Europe. First Belgium, then Holland and Switzerland, countries, like our own, imbued and sustained with the spirit of liberty, were, one after another, to be bent to the yoke. And these ambitions were fed and fostered by a body of new doctrine, a new philosophy, preached by professors and learned men. The free and full self-development which to these small States, to ourselves, to our great and growing Dominions over the seas, to our kinsmen across the Atlantic, is the well-spring and life-breath of national existence, that free self-development is the one capital offence in the code of

those who have made force their supreme divinity, and upon its altars they are prepared to sacrifice both the gathered fruits and the potential germs of the unfettered human spirit. I use this language advisedly.

This is not merely a material, it is also a spiritual conflict. Upon its issue everything that contains the promise of hope, that leads to emancipation and a fuller liberty for the millions who make up the mass of mankind, will be found sooner or later to depend.

Let me now turn for a moment to the actual situation in Europe. How do we stand? For the last ten years by what I believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrangements we have established friendly and increasingly intimate relations with the two Powers, France and Russia, with whom in days gone by we have had in various parts of the world occasion for constant friction, and now and again for possible conflict. These new and better relations, based in the first instance upon business principles of give and take, matured into a settled temper of confidence and goodwill. They were never in any sense or at any time, as I have frequently stated in this hall, directed against other Powers.

No man in the history of the world has ever laboured more strenuously or more successfully than my right hon. friend Sir Edward Grey for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world—a general and abiding peace. It is, I venture to think, a very superficial criticism which suggests that under his guidance the policy of this country has ignored, still less that it has counteracted and hampered, the Concert of Europe. It is little more than a year ago when, under the stress and strain of the Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the Great Powers met here day after day and week after week, curtailing the area of possible differences, reconciling warring ambitions and aims, and preserving against almost incalculable odds the general harmony, and it was in the same spirit and with the same purpose when a few weeks ago Austria delivered her ultimatum to Serbia⁽¹⁾ that the Foreign Secretary—for it was he—put forward the proposal for a mediating conference between the four Powers not directly concerned—Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves.⁽²⁾ If that proposal had been accepted the actual controversy would have been settled with honour to everybody, and the

⁽¹⁾ [B. 4.]

⁽²⁾ [B. 36.]

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whole of this terrible welter would have been avoided. And with whom does the responsibility rest for its refusal and for all the illimitable sufferings which now confront the world ? One Power, and one Power only, and that Power is Germany. There is the foundation and origin of this world-wide catastrophe. We persevered to the end, and no one who has not been confronted, as we were, with the responsibility—which unless you had been face to face with it you could not possibly measure, the responsibility of determining the issues of peace and war—no one who has not been in that position can realise the strength, energy, and persistence with which we laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest—straining almost to the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations—even to the last moment making effort upon effort, and indulging hope against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realise that the choice lay between honour and dishonour, between treachery and good faith—when we at last reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then only that we declared for war.

Is there any one in this hall, or in this United Kingdom, or in the vast Empire of which we here stand in the capital and centre, who blames us or repents our decision ? If not, as I believe there is not, we must steel ourselves to the task, and, in the spirit which animated our forefathers in their struggle against the dominion of Napoleon, we must, and we shall, persevere to the end.

It would be a criminal mistake to underestimate either the magnitude, the fighting quality, or the staying power of the forces which are arrayed against us ; but it would be equally foolish, and equally indefensible, to belittle our own resources whether for resistance or for attack. Belgium has shown us by memorable and glorious example what can be done by a relatively small State when its citizens are animated and fired by the spirit of patriotism.

In France and Russia we have as allies two of the greatest Powers in the world, engaged with us in a common cause, who do not mean to separate themselves from us any more than we mean to separate ourselves from them. We have upon the seas the strongest and most magnificent Fleet the world

has ever seen. The Expeditionary Force which left our shores less than a month ago has never been surpassed, as its glorious achievements in the field have already made clear, not only in material equipment, but in the physical and moral quality of its constituent parts.

As regards the Navy, I am sure my right honourable friend Mr. Churchill, whom we are glad to see here, will tell you there is happily little more to be done. I do not flatter it when I say that its superiority is equally marked in every department and sphere of its activity. We rely on it with the most absolute confidence, not only to guard our shores against the possibility of invasion, not only to seal up the gigantic battleships of the enemy in the inglorious seclusion of their own ports, whence from time to time he furtively steals forth to sow the sea with murderous snares, which are more full of menace to neutral ships than to the British Fleet. Our Navy does all this, and while it is thirsting, I do not doubt, for that trial of strength in a fair and open fight which has so far been prudently denied it, it does a great deal more. It has hunted the German Mercantile Marine from the high seas. It has kept open our own stores of food supply, and largely curtailed those of the enemy, and when the few German cruisers which still infest the more distant ocean routes have been disposed of—as they will be very soon—it will achieve for British and neutral commerce, passing backwards and forwards, from and to every port of our Empire, a security as complete as it has ever enjoyed in the days of unbroken peace. Let us honour the memory of the gallant seamen who, in the pursuit of one or another of these varied and responsible duties, have already laid down their lives for their country.

In regard to the Army, there is a call for a new, a continuous, a determined, and a united effort. For, as the war goes on, we shall have not merely to replace the wastage caused by casualties, not merely to maintain our military power at its original level, but we must, if we are to play a worthy part, enlarge its scale, increase its numbers, and multiply many times its effectiveness as a fighting instrument. The object of the appeal which I have made to you, my Lord Mayor, and to the other Chief Magistrates of our capital cities, is to impress upon them the imperious urgency of this supreme duty.

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Our self-governing Dominions throughout the Empire, without any solicitation on our part, demonstrated with a spontaneousness and unanimity unparalleled in history their determination to affirm their brotherhood with us, and to make our cause their own.

From Canada, from Australia, from New Zealand, from South Africa, and from Newfoundland, the children of the Empire assert, not as an obligation, but as a privilege, their right, and their willingness to contribute money, material, and, what is better than all, the strength and sinews, the fortunes, and lives of their best manhood.

India, too, with not less alacrity, has claimed her share in the common task. Every class and creed, British and native, princes and people, Hindoos and Mohammedans, vie with one another in a noble and emulous rivalry. Two divisions of our magnificent Indian Army are already on their way. We welcome with appreciation and affection their proffered aid, and, in an Empire which knows no distinction of race or class, where all alike, as subjects of the King Emperor, are joint and equal custodians of our common interest and fortunes, we here hail with profound and heartfelt gratitude their association side by side and shoulder to shoulder with our home and Dominion troops, under the flag which is a symbol to all of a unity that the world in arms cannot dissever or dissolve.

With these inspiring appeals and examples from our fellow-subjects all over the world, what are we doing, and what ought we to do at home? Mobilisation was ordered on August 4th. Immediately afterwards Lord Kitchener issued his call for 100,000 recruits for the Regular Army, which has been followed by a second call for another 100,000.⁽¹⁾ The response up to to-day gives us between 250,000 and 300,000 men, and I am glad to say that London has done its share. The total number of Londoners accepted is not less than 42,000. I need hardly say that the appeal involves no disparagement or discouragement of the Territorial Force. The number of units in that force who have volunteered for foreign service is most satisfactory, and grows every day. We look to them with confidence to increase their numbers, to perfect their organisation in training, and to play the efficient part which has always been assigned to them,

⁽¹⁾ [See first
Military
vol.]

both offensive and defensive, in the military system of the Empire.

But to go back to the expansion of the Regular Army, we want more men, men of the best fighting quality, and if for the moment the number who offer and are accepted should prove to be in excess of those who can at once be adequately trained and equipped, do not let them doubt that appropriate provision will be made for incorporation of all willing and able men in the fighting forces of the King. We want first of all men, and we shall endeavour to secure that men desiring to serve together shall, wherever possible, be allotted to the same regiment or corps. The raising of battalions by counties or by municipalities with this object will be in every way encouraged, but we want not less urgently a larger supply of ex-non-commissioned officers, the pick of the men who have served their country in the past, and whom, therefore, in most cases, we shall be asking to give up regular employment in order that they may return to the work for the State which they alone are competent to do.

The appeal which we make is addressed quite as much to their employers as to the men themselves. They ought surely to be assured of reinstatement in their positions at the end of the war. Finally, there are numbers of commissioned officers now in retirement with large experience of handling troops, who have served their country in the past. Let them come forward, too, and show their willingness, if need be, to train bodies of men, for whom for the moment no regular cadres or units can be found. I have little more to say.

As to the actual progress of the war I will not say anything except that, in my judgment, in whatever direction we look there is abundant ground for pride and for comfort.

I say nothing more, because I think we should bear in mind, all of us, that we are at present watching the fluctuation of fortune only in the early stages of what is going to be a protracted struggle. We must learn to take long views and to cultivate above all other qualities—those of patience, endurance, and steadfastness.

Meanwhile, let us go, each one of us, to his or her appropriate part in the great common task.

Never had a people more or richer sources of encouragement and inspiration. Let us realise, first of all, that we are

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fighting as a United Empire, in a cause worthy of the highest traditions of our race. Let us keep in mind the patient and indomitable seamen who never relax for a moment, night or day, their stern vigil on the lonely sea. Let us keep in mind our gallant troops, who to-day, after a fortnight's continuous fighting under conditions which would try the mettle of the best army that ever took the field, maintain not only an undefeated but an unbroken front.

Finally, let us recall the memories of the great men and the great deeds of the past, commemorated some of them in the monuments which we see around us on these walls, not forgetting the dying message of the younger Pitt—his last public utterance, made at the table of your predecessor, my Lord Mayor, in this very hall, “England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.” The England of those days gave a noble answer to his appeal and did not sheathe the sword until after nearly twenty years of fighting the freedom of Europe was secured. Let us go and do likewise.

MR. ASQUITH IN EDINBURGH, SEPTEMBER 18, 1914.*

A FORTNIGHT ago to-day, in the Guildhall of the City of London,⁽¹⁾ I endeavoured to present to the nation and to the world the reasons which have compelled us, the people of all others who have the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, to engage in the hazards and the horrors of war. I do not wish to repeat to-night in any detail what I then said. The war has arisen immediately and ostensibly, as everyone knows, out of a dispute between Austria and Serbia, in which we in this country had no direct concern. The diplomatic history of those critical weeks—the last fortnight in July and the first few days of August—is now accessible to all the world. It has been supplemented during the last few days by the admirable and exhaustive despatch⁽²⁾ of our late Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen—a despatch which I trust everybody will read, and no one who reads it can doubt that largely through the efforts of my

[See p. 439.]

[B. 161.]

* “The War of Civilisation.” Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. (London: Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

right hon. friend and colleague, Sir Edward Grey, the conditions of a peaceful settlement of the actual controversy were already within sight when on July 31st Germany, by [O. 70.] her own deliberate act, made war a certainty.⁽¹⁾

The facts are incontrovertible. They are not sought to be controverted, except, indeed, by the invention and circulation of such wanton falsehoods as that France was contemplating and even commencing the violation of Belgian territory as a first step on her road to Germany.⁽²⁾ The result is that [G. 20, 22; Y. 147, 148.] we are at war, and we are at war—as I have already shown elsewhere, and as I repeat here to-night—for three reasons.

In the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obligations and of what is properly called the public law of Europe; in the second place, to assert and to enforce the independence of free States, relatively small and weak, against encroachment and violence by the strong; and in the third place, to withstand, as we believe in the best interests not only of our own Empire, but of civilisation at large, the arrogant claim of a single Power to dominate the development of the destinies of Europe.

Since I last spoke some faint attempts have been made in Germany to dispute the accuracy and the sincerity of this statement of our attitude and aim. It has been suggested, for instance,⁽³⁾ that our professed zeal for treaty rights and for the interests of small States is a new-born and stimulated passion. What, we are asked, has Great Britain cared in the past for treaties or for the smaller nationalities except when she had some ulterior and selfish purpose of her own to serve? I am quite ready to meet that challenge, and to meet it in the only way in which it could be met, by reference to history; and out of many illustrations which I might take I will content myself with two, widely removed in point of time, but both, as it happens, very apposite to the present case. I will go back first to the war carried on at first against the revolutionary Government of France and then against Napoleon, which broke out in 1793 and which lasted for more than 20 years. We had then at the head of the Government in this country one of the most peace-loving Ministers who has ever presided over our fortunes, Mr. Pitt. For three years, from 1789 to 1792, he resolutely refused to interfere in any way with the revolutionary proceedings in France

⁽¹⁾ [See p. 370, German Chancellor to Danish Press Bureau.]

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or in the wars that sprang out of them, and as late, I think, as February in 1792, in a memorable speech in the House of Commons, which shows amongst other things the shortness of human foresight, he declared that there never was a time when we in this country could more reasonably expect 15 years of peace. And what was it that, within a few months of that declaration, led this pacific Minister to war? It was the invasion of the treaty rights, guaranteed by ourselves, of a small European State—the then States General of Holland.

For nearly 200 years the Great Powers of Europe had guaranteed to Holland the exclusive navigation of the River Scheldt. The French revolutionary Government invaded what is now Belgium, and as a first act of hostility to Holland declared the navigation of the Scheldt to be open. Our interest in that matter then, as now, was relatively small and insignificant. But what was Mr. Pitt's reply? I quote you the exact words he used in the House of Commons; they are so applicable to the circumstances of the present moment. This is in 1793:—

"England will never consent that another country should arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political system of Europe established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of the Powers."

He went on to say that "If this House—the House of Commons—means substantial good faith to its engagements, if it retains a just sense of the solemn faith of treaties, it must show a determination to support them." And it was in consequence of that stubborn and unyielding determination to maintain treaties, to defend small States, to resist the aggressive domination of a single Power that we were involved in a war which we had done everything to avoid and which was carried on upon a scale both as to area and as to duration up to then unexampled in the history of mankind.

That is one precedent. Let me give you one more. I come down to 1870, when this very treaty to which we are parties no less than Germany, and which guarantees the integrity and independence of Belgium, was threatened. Mr. Gladstone was then Prime Minister of this country, and he was, if possible, a stronger and more ardent advocate of peace even than Mr. Pitt himself. Mr. Gladstone, pacific as

⁽¹⁾[See pp.
488-9.]

he was, felt so strongly the sanctity of our obligations that—though here again we had no direct interest of any kind at stake—he made agreements with France and Prussia to co-operate with either of the belligerents if the other violated Belgian territory.⁽¹⁾ I should like to read a passage from a speech 10 years later, delivered in 1880 by Mr. Gladstone himself in this city of Edinburgh, in which he reviewed that transaction and explained his reasons for it.

After narrating the facts which I have summarised, he said this : “ If we had gone to war ”—which he was prepared to do—“ we should have gone to war for freedom. We should have gone to war for public right, we should have gone to war to save human happiness from being invaded by a tyrannous and lawless Power. That,” Mr. Gladstone said, “ is what I call a good cause, gentlemen. And though I detest war, and there are no epithets too strong if you will supply me with them that I will not endeavour to heap upon its head ; in such a war as that, while the breath in my body is continued to me, I am ready to engage.”

So much for our own action in the past in regard to treaties and small States. But, faint as is this denial of this part of our case, it becomes fainter still, it dissolves into the thinnest of thin air, when it has to deal with our contention that we and our Allies are notwithstanding a Power whose aim is nothing less than the domination of Europe. It is, indeed, the avowed belief of the leaders of German thought, I will not say of the German people, but of those who for many years past have controlled German policy, that such a domination, carrying with it the supremacy of what they call German culture and the German spirit, is the best thing that could happen to the world.

Let me, then, ask for a moment what is this German culture ? What is this German spirit of which the Emperor’s armies are at present the missionaries in Belgium and in France ? Mankind owes much to Germany, a very great debt for the contributions she has made to philosophy, to science, and to the arts, but that which is specifically German in the movement of the world in the last 30 years has been, on the intellectual side, the development of the doctrine of the supreme and ultimate prerogative in human affairs of material force, and on the practical side the taking of the

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foremost place in the fabrication and the multiplication of the machinery of destruction. To the men who have adopted this gospel, who believe that power is the be all and end all of a State, naturally a treaty is nothing more than a piece of parchment, and all the old world talk about the rights of the weak and the obligations of the strong is only so much threadbare and nauseating cant.

One very remarkable feature of this new school of doctrine, whatever be its intellectual or its ethical merits, is that it has turned out, as an actual code for life, to be a very purblind philosophy.

For German culture and the German spirit did not save the Emperor and his people from delusions and miscalculations as dangerous as they were absurd in regard to the British Empire. We were believed by these cultivated observers to be the decadent descendants of a people who, by a combination of luck and of fraud had managed to obtain dominion over a vast quantity of the surface and the populations of the globe. This fortuitous aggregation which goes by the name of the British Empire was supposed to be so insecurely founded, and so loosely knit together, that, at the first touch of serious menace from without, it would fall to pieces and tumble to the ground. Our great Dominions were getting heartily tired of the Imperial connection. India, it was notorious to every German traveller, was on the verge of open revolt, and here at home, we, the people of this United Kingdom, were riven by dissension so deep and so fierce that our energies, whether for resistance or for attack, would be completely paralysed. What a fantastic dream! And what a rude awakening! And in this vast and grotesque, and yet tragic, miscalculation is to be found one of the roots, perhaps the main root, of the present war.

But let us go one step more. It has been said "By their fruits ye shall know them," and history will record that, when the die was cast and the struggle began, it was the disciples of that same creed who revived methods of warfare which have for centuries past been condemned by the common sense, as well as by the humanity, of the great mass of the civilised world.

Louvain, Malines, Termonde. These are names which will henceforth be branded on the brow of German culture.

The ruthless sacking of the ancient and famous towns of Belgium is fitly supplemented by the story that reaches us only to-day from our own Headquarters in France, of the proclamation issued less than a week ago by the German authorities, who were for a moment, and, happily, for little more than a moment, in occupation of the venerable city of Reims. Let me read, for it should be put on record, the concluding paragraph of the proclamation :

" With a view to securing adequately the safety of the troops, and to instil calm into the population of Reims, the persons named below [81 in number, and including all the leading citizens of the town] have been seized as hostages by the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. These hostages will be hanged at the slightest attempt at disorder. Also the town will be totally or partially burned and the inhabitants will be hanged for any infraction of the above.

" By order of German authorities."

Do not let it be forgotten that it is from a Power whose intellectual leaders are imbued with the ideal that I have described, and whose generals in the field sanction and even direct those practices—it is from that Power that the claim proceeds to impose its culture, its spirit—which means its domination—upon the rest of Europe. That is a claim, I say to you, to all my fellow-countrymen, to every citizen and subject of the British Empire whose ears and eyes my words can reach—that is a claim that everything that is great in our past and everything that promises hope or progress in our future summons us to resist to the end. The task—do not let us deceive ourselves—the task will not be a light one. Its full accomplishment—and nothing short of full accomplishment is worthy of our traditions or will satisfy our resolve—will certainly take months, it may even take years. I have come here to-night, not to ask you to count the cost, for no price can be too high to pay when honour and freedom are at stake, but to put before you, as I have tried to do, the magnitude of the issue and the supreme necessity that lies upon us as a nation, nay, as a brotherhood and family of nations, to rise to its height and acquit ourselves of our duty.

The war has now lasted more than six weeks. Our supremacy at sea has not been seriously questioned. Full supplies

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of food and of raw materials are making their way to our shores from every quarter of the globe. Our industries, with one or two exceptions, maintain their activities. Unemployment is so far not seriously in excess of the average. The monetary situation has improved, and every effort that the zeal and the skill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the co-operation and expert advice of the bankers and business men of the country, can devise—every effort is being made to achieve what is most essential—the complete re-establishment of the foreign exchanges. Meanwhile, the merchant shipping of the enemy has been hunted from the seas, and our seamen are still, patiently or impatiently, waiting a chance to try conclusions with the opposing Fleet. Great and incalculable is the debt which we have owed during these weeks, and which in increasing measure we shall continue to owe, to our Navy. The Navy needs no help, and as the months roll on—thanks to a far-sighted policy in the past—its proportionate strength will grow.

If we turn to our Army we can say with equal justice and pride that, during these weeks, it has revived the most glorious records of its past. Sir John French and his gallant officers and men live in our hearts as they will live in the memories of those who come afterwards. But splendid achievements such as these—equally splendid in retirement and in advance—cannot be won without a heavy expenditure of life and limb, of equipment, and supplies. Even now, at this very early stage, I suppose there is hardly a person here who is not suffering from anxiety and suspense. Some of us are plunged in sorrow for the loss of those we love, cut off, some of them, in the springtime of their young lives. We will not mourn for them overmuch.

“ One crowded hour of glorious life
Is worth an age without a name.”

But these gaps have to be filled. The wastage of modern war is relentless and almost inconceivable. We have—I mean His Majesty’s Government have—since the war began dispatched to the front already considerably over 200,000 men, and the amplest provision has been made for keeping them supplied with all that was necessary in food, in stores, and in equipment. They will very soon be reinforced by

Regular troops from India, from Egypt, and the Mediterranean, and in due time by the contingents which our Dominions are furnishing with such magnificent patriotism and liberality. We have with us here our own gallant Territorials, becoming every day a fitter and a finer force, eager and anxious to respond to any call, either at home or abroad, that may be made upon them.

But that is not enough. We must do still more. Already in little more than a month we have half a million recruits for the four new Armies which, as Lord Kitchener told the country yesterday, he means to have ready to bring into the field. Enlisting, as we were last week, in a single day as many men as we have been accustomed to enlist in the course of a whole year, it is not, I think, surprising that the machinery has been over-strained, and there have been many cases of temporary inconvenience and hardship and discomfort. With time and patience and good organisation these things will be set right, and the new scale of allowances which was announced in Parliament yesterday will do much to mitigate the lot of wives and children and dependents who are left behind. We want more men, and perhaps most of all help for training them. Every one in the whole of this kingdom who has in days gone by, as officer or as non-commissioned officer, served his country never had a greater or a more fruitful opportunity of service than is presented to him to-day.

We appeal to the manhood of the three kingdoms. To such an appeal I know well, coming from your senior representative in the House of Commons, that Scotland will not turn a deaf ear. Scotland is doing well, and indeed more than well, and no part of Scotland, I believe, in proportion better than Edinburgh. I cannot say with what pleasure I heard the figures given out by the Lord Provost, and those which have been supplied to me by the gallant general who has the Scottish Command, which show, indeed, as we expected, that Scotland is more than holding her own.

In that connection let me repeat what I said two weeks ago in London. We think it of the highest importance that, as far as possible and subject to the accidents of war, people belonging to the same place, breathing the same atmosphere, having the same associations, should be kept together.

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I have only one word more to say. What is it that we can offer to our recruits? They come to us spontaneously, under no kind of compulsion, of their own free will, to meet a national and an Imperial need; we present to them no material inducement in the shape either of bounty or bribe, and they have to face the prospect of a spell of hard training from which most of the comforts and all the luxuries that many of them have been accustomed to are rigorously banished. But then, when they are fully equipped for their patriotic task, they will have the opportunity of striking a blow, it may be even of laying down their lives, not to serve the cause of ambition or aggression, but to maintain the honour and the good faith of our country, to shield the independence of free States, to protect against brute force the principles of civilisation and the liberties of Europe.

MR. ASQUITH IN DUBLIN, SEPTEMBER 25, 1914.*

(EXTRACT.)

IT is no part of my mission to-night—it is indeed at this time of day wholly unnecessary—to justify, still less to excuse, the part that the Government of the United Kingdom has taken in this supreme crisis in our national affairs. There have been wars in the past in regard to which there has been among us diversity of opinion, uneasiness as to the wisdom of our diplomacy, anxiety as to the expediency of our policy, doubts as to the essential righteousness of our cause. That is not the case to-day. Even in the memorable struggle which we waged a hundred years ago against the domination of Napoleon there was always a minority, respectable not merely in number, but in the sincerity and in the eminence of its adherents, which broke the front of our national unity. Again I say that is not the case to-day. We feel as a nation—or rather, I ought to say, speaking here and looking round upon our vast Empire in every quarter of the globe, as a family of nations—without distinction of creed or party, of race or climate, of class or section, that we are united in

* "A United Empire." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. (London: Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

defending principles and in maintaining interests which are vital, not only to the British Empire, but to all that is worth having in our common civilisation and all that is worth hoping for in the future progress of mankind.

What better or higher cause, whether we succeed or fail, and we are going not to fail but to succeed, what higher cause can arouse and enlist the best energies of a free people than to be engaged at one and the same time in the vindication of international good faith, the protection of the weak against the violence of the strong, and in the assertion of the best ideals of all the free communities in all the ages of time and in every part of the world against the encroachments of those who believe, and who preach, and who practise the religion of force?

It is not—I am sure you will agree with me—it is not necessary to demonstrate once more that of this war Germany is the real and the responsible author. The proofs are patent, manifold, and overwhelming. Indeed, on the part of Germany herself we get upon this point, if denial at all, a denial only of the faintest and the most formal kind. For a generation past she has been preparing the ground, equipping herself both by land and sea, fortifying herself with alliances, what is perhaps even more important, teaching her youth to seek and to pursue as the first and the most important of all human things the supremacy of German power and the German spirit, and all that time biding her opportunity. Many of the great wars of history have been almost accidentally brought on. There was nothing in the quarrel, such as it was, between Austria and Serbia that could not, and would not, have been settled by pacific means. But in the judgment of those who guide and control German policy the hour had come to strike the blow that had been long and deliberately prepared. In their hands lay the choice between peace and war, and their election was for war. In so deciding, as everybody now knows, Germany made two profound miscalculations, both of them natural enough in men who had come to believe that in international matters everything can be explained and measured in terms of material force.

What were those mistakes? The first was that Belgium, a small and prosperous country, entirely disinterested in

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European quarrels, guaranteed by the joint and several compacts of the Great Powers, would not resent, and certainly would not resist, the use of her territory as a high road for an invading German force into France. How could they imagine that this little country, rather than allow her neutrality to be violated and her independence insulted and menaced, was prepared that her fields should be drenched with the blood of her soldiers, her towns and villages devastated by marauders, her splendid heritage of monuments and of treasures built up for her by the piety, art, and learning of the past ruthlessly laid in ruins? The passionate attachment of a numerically small population to the bit of territory, which looks so little upon the map, the pride of unconquerable devotion of a free people to their own free State—these were things which apparently had never been dreamed of in the philosophy of Potsdam.

Rarely in history has there been a greater material disparity between the invaders and the invaded. But the moral disparity was at least equally great, for the indomitable resistance of the Belgians did more than change the whole face of the campaign. It proved to the world that ideas which cannot be weighed or measured by any material calculus can still inspire and dominate mankind. That is the reason why the whole sympathy of the civilised world at this moment is going out to these small States—Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro—that have played so worthy a part in this historic struggle.

But Germany was guilty of another and a still more capital blunder in relation to ourselves. I am not referring for the moment to the grotesque misunderstanding upon which I dwelt a week ago at Edinburgh⁽¹⁾—their carefully fostered belief that we here were so rent with civil distraction, so paralysed by lukewarmness or disaffection in our Dominions and Dependencies, that if it came to fighting we might be brushed aside as an impotent and even a negligible factor. The German misconception went even deeper than that. They asked themselves what interest, direct or material, had the United Kingdom in this conflict. Could any nation, least of all the cold, calculating, phlegmatic, egotistic British nation, embark upon a costly and bloody contest from which it had nothing in the hope of profit

⁽¹⁾[See p. 451.]

to expect? They forgot that we, like the Belgians, had something at stake which cannot be translated into what one of our poets has called "the lore of nicely calculated less or more."

What was it we had at stake? First and foremost, the fulfilment to the small and relatively weak country of our plighted word, and behind and beyond that the maintenance of the whole system of international good will, which is the moral bond of the civilised world. Here again they were wrong in thinking that the reign of ideas, old-world ideas like those of duty and good faith, had been superseded by the ascendancy of force. War is at all times a hideous thing; at the best an evil to be chosen in preference to worse evils, and at the worst little better than the letting loose of hell upon earth. The Prophet of old spoke of the "confused noise of battle and the garments rolled in blood," but in these modern days, with the gigantic scale of the opposing armies and the scientific developments of the instruments of destruction, war has become an infinitely more devastating thing than it ever was before. The hope that the general recognition of a humarer code would soften or abate some of its worst brutalities has been rudely dispelled by the events of the last few weeks. The German invasion of Belgium and France contributes indeed some of the blackest pages to its sombre annals. Rarely has a non-combatant population suffered more severely, and rarely, if ever, have the monuments of piety and of learning and of those sentiments of religious and national association of which they are the permanent embodiment, even in the worst times of the most ruthless warriors been so shamefully and cynically desecrated; and behind the actual theatre of conflict, with its smoke and its carnage, there are the sufferings of those who are left behind, the waste of wealth, the economic dislocation, the heritage—the long heritage—of enmities and misunderstanding which war brings in its train.

Why do I dwell upon these things? It is to say this—that great indeed is the responsibility of those who allow their country—as we have done—to be drawn into such a welter. But there is one thing much worse than to take such a responsibility, and that is upon a fitting occasion to shirk it. Our record in the matter is clear. We strove up

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to the last moment for peace, and only when we were satisfied that the price of peace was the betrayal of other countries and the dishonour and degradation of our own did we take up the sword.

I should like, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which, in this war, we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said : "The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." Nearly 50 years have passed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet been made towards that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy. The idea of public right—what does it mean when translated into concrete terms ? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and of the future moulding of the European world. It means next that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities each with a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, Greece, and the Balkan States—they must be recognised as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbours—more powerful in strength and in wealth—to a place in the sun. And it means finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps, by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not, or will not, be realised either to-day or to-morrow, but if and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies it will at once come within the range and before long within the grasp of European statesmanship.

MR. ASQUITH IN CARDIFF, OCTOBER 2, 1914.*

(EXTRACT.)

... I am not here to-night to argue out propositions which British citizens in every part of the world to-day regard as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that in the history of mankind there has ever been in such a vast and diverse community agreement so unanimous in purpose and so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear and so convinced, co-operation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so resolute. Just consider what it means, here in this United Kingdom—England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales—to hear one plain, harmonious, great united voice over the seas from our great Dominions. Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, our Crown Colonies swell the chorus.

In India—where whatever we won by the sword we hold and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule, by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee—the response to our common appeal has moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our enemies. That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle.

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact and irresistible force the energies and the will of the greatest Imperial structure that the world has ever known? That is a question which, for a moment, at any rate, it is well worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first negatively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and aggression play no part. What do we want? What do we aim at? What have we to gain?

We are a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership. By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and adventure by land and sea, by the

* "Why We are at War." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. (London: Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.)

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insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that to-day our Dominion does not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received it, and such as we hope to have it, with it we are content.

We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. All that we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to consolidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British liberty. Does it not follow from that that nowhere in the world is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and ensue peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and breadth of our Empire everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords? Why are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the factory and the counting-house for the recruiting office and the training camp?

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had no ill will to gratify nor wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Germany in particular, our policy—repeatedly stated in Parliament, resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin—our policy has been to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction and so to establish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.

We have said from the first—I have said it over and over again, and so has Sir Edward Grey—we have said from the first that our friendships with certain Powers, with France, with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as implying cold feelings and still less hostile purposes against any other Power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as

far back as November, 1911—I quote his exact words—“One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have, but not at the expense of the ones we have.” That has been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation⁽¹⁾ describes as the treacherous English.

⁽¹⁾ [See first
Military
vol.]

We laid down—and I wish to call not only your attention but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many false legends are now being invented and circulated—in the following year—in the year 1912 we laid down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German Government—“Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that

⁽²⁾ [*cf.* Sir E. Grey, p. equivocal about that.]

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But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and her defensive resources, especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world.

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave. None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two years, and never more energetically and more successfully than during the Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe but for the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial co-operation between all the Powers. From both points of view, that of our domestic interests as a kingdom and an Empire, and that of our settled attitude and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and

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could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes—among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst.

Four weeks ago, speaking at the Guildhall, in the City of London, when the war was still in its early days, I asked my fellow-countrymen⁽¹⁾ with what countenance, with what conscience, had we basely chosen to stand aloof, we could have watched from day to day the terrible unrolling of events—public faith shamelessly broken, the freedom of a small people trodden in the dust, the wanton invasion of Belgium and then of France, by hordes who leave behind them at every stage of their progress a dismal trail of savagery, of devastation, and of desecration worthy of the blackest annals in the history of barbarism. That was four weeks ago. The war has now lasted for 60 days, and every one of those days has added to the picture its share of sombre and repulsive traits. We now see clearly written down in letters of carnage and spoliation the real aims and methods of this long-prepared and well-organised scheme against the liberties of Europe.

I say nothing of other countries. I pass no judgment upon them. But if we here in Great Britain had abstained and remained neutral, forsaken our word, deserted our friends, faltered and compromised with the plain dictates of our duty—nay, if we had not shown ourselves ready to strike with all our forces at the common enemy of civilisation and freedom, there would have been nothing left for our country but to veil her face in shame and to be ready in her turn—for her time would have come—to share the doom which she would have richly deserved, and after centuries of glorious life to go down to her grave “unwept, unhonoured, and unsung.”

Let us gladly acknowledge what becomes clearer and clearer every day, that the world is just as ready as it ever was, and no part of it readier than the British Empire, to understand and to respond to moral issues. The new school of German thought has been teaching for a generation past that in the affairs of nations there is no code of ethics. According to their doctrine force and nothing but force is the test and the measure of right. As the events which are going on before our eyes have made it plain, they have succeeded only too well in indoctrinating with their creed—I

⁽¹⁾ [See pp.
440-1.]

will not say the people of Germany—like Burke, I will not attempt to draw up an indictment against a nation—I will not say the people of Germany, but those who control and execute German policy.

But it is one of those products of German genius which, whether or not it was intended exclusively for home consumption, has not, I am happy to say, found a market abroad, and certainly not within the boundaries of the British Empire. We still believe here, old-fashioned people as we are, in the sanctity of treaties, that the weak have rights and that the strong have duties, that small nationalities have every bit as good a title as large ones to life and independence, and that freedom for its own sake is as well worth fighting for to-day as it ever was in the past. And we look forward at the end of this war to a Europe in which these great and simple and venerable truths will be recognised and safeguarded for ever against the recrudescence of the era of blood and iron. Stated in a few words that is the reason for our united front, the reason that has brought our gallant Indian warriors to Marseilles, that is extracting from our most distant Dominions the best of their manhood, and which in the course of two months has transformed the United Kingdom into a vast recruiting ground.

SIR EDWARD GREY AT BECHSTEIN HALL, LONDON,
MARCH 22, 1915.

(Authenticated Report.)

WHILE we are taken up by the particular methods by which the war is to be prosecuted to a successful conclusion, do not let us lose sight, even for a moment, of the character and origin of this war and of the main issue for which we are fighting.

Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been wounded or maimed, in Europe during the last few months. All this might have been avoided by the simple method of a Conference or joint discussion between the European Powers concerned, which might have been held in London or in The

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Hague or wherever or in whatever form Germany would have consented to have it. It would have been far easier to have settled by a Conference the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which Germany made the occasion for this war, than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of two years ago. Germany knew, from her experience of the Conference in London which settled the Balkan crisis, that she could count upon our goodwill for peace in any Concert or Conference of the Powers. We had sought no diplomatic triumph in the Balkan Conference. We had not given ourselves to any intrigue. We had pursued impartially and honourably the end of peace. We were ready, last July, to do the same again.⁽¹⁾ In recent years, we had given Germany every assurance that no aggression upon her would receive any support from us. We had withheld from her but one thing: an unconditional promise to stand aside, however aggressive Germany herself might be to her neighbours.⁽²⁾ [See B. 36.] Last July, France was ready to accept a Conference, Italy was ready to accept a Conference, Russia was ready to accept a Conference; and we know now that, after the British proposal for a Conference was made, the Emperor of Russia himself proposed to the German Emperor that the dispute should be referred to The Hague.⁽³⁾ Germany refused every suggestion made to her for settling the dispute in this way, and on her rests now, and must rest for all time, the appalling responsibility for having plunged Europe into this war, and for involving herself and the greater part of a whole Continent in the consequences of it.

We know now that the German Government had prepared for war as only people who plan can prepare. This is the fourth time within living memory that Prussia has made war in Europe. In the Schleswig-Holstein war, in the war against Austria in 1866, in the war against France in 1870, as we now know from all the documents that have been revealed, it was Prussia who planned and prepared these wars. The same thing has occurred again, and we are determined that it shall be the last time that war shall be made in this way.

As to our own part: We had assured Belgium that never would we violate her neutrality so long as it was respected by others.⁽⁴⁾ I had given this pledge to Belgium long before [See p. 327.]

the war. On the eve of the war, we asked France and Ger-

⁽¹⁾ [B. 114.] many to give the same pledge.⁽¹⁾ France at once did so,⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾ [B. 125.] but Germany declined to give it.⁽³⁾ When, after that,

⁽³⁾ [B. 122.] Germany invaded Belgium, we were bound to oppose Germany

with all our strength ; and, if we had not done so at the first moment, is there anyone who now believes that, when Germany attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and non-combatants, and ravaged the country in a way that violated all rules of war of recent times, and all rules of humanity of all times, is there any one who thinks it possible that we could have sat still and looked on, without eternal disgrace ?

Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting ? In due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by our Allies in common with us, in accordance with the Alliances that now exist between us and are public to the world. But one essential condition must be the restoration of Belgium to her independent national life and the free possession of her territory ; and reparation to her, as far as reparation is possible, for the cruel wrong done to her.

That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies are contending, and which is this : We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working out their own forms of government for themselves and their own national development, whether they be great States or small States, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The German ideal—we have had it poured out by German Professors and publicists since the war began—is that of the Germans as a superior people ; to whom all things are lawful in the securing of their own power ; against whom resistance of every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down ; a people establishing a domination over the nations of the Continent ; imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations, but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or leave this Continent altogether than live in it under such conditions. After this war, we and the other nations of Europe must be free to live, not menaced by talk of supreme War Lords and shining armour and the sword continually rattled in the scabbard, and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our national destinies and activities controlled by the military caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim

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for themselves and together we will secure for Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the different nations ; the right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal liberty.

All honour for ever be given from us, whom age or circumstances have kept at home, to those who voluntarily have come forward to risk their lives, and give their lives, on the field of battle on land or sea. They have their reward in enduring fame and honour. And all honour be from us to the brave Armies and Navies of our Allies, who have exhibited such splendid courage and noble patriotism. The admiration they have aroused and the comradeship in arms will be an ennobling and endearing memory between us, cementing friendship and perpetuating National Goodwill.

And for all of us who are serving the State at home in whatever capacity, whether officials, employers or wage-earners, doing our utmost to carry on the National life in this time of stress, there is the knowledge that there can be no nobler opportunity than that of serving one's country when its very existence is at stake, and when its cause is just and right ; that never was there a time in our history when the crisis was so great and imperative as it is now, or the cause more just and right.

FOREIGN ADDRESSES, PROCLAMATIONS AND MESSAGES.

[Addresses, etc., of a military character will be found in the first Military Volume.]

FRANCE.

Proclamation by the President of the Republic.

To THE FRENCH NATION :

*[Pages
d'His-
toire.]*

IN spite of all the efforts of diplomacy, the situation in Europe has in the last few days become considerably worse. The outlook has become darker. At this moment most nations have mobilised their forces, and even those countries whose neutrality is guaranteed have taken the same precautionary measure. Those Powers whose constitutional laws are different from ours have, without actually mobilising, commenced, and are proceeding with, preparations which are equivalent to actual mobilisation, and in anticipation of it.

France, which has always plainly asserted her pacific intentions, which has, in these tragic days, given to Europe counsels of moderation and a living example of wise prudence, and which has redoubled her efforts to maintain the peace of the world, has prepared herself for all eventualities, and has now taken the first indispensable steps for safeguarding her territory ; but our legislation does not permit these preparations to be completed without a decree of mobilisation.

The Government, mindful of its responsibilities, and knowing that it would fail in its sacred duty if it left matters in their present state, has just ordered the necessary decrees to be issued. Mobilisation is not war ; on the contrary, it appears to be the best means, in the present circumstances, of securing peace with honour. Strong in its ardent wish to arrive at a peaceful solution of the crisis, the Government will continue its diplomatic efforts, sheltered by these precautionary measures, and still hopes that these efforts will be

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crowned with success. It counts on the self-restraint of our noble nation not to be carried away by unwarrantable excitement. It counts on the patriotism of every Frenchman, and knows that there is not one who is not ready to do his duty. At this moment there are no more parties, there is only the same France as of old, France peaceful and resolute, the Fatherland of right and justice, absolutely unanimous in its calmness, vigilance and dignity.

The President of the French Republic,
RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

The President of the Council,
RENÉ VIVIANI.

[Signed also by all the Ministers and Under-Secretaries of State.]

Paris, *August 1st.*

Appeal by the President of the Council to the Women of France.

IN spite of the efforts of France, Russia and England [Pages d'*Histoire.*] to maintain peace, Germany has plunged us into war. At their country's call, your fathers, your brothers and your husbands have risen, and will to-morrow have taken up the challenge.

The departure on active service of all who are capable of bearing arms interrupts the work in the fields. The harvest is not yet gathered in, and the time of the vintage is approaching. In the name of the Government of the Republic, and in the name of the entire nation at its back, I appeal to your fortitude and to that of your children, whose age alone and not lack of courage keeps from the fight. I ask you to continue the cultivation of the fields, to complete the gathering of this year's crops, and to prepare for those of next year. You can render no greater service to your country than this, and I appeal to you for her sake. You have to secure your own subsistence and the provisioning of the population of the towns, and above all the provisioning of those who are defending on the frontier civilisation and justice, as well as the independence of the country.

Up then, French women, young children, sons and daughters of the Fatherland! Take the place on the field of toil of those who have gone to the field of battle. Prepare

to show them, later on, the ground cultivated, the crops gathered in, and the fields sown ! In these grave hours no labour is menial, all is noble that serves the country. Up! then; to action and to work ! to-morrow there will be glory for everyone !

Vive la République ! Vive la France !

The President of the Council of Ministers,

RENÉ VIVIANI.

RUSSIA.

Imperial Manifesto.

[Official.]

BY God's Grace, We, Nicholas II., Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc.,

Declare to all Our loyal subjects :

In pursuance of her historical covenants, Russia, one in faith and blood with the Slav peoples, has never regarded their fate with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of the Russian people towards the Slavs have recently been aroused with entire unanimity and special force when Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands notoriously unacceptable for a sovereign State.

Treating with contempt the conciliatory and peace-loving reply of the Serbian Government, and rejecting the well-intentioned mediation of Russia, Austria hurriedly had recourse to armed attack, and began a bombardment of defenceless Belgrade.

Compelled by force of conditions thus created to adopt indispensable measures of precaution, We commanded the Army and Navy to be placed upon a war footing, but, careful of the blood and property of Our subjects, We exerted every effort for a pacific outcome to the negotiations which had begun.

Amid friendly negotiations Austria's ally, Germany, despite Our hopes of prolonged good neighbourly relations and disregarding Our assurances that the measures adopted had absolutely no hostile intention towards herself, began to

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urge their immediate abrogation and, on meeting with a refusal of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia.

It now behoves us no longer merely to intervene on behalf of a country akin to Us and unjustly insulted, but to guard the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and her position among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that in the defence of Russian Soil all Our loyal subjects will harmoniously and devotedly come forward.

In the threatening hour of trial let all internal dissensions be forgotten ! May the union of the Tsar with His people be still more closely strengthened, and may Russia, rising as one man, repel the insolent attack of the foe !

With profound faith in the justice of Our cause and humble reliance on Almighty Providence, We prayerfully invoke God's blessing on Holy Russia and Our valiant troops.

Given at St. Petersburg on the Twentieth day of July (August 2) in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fourteen and the Twentieth year of Our Reign.

Signed by His Imperial Majesty's own Hand

NICHOLAS.

Message from the Municipal Council of Petrograd to the Municipal Councils of Paris and London, August 8, 1914.

WE are with you, and our feelings towards you are [Pages d'*Histoire.*] unchanged. We were your friends in peace, and remain your friends in war. We will all rise for the protection of our common interests, and to fight against the common enemy, hostile to the world and to the fraternal unity of nations. We appreciate your friendship ; accept our cordial greetings.

The Tsar at the Kremlin.

August 18.

THE Emperor and Empress to-day received in the Hall [Times, Aug. 20, 1914.] of St. George, the Great Palace of the Kremlin, deputations of the nobility, the City of Moscow, the Zemstvo, and the merchants, who presented loyal addresses to their Majesties.

In a general reply, his Majesty said :—

“ At this stormy, warlike hour, which, suddenly and against my wishes, has fallen upon my peaceful people, I seek, according to the custom of my ancestors, to strengthen the forces of my soul in the sanctuaries of Moscow.

“ Within the walls of the old Kremlin I greet in you, inhabitants of Moscow, my beloved ancient capital, all my people, who everywhere, in the villages of their birth, in the Duma, and in the Council of the Empire, unanimously replied to my appeal and rose with vigour throughout the country, forgetting all private differences, to defend the land of their birth and the Slav race.

“ In a powerful common impulse all nationalities, all tribes of our vast Empire, have united. Russia, like myself, will never forget these historic days.

“ This union of thought and sentiment in all my people affords me deep consolation and a calm assurance for the future. From here, from the heart of the Russian land, I send a warm greeting to my gallant troops and to our brave Allies who are making common cause with us to safeguard the down-trodden principles of peace and truth. May God be with us.”

Message from Imperial Duma of Russia.

House of Commons, August 25, 1914.

[*Hansard.*]

MR. SPEAKER : I have to inform the House that since the House adjourned, I have received a telegram from the President of the Imperial Duma of Russia, M. Michel de Rodzianko, which I should like to read to the House :

August 10, 1914.

“ The Duma of the Empire, assembled in extraordinary Session, in view of the exceptional events passing in the civilised world, begs the House of Commons of Great Britain to accept their warm and sincere greeting in the name of the sentiments of profound friendship which unite our two great nations. The whole of Russia has welcomed with enthusiasm the resolution of the British people to give their powerful support to the friendly nations in the historic struggle which is developing at this moment. May God bless the arms of the friendly nations of the Triple Entente. Long live His Majesty

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King George and his valiant Fleet and Army ! Long live the British Parliament ! Long live Great Britain !”

In reply I sent the following telegram :

“ I hasten to thank you warmly for the telegram in which you have been good enough to convey to me the sentiments of friendship which the Duma of the Empire has expressed towards the House of Commons.

“ As soon as the House meets again, towards the end of this month, I shall not fail to inform it of this graceful manifestation of the cordial relations which so happily exist between our two countries.”

BELGIUM.

*King Albert's Speech to the Belgian Chambers, Brussels,
August 4, 1914.*

GENTLEMEN :

NEVER since 1830 has a graver hour struck for Belgium : [Neutralité de la Belgique.]

The very strength of our right, the sympathy which Belgium, proud of her free institutions and her moral conquests, has continued to enjoy among the other nations, the fact that our independent existence is essential to the balance of power in Europe, induce us still to hope that the events which are dreaded will not occur.

But if our hopes are vain, if we are called upon to resist the invasion of our soil and to defend our threatened hearths, this duty, however hard it may be, will find us armed and ready for the greatest sacrifices.

Henceforth, prepared for any emergency, our brave youths are on their feet, firmly resolved, with the tenacity and self-possession traditional among Belgians, to defend the country in its danger.

I offer them, in the name of the nation, a fraternal greeting. Everywhere, throughout Flanders and the land of the Walloons, in town and country alike, one single feeling unites our hearts—patriotism ; one vision alone fills our thoughts—our menaced independence ; one duty alone presents itself to our wills—stubborn resistance.

In these grave circumstances two virtues are requisite, a courage that is calm and steadfast, and complete unity among all Belgians.

Both of these have already been conspicuously displayed before the eyes of an enthusiastic nation.

The faultless mobilisation of our army, the multitude of voluntary enlistments, the devotion of the civilian population, the self-sacrifice of families, have shown in the most unmistakable manner the fortifying courage which animates the Belgian people.

The moment has come for action.

I have called you together, Gentlemen, in order to give the legislative Chambers an opportunity to associate themselves with the enthusiasm of the people in a common feeling of sacrifice.

You will know how to take with urgency all those measures, both for war and for public order, which the situation demands.

When I look at this assembly, stirred with emotion, in which there is now only one party, that of the country, where at this moment all hearts beat in unison, my thoughts are carried back to the Congress of 1830, and I ask you, Gentlemen, Are you resolutely determined to maintain inviolate the sacred patrimony of our ancestors ?

No one in this country will fail in his duty.

The Army, strong and disciplined, is equal to its task ; my Government and I myself have full confidence in its leaders and in its rank and file.

In close touch with, and supported by the people, the Government knows its responsibilities and will fulfil them to the end, with the deliberate conviction that the efforts of all, united in the most fervent and most generous patriotism, will secure the highest welfare of the country.

If the foreigner violates our territory, in contempt of the neutrality whose claims we have always scrupulously observed, he will find all Belgians grouped around their Sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath, and around the Government which enjoys the full confidence of the entire nation.

I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself wins the respect of all. That country does not perish.

God will be with us in this just cause.

Long live independent Belgium !

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SYMPATHY WITH BELGIUM.

Address to His Majesty.

House of Commons, August 27, 1914.

THE PRIME MINISTER (MR. ASQUITH) : I beg to [Hansard.] move, "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty praying Him to convey to His Majesty the King of the Belgians the sympathy and admiration with which this House regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and people to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of the determination of this country to support in every way the efforts of Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the public law of Europe."

Sir, very few words are needed to commend to the House the Address, the terms of which will shortly be read from the Chair. The War which is now shaking to its foundations the whole European system originated in a quarrel in which this country had no direct concern. We strove with all our might, as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when that was no longer possible, to limit its area. It is all important, and I think it is relevant to this Motion, that it should be clearly understood when it was, and why it was, that we intervened. It was only when we were confronted with the choice between keeping and breaking solemn obligations—between the discharge of a binding trust and of shameless subservience to naked force—that we threw away the scabbard. We do not repent our decision. The issue was one which no great and self-respecting nation—certainly none bred and nurtured like ourselves, in this ancient home of liberty—could, without undying shame, have declined. We were bound by our obligations, plain and paramount, to assert and maintain the threatened independence of a small and neutral State. Belgium had no interests of her own to serve, save and except the one supreme and ever-widening interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the name, the preservation of her integrity and of her national life.

History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining that great principle—which is, after all, the well-spring of

civilisation and of progress—has fallen once and again at the most critical moment in the past to States relatively small in area and in population, but great in courage and in resolve—to Athens and Sparta, to the Swiss Cantons, and, not least gloriously, three centuries ago, to the Netherlands. Never, Sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and bravely acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously and heroically discharged, than during the last weeks by the Belgian King and the Belgian people. They have faced, without flinching and against almost incalculable odds, the horrors of irruption, of devastation, of spoliation, and of outrage. They have stubbornly withheld and successfully arrested the inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and an overwhelming force. The defence of Liège will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring chapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance and their friendship. We salute them with respect and with honour. We are with them heart and soul, because, by their side and in their company, we are defending at the same time two great causes—the independence of small States and the sanctity of international covenants. We assure them—as I ask the House in this Address to do—we assure them to-day, in the name of this United Kingdom and of the whole Empire, that they may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unfailing support.

[An Address identical in wording was passed on the same day in the House of Lords, on the motion of Lord Crewe.]

Reply from King Albert.

House of Commons, September 17, 1914.

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have to state to the House that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received from His Majesty's Minister at the Court of Belgium a despatch, dated the 17th inst., stating that he has had the honour of being received in audience by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, and that, in obedience to the King's Command,

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he presented to His Majesty a copy of the Address adopted by the House of Commons on the 27th ultimo. He had received a reply thereto in these terms :—

" His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, desires His Majesty's Minister to convey his heartfelt thanks to the Prime Minister and the Marquis of Crewe, and, through them, to the Members of both Houses of Parliament. His Majesty deeply appreciates the language employed in the Address as a further and striking proof of the sympathy and support of the whole British nation, to which he attaches the utmost value."

[A similar statement was made on the same day in the House of Lords by Lord Crewe.]

SERBIA.

Message from the Skupshtina to the French Chamber of Deputies. (Communicated August 4, 1914.)

Nish.

IN the name of the national Skupshtina assembled at [Pages Nish ; and by virtue of a unanimous resolution, I have the *d'Histoire.*] honour to transmit to you the warmest greetings of the Serbian Skupshtina, and ask you to communicate them to the Chamber of Deputies. The Serbian people has always had the liveliest sympathy and the very highest respect for the great French nation. At this historic moment, the whole of Serbia derives fresh strength from finding itself on the same side as France in the defence of right and justice.

The President,
NICOLITCH.

GERMANY.

I.—THE EMPEROR WILLIAM.

[All from
*Kriegsaus-
bruch.*]

Speech by the Emperor on July 31, 1914, from the Balcony of the Royal Palace.

A MOMENTOUS hour has struck for Germany. Envious rivals everywhere drive us to legitimate defence. The sword

has been forced into our hand. I hope that, if my endeavours up to the very last moment should not succeed in bringing the adversaries to reason and in preserving peace, we may wield the sword, with God's help, so that we may sheath it again with honour. War would demand enormous sacrifices from the German people, but we would show the enemy what it means to attack Germany. And so I commend you to God. Go now into the churches, kneel before God and implore His help for our brave army.

Speech of the Emperor on the Day of Mobilisation, August 1, 1914, from the Balcony of the Royal Palace.

I THANK you from the bottom of my heart for the expression of your affection and your loyalty. In the struggle which now lies before us I recognise no longer any parties amongst my people.⁽¹⁾ There are none but Germans amongst us, and whatever parties may have turned against me in the course of past controversies, I forgive them all whole-heartedly. Now the only course is for us to stand together as brothers and then God will help the German sword to victory.

Speech from the Throne, Delivered on August 4, 1914, in the White Hall of the Royal Palace at Berlin.

GENTLEMEN,

IN a fateful hour I have gathered round me the chosen representatives of the German people. For nearly half a century we have been able to persevere in the path of peace. Attempts to impute warlike designs to Germany and to cramp her position in the world have often placed a heavy strain upon the patience of our people. In unerring sincerity my Government has pursued, even in circumstances of great provocation, the development of all moral, intellectual and economic forces as its highest goal. The world has been a witness how indefatigably in the stress and storm of recent years we have striven in the first rank to spare the peoples of Europe a war between the Great Powers.

The gravest dangers conjured up by the events in the Balkan Peninsula appeared to have been overcome. Then, with the murder of my friend, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,

⁽¹⁾ [cf. p. 480.]

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the abyss opened up. My exalted Ally, the Emperor and King, Francis Joseph, was compelled to have recourse to arms, to defend the safety of his realm against dangerous intrigues from a neighbouring state. In the pursuit of its legitimate interests the Allied Monarchy found the Russian Empire standing in its path. It is not only our duty as an Ally that calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. There devolves upon us equally the formidable task of defending, together with the ancient culture common to both realms, our own position against the storm of hostile forces.

With a heavy heart have I been compelled to mobilise my army against a neighbour with whom it has fought shoulder to shoulder on so many battle-fields. With sincere sorrow have I seen a friendship broken which Germany had faithfully preserved. The Imperial Russian Government, yielding to the pressure of an insatiable nationalism, has cast in its lot with a State which has brought on the disaster of this war by favouring criminal conspiracies. That France should also have placed herself at the side of our adversaries cannot surprise us. Too often have our endeavours to arrive at more friendly relations with the French Republic been defeated by long-standing aspirations and long-standing resentments.

Gentlemen, what human insight and power can do to arm a nation for the supreme decisions, that has been done with your patriotic help. The hostility which, for a long time past, has been spreading in the East and in the West has now broken out into open flames. The present situation has not arisen out of trivial conflicts of interest or diplomatic combinations, it is the result of an active ill will for long years past towards the power and prosperity of the German Empire.

No lust of conquest drives us. We are animated by the unconquerable will to preserve for ourselves and all generations to come the place to which God has called us.

From the documents which have been laid before you you will see how my Government and, above all, my Chancellor, strove to the very last moment to avert extremities. In compulsory self-defence we drew the sword, with a clean hand and a clean conscience.

To the peoples and races of the German Empire my cry goes forth to defend with their combined weight, and in

brotherly association with our Allies, that which we have wrought in peaceful endeavour. Staunch and true, after the manner of our fathers, earnest and chivalrous, humble before God, and joyfully brave before the enemy, we put our trust in the Eternal and Omnipotent Power to strengthen our defence and to lead it to a fortunate issue.

To you, gentlemen, the whole German nation, mustered around its princes and leaders, looks up to-day. May you come to unanimous and prompt decisions, that is my innermost wish.

His Majesty added :—

“ You have read, Gentlemen, what I said to my people from the balcony of the Palace.⁽¹⁾ I repeat it to you here—

^{(1) See p. 478.]} I know no longer any parties, I know only Germans (prolonged and enthusiastic cheers); and in witness that you are determined, without difference of party, without difference of race, without difference of creed, to stand fast with me, through thick and thin, through trials and through death, I invite the leaders of the parties to come forward and to give me their hands as the pledge thereof.”

The leaders of the parties came forward in answer to this invitation amidst a storm of cheers. Thereupon the Chancellor stepped forward and declared the Reichstag open.

All Highest Decree of Amnesty.

WE, Wilhelm, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia, etc., in view of the self-sacrificing love of the Fatherland which the whole nation is displaying in the war which has been forced upon us, do unto all persons who, up to the present day, have

(1) For *lèse majesté* against their own ruler or against a federal Prince (paragraphs 94–101 of the Criminal Code); for hostile action against friendly states in the sense of paragraphs 103–104 of the Criminal Code; for offences and misdemeanours in the exercise of civic rights (paragraphs 105–109 of the Criminal Code); for resistance to the authority of the State (paragraphs 110–122 of the Criminal Code); for offences and misdemeanours against public order in the sense of paragraphs 123–138 of the Criminal Code; for insults in

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cases provided for by paragraphs 196-197 of the Criminal Code; for offences in the sense of paragraph 153 of the Industrial Regulations; for punishable actions committed through the Press or punishable under the Press Law of May 7th, 1874. (*Imperial Law Gazette*, page 65), or under the Law of Public Meetings of April 19th, 1908 (*Imperial Law Gazette*, page 151)

Been condemned to a fine, to arrest, to confinement within a fortress up to two years, inclusive, or to imprisonment up to two years; or

(2) For theft or embezzlement (paragraphs 242-248 of the Criminal Code, paragraph 138 of the Military Code) for fraud in the sense of paragraph 264a of the Criminal Code; for criminal appropriation in the sense of paragraphs 288-289 of the Criminal Code; for malversation in the sense of paragraph 370 of the Criminal Code; or for an action punishable under the Law relating to poaching of April 15th, 1878, (Collection of Laws, page 222)

Have been condemned to a fine, or to arrest or to imprisonment up to three months inclusive

Grant remission of such penalties as shall have not yet been carried out, together with all costs in arrears and the enjoyment of all civic rights which they may have forfeited.

If penalties have also been inflicted on account of one and the same act under a provision which does not fall within the scope of this decree, remission of such penalty is also granted if it can be established under the Law with which this decree is concerned. In the case of punishment resulting from conviction for another punishable offence full remission is granted of the punishment inflicted for the offence within the scope of the present decree.

If for the same act a fine had been inflicted as well as loss of liberty, a fine is only to be remitted if the punishment involving loss of liberty comes within this decree.

In the case of sentences pronounced by a tribunal exercising jurisdiction in common with other Federal States this decree finds application in so far as we possess the right of amnesty in the particular case under agreements made with the Governments concerned.

Our Minister of State is to provide for the prompt publication and execution of this decree.

Berlin Castle,

August 4, 1914.

WILHELM R.

The Emperor's Appeal to the German People.

SINCE the foundation of the Empire it has been for forty-three years my strenuous endeavour, and that of my predecessors, to preserve the peace of the world and to promote by peaceful means our vigorous development. But our adversaries were jealous of the success of our work.

All open and latent hostility on the east and on the west and beyond the sea we have borne till now in the consciousness of our responsibility and power. Now, however, an attempt is being made to humiliate us. We are expected to look on with folded arms whilst our enemies are arming themselves for a treacherous attack. They will not suffer that we maintain resolute fidelity to our ally who is fighting for his position as a Great Power, and with whose humiliation our power and honour would equally be lost.

So the sword must decide. In the midst of perfect peace the enemy takes us by surprise. Therefore to arms! Any dallying, any temporising would be to betray the Fatherland.

What is at stake is whether the Empire which our fathers founded anew shall or shall not subsist, whether German power and German life shall or shall not subsist. We shall resist to the last breath of man and horse, and shall fight out the struggle even against a world of enemies. Never has Germany been subdued when it was united. Forward with God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors!

Berlin,

August 6.

WILHELM.

The Emperor to the Oberbürgermeister of Berlin.

THE progress of military operations compels me to remove my Headquarters from Berlin. My heart prompts me, in bidding farewell to the citizens of Berlin to return my deepest thanks for all the manifestations and proofs of love and affection which these great and fateful days have brought to me in such abundant measure. I rely fully on the help of

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God, on the gallantry of the army and the navy, and on the unconquerable resolution of the united German nation in the hour of danger. Victory will not fail our righteous cause.

Berlin, the Palace,

August 16, 1914.

WILHELM I.R.

II.—THE EMPRESS.

TO THE WOMEN OF GERMANY.

OBEYING the summons of the Emperor our people [*Kriegsaus-bruch.*] is preparing for an unprecedented struggle, which it did not provoke and which it is carrying on only in self-defence.

Whoever can bear arms will joyfully fly to the Colours to defend the Fatherland with his blood.

The struggle will be gigantic and the wounds to be healed innumerable. Therefore I call upon you, women and girls of Germany, and upon all to whom it is not given to fight for our beloved home, for help. Let every one now do what lies in her power to lighten the struggle for our husbands, sons, and brothers. I know that in all ranks of our people without exception the will exists to discharge this high duty, but may the Lord God strengthen us in our holy work of love, which summons us women to devote all our strength to the Fatherland in its decisive struggle.

The organisations primarily concerned to whom our support is above all things needful have already sent out notices as to the mustering of volunteers and the collection of gifts of all kinds.

Berlin,

August 6.

AUGUSTE VICTORIA.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Message addressed by the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Prime Minister of Austria.

DEAR COUNT STÜRGKH,—

PROFOUNDLY afflicted, I stand under the impression of the nefarious deed* which has cut off my dearly loved

* [The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914.]

[*Wiener Zeitung*,
July 5;
Times,
July 6,
1914.]

nephew in the midst of an activity which was devoted to the earnest fulfilment of his duty, at the side of his noble-hearted Consort, who in the hour of danger remained loyally at his side—a deed which has plunged me and my House into the deepest grief and mourning.

If in this cruel sorrow there can be a consolation for me, it is to be found in the numberless proofs of warm affection and sincere sympathy which have reached me from all classes of the population during the last few days. The hand of a criminal has taken from me a dear relative and faithful helper, has robbed his children, scarcely out of the tenderest age and still in need of protection, of all that was dear to them on earth, and has heaped inexpressible sorrow on their innocent heads.

But the fanaticism of a small band of misguided men cannot shake the sacred ties that bind me to my peoples; it cannot reach the feelings of deep love for me and my House to which expression has been given in all parts of the Monarchy in so touching a manner. Through sixty-five years I have shared with my peoples joy and sorrow, remembering even in the hours of deepest gloom my high duties and my responsibility for the destinies of the millions for whom I am answerable to the Almighty. This fresh painful trial which God's inscrutable decree has imposed upon me and mine will only strengthen me in the resolve to follow to my last breath the way I know to be right for the welfare of my peoples. If some day, as my most priceless legacy, I can leave to my successor the pledge of their love, this will be the fairest reward of my paternal care.

I desire you to make known to all who in these sad days have gathered round my Throne in proven loyalty and devotion my heartfelt thanks.

FRANZ JOSEPH, m.p.

STÜRGKH, m.p.

Vienna,

July 4, 1914.

[An identical message was addressed on the same day to the Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Tisza.]

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Manifesto of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

TO MY PEOPLES !

IT was my most ardent wish to devote the remaining [Kriegsaus-
span of years to be granted to me by the grace of God, to
works of peace, and to the preservation of my peoples from
the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. It has been other-
wise decided in the counsels of Providence. The intrigues
of an enemy filled with hate compel me, after long years
of peace, to draw the sword in defence of the honour of my
Monarchy, for the protection of its credit and its power,
and for the security of its possessions. With an ingratitude
quickly forgetful, the kingdom of Serbia, which, from the
beginning of its independence as a State to the present day,
has been helped and supported by my predecessors and myself,
has, already for years past, trodden the path of open hostility
towards Austria-Hungary. When, after three decades of
peaceful work, fruitful in blessings, in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
I extended my sovereign rights to those lands, that exercise
of my authority called forth in the kingdom of Serbia, whose
rights were in no way affected, outbreaks of unbridled passion
and bitterest hatred. My Government, making use at that
time of the noble privilege of the stronger, showed extreme
indulgence and leniency towards Serbia in demanding only
that it should replace its army on a peace footing, and
undertake, in future, to walk in the ways of peace and friend-
ship. Animated by the same spirit of moderation, my
Government confined itself, when Serbia was engaged two
years ago in war with the Ottoman Empire, to the protection
of the most vital interests of the Monarchy. To this attitude
of the Monarchy in the first place, Serbia owed it that she
was able to achieve her war-like purpose. The hope that
the Serbian Kingdom would appreciate the forbearance and
love of peace of my Government and redeem its promises
has not been fulfilled. Ever higher flames its hatred of me
and of my house. Ever more undisguised the endeavour to
detach inalienable territories by violence from Austria-
Hungary. A criminal agitation is spreading beyond the
frontier to undermine in the South-East of the Monarchy the
foundations of established order, to shake the loyalty towards

ruler and Fatherland of a people to whom I devoted in fatherly solicitude my full care and affection, and to lead the growing generation astray by inciting it to criminal deeds of folly and high treason. A series of murderous enterprises, a conspiracy systematically prepared and carried out, of which the appalling success struck me and my loyal peoples to the heart, has displayed to the sight of all the bloody trail of those secret machinations which have been initiated and directed from Serbia. A halt must be called to these intolerable activities, an end must be put to the continuous provocations of Serbia. The honour and dignity of my Monarchy must be preserved inviolate, and its political, economic, and military development must be secured against constant convulsions. In vain has my Government made yet a last attempt to attain that goal by peaceful measures and to induce Serbia, by an earnest warning, to enter upon a new path. Serbia has rejected the moderate and rightful demands of my Government, and has declined to recognise those duties the fulfilment of which in the life of nations and of States constitutes the natural and necessary foundation for peace. I must, therefore, proceed to obtain by force of arms the indispensable guarantees which shall assure to my States internal tranquillity and enduring peace. In this grave hour I am conscious of the whole consequences of my decision, and of my responsibility before the Almighty. I have considered and weighed everything. With a quiet conscience I tread the path to which my duty points. I rely upon my peoples, who in all times of storm have ever gathered round my throne in unity and loyalty, and been prepared to make the heaviest sacrifices for the honour, greatness and power of the Fatherland. I rely upon the gallant armies of Austria-Hungary, ever filled with devoted enthusiasm, and I rely upon the Almighty that he may grant victory to my arms.

FRANZ JOSEPH, m.p.

STÜRGKH, m.p.

Bad Ischl,

July 28, 1914.

APRIL 19, 1839]

TREATIES.

NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE,
PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND BELGIUM,
ON THE OTHER.

Signed at London, April 19, 1839.

(Extract.)

ARTICLE I.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare, that the Articles hereunto annexed, and forming the tenour of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.

ANNEX TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TREATY.

(Extract.)

ARTICLE 7.

BELGIUM, within the limits specified in Articles I., II., and IV.,* shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State (*un Etat indépendant et perpétuellement neutre*). It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

* [These articles lay down the geographical boundaries of Belgium.]

TREATY BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA,
RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY
OF BELGIUM.

Signed at London, August 9, 1870.

(Ratifications exchanged at London, August 26, 1870.)

ARTICLE I.

HIS Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, She will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19th, 1839.

ARTICLE 2.

His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

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ARTICLE 3.

This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties ; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of April 19th, 1839.

ARTICLE 4.

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof, &c.

Done at London, the ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy.

(L.S.) GRANVILLE.

(L.S.) BERNSTORFF.

[A precisely similar Treaty was concluded between Great Britain and France on August 11, 1870.]

NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG.

TREATY BETWEEN HER MAJESTY, THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA, THE KING OF THE BELGIANS, THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, THE KING OF ITALY, THE KING OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE KING OF PRUSSIA, AND THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG.

Signed at London, May 11, 1867.

(Extracts.)

ARTICLE 2.

THE Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th

of April, 1839 under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State.

It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the Powers signing parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.

ARTICLE 3.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being neutralised, according to the terms of the preceding Article, the maintenance or establishment of fortresses upon its territory becomes without necessity as well as without object.

In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the city of Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a Federal fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain in that city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the maintenance of good order.

ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke, in virtue of the rights of sovereignty which he exercises over the city and fortress of Luxemburg, engages, on his part, to take the necessary measures for converting the said fortress into an open city by means of a demolition which His Majesty shall deem sufficient to fulfil the intentions of the High Contracting Parties expressed in Article 3 of the present Treaty. The works requisite for that purpose shall be commenced immediately after the withdrawal of the garrison. They shall be carried out with all the attention required for the interests of the inhabitants of the city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke promises, moreover, that the fortifications of the city of Luxemburg shall not be restored in future, and that no military establishment shall be there maintained or created.

AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE OF 1879.

(*Made public, February 3, 1888.*)

(TRANSLATION.)

IN consideration that their Majesties the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, must deem it their duty as monarchs in all circumstances to care for the safety of their Empires and the tranquillity of their peoples;

In consideration that both Monarchs—as was the case during their former Alliance—will be able more easily and efficiently to fulfil this duty if their Empires stand firmly together;

In consideration, finally, that close co-operation between Germany and Austria-Hungary can threaten no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe as created by the Berlin Treaty, their Majesties the German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, have resolved to enter into a bond of peace and reciprocal defence under a solemn reciprocal promise that they will never give to their purely defensive agreement an aggressive tendency in any direction.

To this end their Majesties have appointed as Plenipotentiaries: His Majesty the German Emperor, his Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII Reuss, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, his Privy Councillor and Minister of the Imperial House and for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Count Julius Andrassy of Csik-Szent-Kiraly and Kraszna-Horka, who have met in Vienna to-day and, after exchanging their plenipotentiary powers, which have been found good and sufficient, have come to the following agreement:

CLAUSE I.—Should, contrary to the hope and against the sincere wish of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound to stand by each other with

the whole armed forces of their Empires and, in consequence thereof, only to conclude peace jointly and in agreement.

CLAUSE 2.—Should one of the high contracting parties be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting party hereby binds itself, not only not to stand by the aggressor of its high ally, but to observe at least an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards its high co-contractor.

If, however, in such a case, the attacking power should be supported by Russia, either in the form of active co-operation or by military measures menacing to the party attacked, the obligation defined in Clause 1, of reciprocal help with the entire armed strength, comes immediately into force in this case also, and the war will then also be waged jointly by the two high contracting parties until the joint conclusion of peace.

CLAUSE 3.—In accordance with its pacific character, and in order to preclude all misinterpretation, this Treaty shall be kept secret by both of the high contracting parties and shall not be communicated to any third Power except with the consent of both parties and after special agreement.

Both of the high contracting parties cherish the hope, in view of the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander during the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove dangerous to them, and believe for this reason that there is at present no cause to make any communication. Should, however, this hope prove, contrary to expectation, to be erroneous, the two high contracting Powers would recognise it to be a duty of loyalty to inform the Emperor Alexander, at least in a confidential manner, that they would be obliged to regard an attack upon one of them as directed against both.

Signed and sealed in Vienna on October 7, 1879.

PRINCE REUSS.

ANDRÁSSY.

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO.

FRANCO - GERMAN DECLARATION RESPECTING
MOROCCO, SIGNED FEBRUARY 9, 1909.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government, being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Algeciras Act, have agreed to define the meaning which they attach to the articles of that Act with a view to avoid in the future all sources of misunderstanding between them.

Therefore,

The Government of the French Republic, firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire, being resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and, consequently, not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in that country ;

And the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognising on the other hand that the special political interests of France in that country are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those interests ;

Declare that they do not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favour or in that of any Power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavour to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession.

JULES CAMBON.

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER.

FRANCO - GERMAN CONVENTION RESPECTING
MOROCCO, SIGNED NOVEMBER 4, 1911.

(TRANSLATION.)

IN consequence of the troubles which have arisen in Morocco, and which have shown the necessity of carrying on, in that country, in the interests of all, the work of pacification and progress provided for by the Algeciras Act, the Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government have deemed it necessary to define more precisely and to complete the Franco-German Agreement of the 9th February, 1909.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ [See p.

493.]

Therefore, M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary of the French Republic accredited to His Majesty the German Emperor, and M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE I.

The Imperial German Government declare that, having only economic interests in Morocco, they will not obstruct such action as may be taken by France with a view to assist the Moorish Government in the introduction of any administrative, judicial, economic, financial and military reforms of which they may stand in need for the good government of the Empire, as also of any new regulations and modifications in existing regulations which these reforms may entail. Consequently, the German Government adhere to the measures of reorganisation, of control, and of financial guarantee, which the French Government, after obtaining the consent of the Moorish Government, may consider it necessary to take with this object in view, with the reservation that French action will ensure economic equality between the nations in Morocco.

In the event of France being led to strengthen and to extend her control and her protection, the Imperial German Government, recognising France's full liberty of action,

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will raise no objection, subject to the reservation that the commercial liberty guaranteed by former treaties is respected.

It is agreed that the rights and proceedings of the Morocco State Bank, as defined in the Algeciras Act, shall not be in any way impeded.

ARTICLE 2.

With this view it is agreed that the Imperial Government will raise no objection to France, after obtaining the consent of the Moorish Government, proceeding with such military occupation of Moorish territory as she may consider necessary for the maintenance of order and the security of commercial transactions, and to her exercising all rights of police on land and in Moorish waters.

ARTICLE 3.

From now henceforward, if His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco should entrust to the diplomatic and consular agents of France the representation and protection of Moorish subjects abroad, the Imperial Government declare that they will raise no objection.

If, on the other hand, His Majesty the Sultan handed over to the French representative at the Moorish Court the duty of acting as intermediary with the other foreign representatives, the German Government would raise no objection.

ARTICLE 4.

The French Government declare that, firmly attached to the principle of commercial liberty in Morocco, they will not permit any inequality either as regards the establishment of customs duties, taxes, or other contributions, or as regards the establishment of tariffs for transport by rail, river, or other means, and especially as regards all questions of transit.

The French Government will also use their influence with the Moorish Government with a view to prevent any differential treatment of subjects of the different Powers; they will more particularly oppose any measure, the promulgation, for instance, of administrative decrees dealing

with weights and measures, gauging, stamping, &c., which might place the merchandise of a Power in a position of inferiority.

The French Government engage to use their influence with the State Bank with a view to the posts of delegate which are in the gift of the bank, on the Commission of Customs Valuation and on the Standing Customs Committee being conferred in turn on the members of the management of the bank at Tangier.

ARTICLE 5.

The French Government will see that no export duty is levied in Morocco on iron ore exported from Moorish ports. Mines of iron ore will be subject to no special tax on their output or methods of working. They shall, apart from the general taxes, pay only a fixed charge, calculated by the hectare and yearly, and a charge in proportion to the gross output. These charges, which shall be fixed in accordance with articles 35 and 49 of the draft mining regulations attached to the protocol of the 7th June, 1910, of the Paris conference, shall be paid equally by all mining undertakings.

The French Government will see that the mining taxes are collected regularly, and that on no pretext whatever the whole or a part of these taxes shall be remitted.

ARTICLE 6.

The Government of the French Republic engage to see that the contracts for works and materials, which may be necessary in connection with any future concessions for roads, railways, harbours, telegraphs, &c., are allotted by the Moorish Government in accordance with the rules of adjudication.

They engage further to see that the conditions for tendering, more especially as regards the supply of materials and the limit of time within which tenders must be submitted, do not place the subjects of any Power in a position of inferiority.

The working of the great undertakings mentioned above shall be reserved to the Moorish State or entrusted, by a concession, to third parties, who may be asked to furnish

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the funds necessary for the purpose. The French Government will see that as regards the working of railways and other means of transport, as also the application of the regulations which govern such working, no differential treatment is accorded to the subjects of the different Powers who use such means of transport.

The Government of the Republic will use their influence with the State Bank with a view to the post of delegate on the General Commission of Tenders and Contracts being conferred in turn on the members of the management of the bank at Tangier.

Similarly, the French Government will use their influence with the Moorish Government in order that, so long as article 66 of the Algeciras Act remains in force, one of the three posts of Shereefian delegate on the Special Committee of Public Works is conferred on a subject of one of the Powers represented in Morocco.

ARTICLE 7.

The French Government will use their influence with the Moorish Government in order that the owners of mines and other industrial or agricultural undertakings, without distinction of nationality, and in accordance with the regulations which may be issued on the model of French legislation on the same subject, may be authorised to build light railways connecting their centres of production with the lines of general public utility and with the ports.

ARTICLE 8.

Each year a report on the working of the railways in Morocco shall be presented drawn up in the same form and under the same conditions as the reports which are laid before the meetings of shareholders in French railway companies.

The Government of the Republic shall entrust to one of the directors of the State Bank the duty of drawing up this report which, together with the materials on which it is based, shall be submitted to the Censors, and then published, with, if necessary, such observations as the latter may wish to append thereto, founded on their own information.

ARTICLE 9.

In order to avoid, as far as possible, diplomatic representations, the French Government will urge the Moorish Government to refer to an arbitrator, nominated *ad hoc* in each case by agreement between the French consul and the consul of the Power interested, or, failing them, by the two Governments, such complaints brought by foreign subjects against the Moorish authorities or agents acting in the capacity of Moorish authorities as shall not have been found capable of adjustment through the intermediary of the French consul and the consul of the Power interested.

This mode of procedure shall remain in force until such time as a judicial system, founded on the general principles embodied in the legislation of the Powers interested, shall have been introduced, which shall ultimately, by agreement between those Powers, replace the consular courts.

ARTICLE 10.

The French Government will see that foreign subjects continue to enjoy the right of fishing in Moorish waters and harbours.

ARTICLE 11.

The French Government will urge the Moorish Government to open to foreign commerce new ports from time to time in accordance with the growing requirements of trade.

ARTICLE 12.

In order to meet a request of the Moorish Government, the two Governments undertake to urge, in agreement with the other Powers and on the basis of the Madrid Convention, the revision of the lists and the reconsideration of the position of foreign-protected subjects and mokhalats ("associés agricoles"), which are dealt with in articles 8 and 16 of that convention.

They likewise agree to urge upon the signatory Powers any modifications of the Madrid Convention which may be made necessary, when the time comes, by the change in the

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status of foreign-protected persons and mokhalats ("associés agricoles").

ARTICLE 13.

Any clause of an agreement, convention, treaty, or regulation which may conflict with the foregoing stipulations is and remains, abrogated.

ARTICLE 14.

The present agreement shall be communicated to the other signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, and the two Governments engage to give their mutual support with a view to obtain the adhesion of those Powers.

ARTICLE 15.

The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Paris as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate at Berlin, the 4th November, 1911.

JULES CAMBON.

KIDERLEN.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin.

(TRANSLATION.)

Berlin, November 4, 1911.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

IN order to make quite clear the agreement of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, and to define its meaning, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary to assume a protectorate over Morocco, the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in the way.

The adherence of the German Government, accorded in a general manner to the French Government in the first article of the said convention, applies of course to all questions

as are provided for in the Algeciras Act, which require regulating.

You were good enough to inform me, on the other hand, that, should Germany wish to acquire from Spain Spanish Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey Islands, France would be prepared to waive in Germany's favour the exercise of her preferential rights which she holds by virtue of the treaty of the 27th June, 1900, between France and Spain. I have pleasure in taking note of this assurance, and in adding that Germany will not intervene in any special agreements which France and Spain may think fit to conclude with each other on the subject of Morocco, it being understood that Morocco comprises all that part of Northern Africa which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa, and the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro.

The German Government, while they abstain from asking that the share to be granted to German industry in the construction of railways shall be fixed in advance, rely on the readiness of the French Government always to welcome the association of interests between nationals of both countries in schemes for which they may respectively obtain a concession.

They rely likewise on the construction of no other Moorish railway being put up to public tender before the railway from Tangier to Fez, in which all the nations are interested, is put up to public tender, and on the French Government proposing to the Moorish Government the opening of the port of Agadir to international commerce.

Finally, when the system of railways of general interest is planned, the German Government request the French Government to see that the Moorish administration show a genuine regard for the economic interests of Morocco, and that, more particularly, the alignment of the lines of public interest is such as to facilitate, so far as may be possible, connections between the mining districts and the lines of public interest or the ports which form their natural outlet.

Your Excellency was good enough to assure me that as soon as the judicial system referred to in article 9 of the above-mentioned convention shall have been introduced, and the consular courts replaced, the French Government will ensure that German nationals are placed under the new

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jurisdiction in exactly the same conditions as French nationals. I have pleasure in taking note of this assurance, and at the same time in informing your Excellency that, when this judicial system is put into force, in agreement with the Powers, the German Government will consent to the abolition of their consular courts at the same time as those of the other Powers. I would add that, in my view, the expression "changes in the status of protected persons," which is used in article 12 of the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, implies the abrogation, if it be thought necessary, of that part of the Madrid Convention which deals with protected persons and mokhalats ("associés agricoles").

Finally, being desirous of giving to the said convention the character of an act destined not only to remove every cause of conflict between our two countries, but also to strengthen their good relations, we unite in declaring that any disputes which may arise between the contracting parties on the subject of the interpretation and the application of the stipulations of the convention of the 4th November, and which shall not have been settled diplomatically, shall be submitted to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance with the terms of The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907. Terms of Reference shall be drawn up, and the procedure shall follow the rules laid down in the same convention so far as provision to the contrary has not been made by an agreement between the parties at the time of going to arbitration.

DE KIDERLEN.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(TRANSLATION.)

Berlin, November 4, 1911.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE,

I HAVE the honour to take note of the declaration which your Excellency has been good enough to make to me that, in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary

to assume a protectorate over Morocco, the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in the way, and that the adherence of the German Government, accorded in a general manner to the French Government in the first article of the agreement of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, applies as a matter of course to all questions which require regulating provided for in the Algeciras Act.

On the other hand, I have the honour to confirm the statement that, should the German Government wish to acquire from Spain Spanish Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey Islands, France is prepared to waive in Germany's favour the exercise of her preferential rights which she holds by virtue of the treaty of the 27th June, 1900, between France and Spain. I am glad, on my part, to receive the assurance that Germany will not intervene in any special agreements which France and Spain may think fit to conclude with each other on the subject of Morocco, it being understood that Morocco comprises all that part of northern Africa which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa, and the Spanish Colony of Rio de Oro.

I have pleasure also in informing you that, while the German Government abstain from asking that the share to be granted to German industry in the construction of railways shall be fixed in advance, the French Government will welcome the association of interests between nationals of both countries in schemes for which they may respectively obtain a concession.

You may also rest assured that the construction of no other Moorish railway will be put up to public tender before the railway from Tangier to Fez, in which all nations are interested, is put up to public tender, and that the French Government will propose to the Moorish Government the opening of the port of Agadir to international commerce.

Finally, when the system of railways of public interest is planned, the French Government will see that the Moorish administration show a genuine regard for the economic interests of Morocco, and that, more particularly, the alignment of the lines of public interest is such as to facilitate, so far as may be possible, connections between the mining districts and the lines of public interest or the ports which form their natural outlet. Your Excellency may likewise

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rest assured that as soon as the judicial system referred to in article 9 of the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco is introduced, and the consular courts replaced, the French Government will ensure that German nationals are placed under the new jurisdiction in exactly the same conditions as French nationals.

I have, on the other hand, pleasure in taking note of the statement that when this judicial system is put into force, in agreement with the Powers, the German Government will consent to the abolition of their consular courts at the same time as those of the other Powers. I take note also of the statement that, in your Excellency's view, the expression "changes in the status of protected persons," which is used in article 12 of the above-mentioned convention, implies the abrogation, if it be thought necessary, of that part of the Madrid Convention which deals with protected persons and mokhalats ("associés agricoles").

Finally, being desirous of giving to the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, the character of an act destined not only to remove every cause of conflict between our two countries, but also to strengthen their good relations, we are agreed in declaring that any disputes which may arise between the contracting parties on the subject of the interpretation and the application of the stipulations of the said convention, and which shall not have been settled diplomatically, shall be submitted to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance with the terms of The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907.

Terms of Reference shall be drawn up and the procedure shall follow the rules laid down in the same convention, so far as provision to the contrary has not been made, by an agreement between the parties at the time of going to arbitration.

JULES CAMBON.

ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT.

(Signed at London, July 13, 1911.)

PREAMBLE.

THE Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely :

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India ;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China ;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions :—

ARTICLE 1.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE 2.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either

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High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE 3.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

ARTICLE 5.

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE 6.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the

said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

TAKAAKI KATO,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

DECLARATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ENGAGING NOT TO
CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE
PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR.⁽¹⁾

(Signed at London, September 5, 1914.)

THE Undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:—

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war.

The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other allies.

In faith whereof the Undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

⁽¹⁾ [cf. Y. 160, where the date Sept. 4th is incorrectly assigned to the signature of the Declaration.]

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Done at London in triplicate,⁽¹⁾ this 5th day of September, 1914.

⁽¹⁾[Japan became a party to this Declaration on Oct. 19, 1915.]

(L.S.) E. GREY,

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

LES Soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, font la déclaration suivante :

Les Gouvernements britannique, français et russe s'engagent mutuellement à ne pas conclure de paix séparée au cours de la présente guerre.

Les trois Gouvernements conviennent que lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les termes de la paix aucune des Puissances alliées ne pourra poser des conditions de paix sans accord préalable avec chacun des autres alliés.

En foi de quoi les Soussignés ont signé la présente Déclaration et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Londres, en triple original, le 5 septembre, 1914.

(L.S.) E. GREY,

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté britannique.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON,

Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la République française.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF,

Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS SIGNED AT THE
HAGUE, OCTOBER 18, 1907.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾[For text
of other
Hague Con-
ventions,
see Naval
& Military
vols.]

CONVENTION No. 3.

RELATIVE TO THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

ARTICLE 1. The Contracting Powers recognise that hostilities between them must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

2. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not be held to affect them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph. Nevertheless, neutral Powers may not rely on the absence of notification if it be established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war.

3. Article 1 of the present Convention shall take effect in case of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers.

Article 2 applies as between a belligerent Power which is a party to the Convention and neutral Powers which are also parties to the Convention.

(The remaining Articles relate to ratification, procedure, etc.)

[Convention No. 3 was signed and ratified by, among other Powers, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, and Belgium.]

CONVENTION No. 5.

RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS
AND PERSONS IN WAR ON LAND.

CHAPTER I.

THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS.

ARTICLE 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power.

TREATIES

3. Belligerents are likewise forbidden to :—

(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea ;

(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them for purely military purposes on the territory of a neutral Power before the war, and not previously opened for the service of public messages.

4. Corps of combatants must not be formed, nor recruiting agencies opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, to assist the belligerents.

5. A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of neutrality unless such acts have been committed on its own territory.

6. The responsibility of a neutral Power is not involved by the mere fact that persons cross the frontier individually in order to offer their services to one of the belligerents.

7. A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.

8. A neutral Power is not bound to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables, or of wireless telegraphy apparatus, belonging to it or to Companies or to private individuals.

9. A neutral Power must apply impartially to the belligerents every restriction or prohibition which it may enact in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8.

The neutral Power shall see that the above obligation is observed by Companies or private owners of telegraph or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus.

10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

[Convention No. 5 was signed and ratified by, among other Powers, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Belgium and Luxembourg.]

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
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
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